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ABSTRACT 
In Gonzales v. Raich, the United States Supreme Court upheld the application of the 
federal Controlled Substances Act to bar the use of state-grown marijuana for in-
state personal medical use. In so doing, the Court ratified the expansion of Congress’ 
commerce power beyond any known limits. It abandoned the “substantial effects” 
test that it had used since 1937 and applied the “rational basis” test. This Article 
traces the historical development of Congress’ enumerated powers from the earliest 
cases, emphasizing the expansive view of commerce power found in Gibbons v. 
Ogden. From that strong beginning for the commerce power, the Article follows the 
various detours of the United States Supreme Court cases, some cases imposing now 
rejected limits on the commerce power, some setting the foundation for the modern 
test. The main thrust of the Article is to argue that both in terms of history and in 
terms of our federalist form of government that Congress’ commerce power in 
instances not involving the actual crossing of state lines should be limited to local 
activities that in a practical fact-based way have a substantial impact on interstate 
commerce. The Article asserts that the rational basis test should have no role to play 
in determining Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce, that the rational 
basis test is not only historically unsupportable, but that it also represents a failure of 
the Court to play its appropriate role in protecting “Our Federalism.” 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In assessing the scope of Congress’ authority under the 
Commerce Clause, we stress that the task before us is a 
modest one. We need not determine whether 
respondents’ activities, taken in the aggregate, 
substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only 
whether a “rational basis” exists for so concluding.1  
 
In Gonzales v. Raich,2 the United States Supreme Court upheld the 
application of the federal Controlled Substances Act to bar the use of 
state-grown marijuana for in-state personal medical use. In so doing, 
the Court ratified the expansion of Congress’ commerce power beyond 
any known limits. It abandoned the “substantial effects” test that it had 
used since 1937 3  and applied the “rational basis” test. 4  Make no 
mistake about it, the substantial effects test is the correct test based 
upon both Supreme Court precedents and the constitutional division of 
power in our federalist system between the federal government and the 
																																																								
1 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005). 
2 Id. 
3 See, for example, N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 
(1937), where the Court used the “substantial effects test.” In Jones & Laughlin 
Steel, the Court stated that, “Although activities may be intrastate in character 
when separately considered, if they have such a close and substantial relation to 
interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that 
commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot be denied the power 
to exercise that control.” Id. (emphasis added). 
4 The rational basis test is primarily a minimum level of scrutiny used in 
substantive due process and equal protection cases not involving fundamental 
rights or suspect classifications. See e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 
304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (“[R]egulatory legislation affecting ordinary 
commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the 
light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to 
preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the 
knowledge and experience of the legislators.” (emphasis added)). But the 
rational basis test did morph into some Commerce Clause cases. See e.g., 
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303–04 (1964) (“But where we find that 
the legislators, in light of the facts and testimony before them, have 
a rational basis for finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the 
protection of commerce, our investigation is at an end.” (emphasis added)). In 
McClung, the Court upheld Congress’ commerce power under the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act to regulate private racism impacting the interstate shipment of food 
supplies to an in-state restaurant. Id. 
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states. The rational basis test is fundamentally inconsistent with our 
federalist system of government. 
The opening quote from Justice Steven’s opinion in Raich has at 
least three substantive errors. First, the task for the Court in reviewing 
federal enumerated power is far from a “modest one.”5 Determining 
the limits on federal power is one of the Court’s most important jobs. 
Our federalist system of government dividing power between the 
central government and our fifty states requires that the Court enforce 
the limits on federal power. 
Second, in terms of Congress’ power to regulate interstate 
commerce, the Court’s job is specifically to look at the aggregate 
impact of local activity to determine if activity strictly within one state 
has a “substantial effect” on interstate commerce. 6  The substantial 
effects test imposes judicially enforceable limits on federal power over 
local activity strictly in one state. The substantial effects test requires a 
substantial connection between a federal law and some impact on 
interstate commerce and thus imposes limited but specific restrictions 
on Congress’ enumerated power.7 It is a practical fact-based inquiry 
and has the support of history, precedent, and common sense on its 
side. 
Third, the rational basis test is a venerable test for due process and 
equal protection issues, but despite some precedential support, its use 
in determining the scope of federal enumerated commerce power is 
inconsistent with constitutional limits on federal power. The rational 
																																																								
5 As Chief Justice Marshall famously said about the scope of federal power, “But 
the question respecting the extent of the powers actually granted, 
is perpetually arising, and will probably continue to arise, so long as our system 
shall exist. In discussing these questions, the conflicting powers of the general 
and state governments must be brought into view, and the supremacy of their 
respective laws, when they are in opposition, must be settled.” McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 405 (1819). 
6 See the Court’s approach in Wickard v. Filburn, “But even if appellee’s activity 
be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever 
its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on 
interstate commerce . . . .” Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942). Later 
the Court continued, “That appellee’s own contribution to the demand for wheat 
may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal 
regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together with that of many 
others similarly situated, is far from trivial.” Id. at 127–28. 
7 As the Court said in N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, “We have often said 
that interstate commerce itself is a practical conception. It is equally true that 
interferences with that commerce must be appraised by a judgment that does not 
ignore actual experience.” Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 41–42. 
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basis test for determining enumerated powers essentially allows 
Congress to define its own powers and is virtually without identifiable 
limits; it is little more than a judicial rubber stamp on congressional 
legislation. 8  The logic of the rational basis due process and equal 
protection cases is that the political processes will prevent abuse, thus 
precluding the necessity of court review.9 Our federalist system of 
government dividing power between the central government and our 
fifty states requires that the Court enforce the limits on federal power. 
Congress, if left to its own devices, will pass laws on anything that 
seems politically expedient.10 The idea that the constitutional limits on 
federal power will be politically self-correcting is fanciful if not 
ludicrous. 
In short, the Court’s job in determining the scope of federal power 
is crucial. The substantial effects test is the correct test for determining 
Congress’ commerce power to regulate intrastate commerce, and the 
																																																								
8 It is possible that the rational basis test in the commerce power cases may be a 
less permissive level of review than in the due process cases. In the due process 
cases, there are two moving targets. The law limiting substantive interests must 
rationally relate to some legitimate interest, but as applied that means some 
conceivable relationship to some conceivably legitimate purpose. In commerce 
power cases, there is only one moving target; the federal law limiting local 
activities must at least conceivably relate to a fixed object, Congress’ 
enumerated power to regulate commerce among the several states. The Court 
has not indicated that the rational basis test might be more vigorous in the 
commerce power cases. 
9 See, e.g., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979) (“The Constitution presumes 
that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will 
eventually be rectified by the democratic process and that judicial intervention is 
generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a political branch 
has acted. Thus, we will not overturn such a statute unless the varying treatment 
of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any 
combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the 
legislature’s actions were irrational.” (footnote omitted)). 
10 See, for example, Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1 (1999), a case 
clarifying the intent requirement in the Federal Anti-Car Theft Act of 1992, 
which made it a federal crime to use a firearm to steal a motor vehicle that had 
been shipped in interstate commerce. So-called carjacking was likely a crime in 
every state. Other than responding to the spate of publicity in the early 1990s 
from a number of local carjackings, there was no reason whatsoever for 
Congress to pass such a law, yet Congress used the barest connection to 
interstate commerce to pass a law no rational person would think was needed. It 
all culminated in the waste of judicial review, with Holloway resolving a 
conflict in the circuits as to the Act’s definition of specific intent. See id. at 12. 
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rational basis test is the wrong test.11 This Article will first trace the 
historical development of substantial effects test as a limit on federal 
power. It will argue that the test is an important limit on federal power, 
balancing the need to protect our federalist system and its division of 
power between the central government and the states with the 
flexibility that Congress needs to address national issues. Second, the 
Article will develop how the rational basis test became part of the test 
for federal commerce power and why it is inconsistent with 
constitutional limits. The Article will describe the use of the rational 
basis test as a means of achieving federal power to protect violations 
of basic civil rights by private entities totally within one state, a power 
denied to the federal government by a narrow view of Congress’ 
power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and by the 
normal application of the substantial effects test in terms of commerce 
power. The Article will trace the movement of the rational basis test 
from a test in a few commerce power cases to the all-purpose test it 
appears to be in the Raich case. 
II. MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND—OUR FEDERALISM 
Our Federalism12 refers to our form of government, a sharing of 
power between the now fifty states and the central government as 
																																																								
11 See James M. McGoldrick, Katzenbach v. McClung: The Abandonment of 
Federalism in the Name of Rational Basis, 14 BYU J. PUB. L. 1, 1 (1999) for my 
first discussion on this issue, which I addressed some twenty-years ago. Other 
than as specifically cited, no part of this article comes from my earlier effort. 
12 Justice Black stated the concept well, “[T]he National Government will fare best 
if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions 
in their separate ways. This, perhaps for lack of a better and clearer way to 
describe it, is referred to by many as ‘Our Federalism,’ and one familiar with the 
profound debates that ushered our Federal Constitution into existence is bound 
to respect those who remain loyal to the ideals and dreams of 
‘Our Federalism,’ . . . What the concept does represent is a system in which 
there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National 
Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it may be 
to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to 
do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of 
the States. It should never be forgotten that this slogan, ‘Our Federalism,’ born 
in the early struggling days of our Union of States, occupies a highly important 
place in our Nation’s history and its future.” Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 
44–45 (1971). Under the first government, after gaining our freedom from the 
British, the Articles of Confederation created more of a confederation, a loose 
association of the first thirteen colonies, as the states were then called, in a 
shared form of government. There was a central government only if the most 
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represented by the Congress. The best description of this federalist 
form of government is not in the original Constitution13 but in the 
Tenth Amendment, which was part of the later added Bill of Rights: 
“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, 
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.”14 
Like all discussions of our federalist form of government, the 
Supreme Court’s part of that story begins in 1819 with McCulloch v. 
Maryland.15 Chief Justice John Marshall could hardly have been more 
extravagant in his claim of importance for the case involving 
Maryland’s tax of between one and two percent16 on the face value of 
																																																																																																																																			
minimal sense; the central government that existed was fully subject to state 
control. Under the Articles of Confederation, each of the colonies had equal 
power, and it took a consensus of all thirteen colonies for it to be amended. The 
central government, to the degree that there was one, only had the power as 
granted to it by the vote of all of the colonies. 
13 The United States Constitution was ratified by the requisite number of states in 
1787 and replaced the Articles of Confederation as the embodiment of our 
national and state form of government. It is of passing interest that the new 
Constitution was itself of questionable legality in that it provided that only nine 
of the states had to approve it for it to replace the Articles of Confederation. 
Eventually, all of the original thirteen colonies ratified the new Constitution 
seeming to effectively moot any claim of illegality. Unlike the Articles of 
Confederation, the Constitution specifically gave the central government a 
number of enumerated powers, the overwhelming majority found in Article I, 
Section 8, Clauses 1 through 18, with Clause 18 being the Necessary and Proper 
Clause. 
14 U.S. CONST. amend. X. In furtherance of a promise made during the ratification 
debate for the United States Constitution to add civil rights protections to the 
United States Constitution, the first Congress in 1789 proposed twelve 
amendments to the Constitution, ten of which were ratified by the requisite 
number of states in 1791, becoming part of the constitution. The Twenty-
Seventh Amendment was one of twelve proposed amendments by Congress in 
1789, but it was not ratified until 1992. The Twenty-Seventh Amendment limits 
when a congressional pay raise becomes effective. See Schaffer v. Clinton, 240 
F.3d 878, 880 (10th Cir. 2001). Schaffer held that the plaintiffs did not have 
standing to challenge a cost of living increase as being contrary to the Twenty-
Seventh Amendment. Id. at 886. 
15 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). McCulloch and the shortened form 
M’Culloch are used interchangeably by various sources, but McCulloch seems 
the more modern choice. 
16 The taxing scheme was hardly a model of logical clarity. The tax started out at 
2% on a $5 Bank of the United States note, and then reduced to 1.5% on a $20 
note, 1% on a $50 note, only to revert to 2% on a $500 note. In lieu of the tax on 
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banknotes issued by the federally chartered Bank of the United 
States.17 
The constitution of our country, in its most interesting 
and vital parts, is to be considered; the conflicting 
powers of the government of the Union and of its 
members, as marked in that constitution, are to be 
discussed; and an opinion given, which may essentially 
influence the great operations of the government. No 
tribunal can approach such a question without a deep 
sense of its importance, and of the awful responsibility 
involved in its decision.18 
Marshall got quickly to the issue, “The first question made in the cause 
is—has congress power to incorporate a bank?”19 If Congress had the 
power to incorporate the Bank of the United States, then the state tax 
on it was unconstitutional.20 Under the Supremacy Clause,21 federal 
																																																																																																																																			
the individual bank notes, the Bank could also pay a yearly tax of $15,000. 
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 321. 
17 The Bank of the United States was a quasi-public entity which helped the 
federal government manage its basic financial obligations, but it was politically 
controversial for many reasons, including its connection to the Federalist Party 
long since eclipsed by Thomas Jefferson and the Democratic Republicans, its 
lending policies which led to failure of some state banks, and a high level of 
corruption, including at the Baltimore branch at issue in the McCulloch case. As 
summarized by Professors Plous and Baker, “In the minds of much of the public 
the Bank of the United States was a ruthless and irresponsible institution, 
controlled by a small group of private bankers for personal profit. The federal 
government held a minor share of stock and held no actual control over the 
Bank’s policies. While much of the antagonism was emotional, and while the 
Bank perhaps received more blame for economic conditions than it deserved, a 
good deal of the disrepute was justified (as indicated above) by poor 
management and selfish profit-seeking.” Harold J. Plous & Gordon E. 
Baker, Mcculloch v. Maryland: Right Principle, Wrong Case, 9 STAN. L. REV. 
710, 719 (1957). 
18 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 400. There are some who agree with Marshall’s 
assessment of the importance of the case. See Plous & Gordon, supra note 17, at 
710–20 (“Few cases in the history of American constitutional law can match the 
significance and long-range implications of McCulloch v. Maryland. Often 
considered the greatest of Chief Justice John Marshall’s decisions, it is familiar 
to later generations of students not only as the landmark case in the development 
of American federalism, but also as a classic example of solemn Marshallian 
rhetoric.”). 
19 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 401. 
20 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
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law is supreme over inconsistent state law and Marshall said that a 
state tax would necessarily be the “power to destroy”22 the federally 
chartered bank, thus inconsistent with federal law, and under the 
Supremacy Clause would be invalid.23 
The supremacy of federal law over inconsistent state law seems 
incontrovertible, and Marshall had little doubt as to Congress’ power 
to incorporate the bank.24 In upholding federal power, Marshall framed 
the basic black letter law for every federal law: “This government is 
acknowledged by all, to be one of enumerated powers.”25 But despite 
the fact that the Constitution did not anywhere mention the enumerated 
power to incorporate a bank,26 this black letter rule was no obstacle. 
The Constitution empowered the central government “to lay and 
																																																																																																																																			
21 Article VI, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution reads: “This Constitution, 
and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and 
all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United 
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall 
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding.” See generally, Michael D. Ramsey, The Supremacy 
Clause, Original Meaning, and Modern Law, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 559 (2013), 
which nicely summarizes the various historical and scholarly issues related to 
the Supremacy Clause, and leads to Professor Ramsey’s straight-forward 
conclusion, “The Constitution’s text gives Congress power to displace state laws 
to the extent state laws interfere with federal interests.” Id. at 593. 
22 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 427. 
23 Id. at 405 (“If any one proposition could command the universal assent of 
mankind, we might expect it would be this—that the government of the Union, 
though limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of action.”). As for the 
application of the Supremacy Clause to the state tax, Marshall stated, “That the 
power to tax involves the power to destroy; that the power to destroy may defeat 
and render useless the power to create; that there is a plain repugnance in 
conferring on one government a power to control the constitutional measures of 
another, which other, with respect to those very measures, is declared to be 
supreme over that which exerts the control, are propositions not to be denied.” 
Id. at 431. 
24 See id. at 401–02. It was of some importance to Marshall that the law 
incorporating the bank had the imprimatur of the very first Congress and that it 
was passed after open political debate: “The power now contested was exercised 
by the first congress elected under the present constitution. The bill for 
incorporating the Bank of the United States did not steal upon an unsuspecting 
legislature, and pass unobserved. Its principle was completely understood, and 
was opposed with equal zeal and ability.” Id. at 401–02. 
25 Id. at 405. 
26 Id. at 406 (“Among the enumerated powers, we do not find that of establishing a 
bank or creating a corporation.”). 
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collect taxes; to borrow money; to regulate commerce; to declare and 
conduct a war; and to raise and support armies and navies,”27 and this 
power over the “sword and the purse”28 included the implied power29 
to select means to accomplish the enumerated powers or ends.30 
Nonetheless, this implied power to choose means to accomplish 
enumerated ends was not without limits.31 The Constitution required 
that means must bear a “necessary and proper” relationship to the 
enumerated ends. 32  Necessary, Marshall said, did not mean “an 
absolute physical necessity” but rather “no more than that one thing is 
convenient, or useful, or essential to another.” 33  Marshall later 
																																																								
27 Id. at 407. The power to tax and the power to borrow are found in Clause 1 of 
Article I, Section 8; the power to regulate commerce in Clause 3; the power to 
declare war in Clause 11; the power to support armies in Clause 12; and the 
power to maintain a navy in Clause 13. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 406 (“But there is no phrase in the instrument which, like the articles of 
confederation, excludes incidental or implied powers; and which requires that 
everything granted shall be expressly and minutely described.”). 
30 Id. at 409–10 (“The government which has a right to do an act, and has imposed 
on it, the duty of performing that act, must, according to the dictates of reason, 
be allowed to select the means . . . .”). 
31 Id. at 411–12 (“But the constitution of the United States has not left the right of 
congress to employ the necessary means, for the execution of the powers 
conferred on the government, to general reasoning. To its enumeration of 
powers is added, that of making ‘all laws which shall be necessary and proper, 
for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by 
this constitution, in the government of the United States, or in any department 
thereof.’”). 
32 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (“[The Congress shall have Power] To make all 
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the 
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the 
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”) (the 
bracketed addition comes from Article I, Section 8, Clause 1)). 
33 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 413 (“Does it always import an absolute physical 
necessity, so strong, that one thing to which another may be termed necessary, 
cannot exist without that other? We think it does not. If reference be had to its 
use, in the common affairs of the world, or in approved authors, we find that it 
frequently imports no more than that one thing is convenient, or useful, or 
essential to another.”). The Supreme Court in United States v. Comstock used a 
version of this phrase in finding that Congress had power under the Commerce 
Clause to impose civil sentences to sexually dangerous persons who had been 
convicted of an underlying federal crime, “Accordingly, the Necessary and 
Proper Clause makes clear that the Constitution’s grants of specific federal 
legislative authority are accompanied by broad power to enact laws that are 
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concluded, “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the 
constitution, and all means which are appropriate . . . .” 34  Of the 
choices “convenient,” “useful,” “essential” or “appropriate,” history 
shows that the one word that best sums up the necessary and proper 
requirement in the Constitution for the relationship between means and 
enumerated ends is “appropriate.” If the word appropriate is hardly 
conclusive in McCulloch itself for the required means to the ends 
relationship, there is little doubt that it has carried the day in history. 
Of the seventeen amendments added to the United States Constitution 
since McCulloch, eight of them included enabling or enforcement 
clauses, little necessary and proper clauses, each of the eight including 
the word “appropriate” in enabling Congress to enforce the substantive 
provisions of the amendment.35 
In McCulloch, Marshall does not actually attempt to determine if 
the Bank was appropriate to any particular enumerated power. He 
readily acknowledged that there was no enumerated power to 
incorporate a bank or anything else, but among the enumerated powers 
was the power “to lay and collect taxes; to borrow money; to regulate 
commerce; to declare and conduct a war; and to raise and support 
armies and navies.”36  While the power to collect taxes, to borrow 
money, perhaps even to regulate commerce seemed to have the most 
																																																																																																																																			
‘convenient, or useful’ or ‘conducive’ to the authority’s ‘beneficial exercise.’” 
United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 133–34 (2010). 
34 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421. 
35 The first amendment to use the term appropriate and typical of the other seven is 
the Thirteenth Amendment, which reads, “Section 2. Congress shall have power 
to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.” The eight amendments using 
the term “appropriate” as part of its enabling clause are the Thirteenth (the 
prohibition of slavery), the Fourteenth (the protection of privileges and 
immunities, due process, and equal protection rights), the Fifteenth (the bar on 
use of race in voting), the Eighteenth (the prohibition of manufacture and sale of 
alcohol), the Nineteenth (the grant of the right to vote without regard to gender), 
the Twenty-Fourth (the ban on poll tax for voting in federal elections), and the 
Twenty-Sixth (the grant of eighteen-year-olds the right to vote). The Eighteenth 
Amendment is unique in that both the federal government and the states are 
granted the “concurrent power” to pass appropriate legislation. States are not 
limited by the enumerated power concept, and thus in the Eighteenth 
Amendment the point likely was to allow the states to regulate alcohol sales 
without the normal restrictions of the Dormant Commerce Clause. 
36 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 407. 
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logical connection to the Bank of the United States, Marshall took the 
national security route:37 
Throughout this vast republic, from the St. Croix to the 
Gulf of Mexico, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, 
revenue is to be collected and expended, armies are to 
be marched and supported. 38  The exigencies of the 
nation may require, that the treasure raised in the north 
should be transported to the south, that raised in the 
east, conveyed to the west, or that this order should be 
reversed. Is that construction of the constitution to be 
preferred, which would render these operations 
difficult, hazardous and expensive?39 
Other than the general reference to a number of different possible 
enumerated powers and specifically the need to pay the salary of 
federal troops, Marshall made no effort to determine with which power 
the Bank of the United States was appropriate. He just made it so by 
concluding, “After the most deliberate consideration, it is the 
unanimous and decided opinion of this court, that the act to 
incorporate the Bank of the United States is a law made in pursuance 
of the constitution, and is a part of the supreme law of the land.”40 
																																																								
37 The Court’s resort to national security to justify federal power is not without 
controversy. But its use in McCulloch is hardly the worst offender. See 
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217–18 (1944), abrogated by Trump 
v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (“In the light of the principles we announced 
in the Hirabayashi case, we are unable to conclude that it was beyond the war 
power of Congress and the Executive to exclude those of Japanese ancestry 
from the West Coast war area at the time they did.”). 
38 This phrasing reminds one of the Marine Hymn, “From the Halls of Montezuma 
[t]o the shores of Tripoli,” see USA FLAG SITE, The Marine’s Hymn Lyrics, 
http://www.usa-flag-site.org/song-lyrics/the-marines-hymn/ 
[https://perma.cc/5DH3-3S6N] (last visited Jan. 29, 2019), but unlike the Marine 
Hymn the reference here appears to be just to areas geographically remote from 
each other, and not related to military battles. St Croix seems to refer to a river 
in Minnesota, which would be the North to the Gulf of Mexico’s South. See 
NAT’L PARK SERV., Saint Croix, 
https://www.nps.gov/sacn/planyourvisit/maps.htm [https://perma.cc/S7L6-
LKZJ] (last updated Feb. 15, 2019). St. Croix is also one of the U.S. Virgin 
Islands and was purchased from Denmark in 1917 for $25,000,000. See VINOW, 
Virgin Islands History, http://www.vinow.com/general_usvi/history/ 
[https://perma.cc/3EGL-4LXJ] (last visited Feb. 17, 2019). 
39 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 408. 
40 Id. at 424. 
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Despite McCulloch’s importance as a case in defining federal 
enumerated power broadly, it was singularly unhelpful in 
demonstrating how to determine if any particular means was 
appropriate.41 Thomas Jefferson had, several years before, expressed 
concern about unbounded federal power. As described by Justice 
Kennedy in a concurring opinion in United States v. Comstock, “[A]s 
Thomas Jefferson warned, congressional powers become completely 
unbounded by linking one power to another ad infinitum in a veritable 
game of ‘this is the house that Jack built.’”42 Nothing in McCulloch 
																																																								
41 In one of the first cases to refer to the holding of McCulloch, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court said only, “The term necessary, is not however to be confined to 
cases of absolute necessity, but extends to cases of convenience also.” Bank of 
the N. Liberties v. Cresson, 1825 WL 1907, at *4 (Pa. Apr. 8, 1825). McCulloch 
was cited in a few earlier cases, but generally only as to the holding related to 
the Bank. A Connecticut state court concluded its discussion of the legitimacy of 
the Bank with these obsequious words, “I am, therefore, clearly of opinion, that 
the act of Congress incorporating the bank of the United States, is a law made in 
pursuance of the constitution; and advise, that judgment be rendered for the 
defendants. In coming to this conclusion, I have been relieved from an anxious 
responsibility, by the luminous and cogent reasons of Chief Justice Marshall, 
in McCulloch v. Maryland, upon the general question of the constitutionality of 
the charter . . . .” Magill v. Parsons, 4 Conn. 317, 322 (Conn. 1822). 
42 United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 150 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
In Comstock, the Supreme Court found within federal commerce power a federal 
law providing for civil commitment of sexually dangerous predators, “Taken 
together, these considerations lead us to conclude that the statute is a ‘necessary 
and proper’ means of exercising the federal authority that permits Congress to 
create federal criminal laws, to punish their violation, to imprison violators, to 
provide appropriately for those imprisoned, and to maintain the security of those 
who are not imprisoned but who may be affected by the federal imprisonment of 
others.” Id. at 149. Kennedy referenced the original sources: “Letter from 
Thomas Jefferson to Edward Livingston (Apr. 30, 1800), 31 The Papers of 
Thomas Jefferson 547 (B. Oberg ed.2004).” Id. at 150. Kennedy also referred to 
a modern expression of a similar concern by the Tenth Circuit in United States 
v. Patton, 451 F.3d 615, 628 (10th Cir. 2006). Patton quoted the following 
language from Judge Posner in United States v. Marrero, “[W]e are in a new era 
and must be wary of such arguments as that the theft of a bottle of aspirin from a 
person’s home ‘affects’ commerce, provided only that the bottle was shipped 
from another state, because the homeowner would be likely to buy another 
bottle from his local druggist to replace the one that was stolen and the druggist 
would replace that sale by purchasing another bottle interstate.” Patton, 451 
F.3d at 628 (quoting United States v. Marrero, 299 F.3d 653, 656 (7th Cir. 
2002)). Marrero upheld the application of the federal Hobbs Act, which makes a 
federal crime of robberies that obstruct interstate or foreign commerce, to the 
robbery of two drug dealers who had been enticed by federal agents to travel 
from Detroit, Michigan to Chicago, Illinois. See generally Marrero, 299 F.3d 
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necessarily supports “the house that Jack built” logic for federal 
enumerated power, but neither does it alleviate that concern. Pretty 
much, all Marshall said was that the Bank could be helpful—and thus 
appropriate—in paying federal troops in remote areas of North 
America. 
III. GIBBONS V. OGDEN—COMMERCE, TO REGULATE, AND THE 
PREPOSITION 
The first enumerated power to be defined with any detail43 was the 
commerce power44 in Gibbons v. Ogden,45 and the breadth of power 
recognized in Gibbons was “embracing and penetrating” in its scope.46 
																																																																																																																																			
653. That interstate trip was enough to bring the case within federal commerce 
power. Id. at 655. “The Hobbs Act criminalizes robberies that obstruct or 
otherwise affect interstate or foreign commerce, and the main issue raised by 
this appeal [was] whether the robbery of the drug dealers had the requisite effect 
on commerce.” Id. at 654. Patton found within Congress’ commerce power a 
federal law barring convicted felons from owning body armor because the law 
applied only to an item that had “moved across state lines at some point in its 
existence.” Patton, 451 F.3d at 635. 
43 Even at the lower court level, there were few attempts to define federal power as 
to any enumerated power. Most of the early lower court cases involved little 
more than a cite to McCulloch. One of the early lower federal court cases 
involved the power of Congress to give jurisdiction “in any circuit court of the 
United States” as to any case involving the Bank of the United States. Bank of 
the U.S. v. Roberts, 2 F. Cas. 728, 729 (Cir. Ct. Ky. 1822). One South Carolina 
court found that McCulloch did not apply to a Charleston city tax on Bank stock 
held by an individual residing in Charleston, “I think it has been before shown, 
that the interest of the United States and the individual stockholders are distinct 
and independent.” Bulow v. City Council of Charleston, 10 S.C.L. (1 Nott & 
McC.) 527, 530 (S.C. Const. Ct. App. 1819). 
44 See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 301–02 (1964). The Court in 
Katzenbach summarized Congress’ interstate commerce power in Article 1, 
Section 8, Clause 3 and Clause 18 as conferring “upon Congress the power ‘(t)o 
regulate Commerce . . . among the several States’ and Clause 18 of the same 
Article grants it the power ‘(t)o make all Laws which shall be necessary and 
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers’ . . . .” Id. The 
Commerce Clause has been the subject of much litigation. As one lower court 
put it, “In spite of its simplicity and clarity and because of the constantly 
increasing ‘interpenetrations of modern society,’ it has spawned thousands of 
cases.” McClung v. Katzenbach, 233 F. Supp. 815, 821 (N.D. Ala.), rev’d, 379 
U.S. 294 (1964). 
45 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824). 
46 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942). The Court in Wickard stated, “At 
the beginning Chief Justice Marshall described the Federal commerce power 
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Gibbons paralleled McCulloch in that both cases involved a conflict 
between federal law and state law with federal law being supreme over 
state law if the federal law was passed pursuant to some federally 
enumerated power. In Gibbons, New York and New Jersey had given 
a monopoly on steamboat traffic between New York and New Jersey 
to Fulton and Livingston, who were credited with the invention of the 
steamboat, and who had, in turn, granted a license to Ogden. 47 
Marshall read federal law as giving Gibbons a license to operate 
interstate, including between New York and New Jersey.48 If Congress 
had the federal power to give Gibbons a license, then the New York 
and New Jersey monopoly to Fulton and Livingston—and their 
																																																																																																																																			
with a breadth never yet exceeded.” Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist would seem to 
disagree that Gibbons was the pinnacle of commerce power, “Jones & Laughlin 
Steel, Darby, and Wickard ushered in an era of Commerce Clause jurisprudence 
that greatly expanded the previously defined authority of Congress under that 
Clause.” United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556 (1995). Lopez found that 
Congress did not have the commerce power to criminalize the possession of a 
gun on public school grounds. Id. at 551. 
47 Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 1–2. 
48 Marshall latched on to the Federal Coastal Act of 1793 as being the source of 
Gibbon’s license. It is unlikely that the federal law had any such intention. As 
argued in the case, the law gave “no right to trade; and that its sole purpose is to 
confer the American character,” that is, it was intended only to register a vessel 
as being from the United States. Id. at 21. Marshall concluded that the law’s use 
of the term “license” meant otherwise and was “founded too clearly in the words 
of the law, to require the support of any additional observations.” Id. Marshall 
relied on the federal law and the Supremacy Clause to avoid having to decide 
whether the Commerce Clause’s grant of power to the federal government all by 
itself prevented New York and New Jersey from regulating items in interstate 
commerce. This use of the Commerce Clause to limit state power is popularly 
referred to as the Dormant or Negative Commerce Clause and is beyond the 
scope of this article except as to its impact on federal enumerated power. Daniel 
Webster arguing for Gibbons relied primarily on the Dormant Commerce Clause 
argument that the grant of power to Congress to regulate commerce meant that 
the states could not. Id. at 209. Marshall was sympathetic to the Dormant 
Commerce Clause argument and conceded, “There is great force in this 
argument, and the Court is not satisfied that it has been refuted.” Id. But 
Marshall said that he did not need to resolve whether Congress’ power in the 
constitution by itself precluded state regulations of interstate commerce. In 
Gibbons, a much easier argument was available to Marshall. There was a federal 
law, the state law was inconsistent with it, and under the Supremacy Clause, the 
state law was invalid. Marshall summarized the importance of the Supremacy 
Clause, “In every such case, the act of Congress, or the treaty, is supreme; and 
the law of the State, though enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted, 
must yield to it.” Id. at 211. 
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franchise to Ogden—was inconsistent with that federal license and, 
under the Supremacy Clause, was invalid. 
Marshall’s opinion first defines federal commerce power broadly, 
it then expresses agreement with the Dormant Commerce Clause 
argument, and finally concludes that a federal license preempted the 
state monopoly. 
As Marshall read it, the Federal Coastal Act of 1793 gave Gibbons 
a federal license to operate his steamboat Bellona anywhere in the 
coastal areas of the United States: “The license must be understood to 
be what it purports to be, a legislative authority to the steamboat 
Bellona, ‘to be employed in carrying on the coasting trade, for one 
year from this date.’” 49  Since this included in the case steamboat 
traffic between New York and New Jersey, it would seem to easily fall 
within Congress’ power to regulate commerce among the several 
states, but Marshall’s definition of commerce power, which gave each 
element the broadest definition possible, went far beyond the facts of 
the case.50 
Marshall begins his discussion of the federal commerce power 
with the text of Article I, Section 8, Clause 3: “The words are, 
‘Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign 
nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.’”51 
He then defines it in this order (1) the noun “commerce,” (2) the 
preposition “among,” and finally (3) the verb “to regulate.” 
Surprisingly, it is his definition of the preposition “among” that 
bedevils us to this day. As to the easy parts of the definitions, Marshall 
said that commerce included all forms of commercial intercourse,52 
																																																								
49 Id. at 214. 
50 See id. at 189–90. Indeed, before turning to the commerce power itself, Marshall 
rejected the notion that federal enumerated power should be strictly constructed, 
and though not citing McCulloch at all, restated his approach in McCulloch that 
federal powers were to be interpreted generously: “This instrument contains an 
enumeration of powers expressly granted by the people to their government. It 
has been said, that these powers ought to be construed strictly. But why ought 
they to be so construed? Is there one sentence in the constitution which gives 
countenance to this rule? In the last of the enumerated powers, that which 
grants, expressly, the means for carrying all others into execution, Congress is 
authorized ‘to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper’ for the 
purpose.” Id. at 187. 
51 Id. at 189. 
52 Id. at 189–90 (“Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more: it is 
intercourse. It describes the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts 
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including navigation. 53  The power “to regulate” was “complete,”54 
“plenary,”55 and only limited by the power of the people to vote.56 It is 
hard to imagine a more comprehensive definition of either 
“commerce” or “to regulate,” but the definitions, though expansive, 
hardly seem revolutionary. Commerce not only included the horse and 
buggy, but also steamboat traffic, intercontinental jets, and, perhaps in 
the future, the Starship Enterprise. The verb to regulate included not 
only the power to impose conditions but also the power to eliminate 
interstate commerce altogether. 
But despite the broadness of the definitions of commerce and to 
regulate, it is the definition of the preposition57 “among”58 that was so 
																																																																																																																																			
of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying 
on that intercourse.”). 
53 Id. at 190 (“All America understands, and has uniformly understood, the word 
‘commerce,’ to comprehend navigation.”). 
54 Id. at 196 (“[The commerce] power, like all others vested in Congress, is 
complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no 
limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution.”). 
55 Id. at 197 (“[Congress’ power over commerce] is plenary as to those objects, the 
power over commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, is 
vested in Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single government . . . .”). 
More specifically, the existence of the states did not limit federal power. 
56 Id. (“[T]he influence which their constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as 
in many other instances, as that, for example, of declaring war, the sole 
restraints on which they have relied, to secure them from its abuse. They are the 
restraints on which the people must often rely solely, in all representative 
governments.”). 
57 Dictionary.com defines a preposition as “any member of a class of words found 
in many languages that are used before nouns, pronouns, or other substantives to 
form phrases functioning as modifiers of verbs, nouns, or adjectives, and that 
typically express a spatial, temporal, or other relationship, as in, on, by, to, 
since.” Preposition, DICTIONARY.COM, 
http://www.dictionary.com/browse/preposition?s=t [https://perma.cc/9PQR-
TRLH] (last visited Feb. 17, 2019). While prepositions are typically 
insignificant connectors, I label “among” The Preposition because to this day its 
ambiguity and potential breadth continue to confound the relationship of 
commerce to states and activities within the states. Cf. J.M. Balkin, The 
Footnote, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 275 (1989) (where Professor Balkin elevates the 
famous footnote number 4 in United States v. Carolene Products Co., to 
legendary status with The Ohio State and The City (San Francisco)). Carolene 
Products is commonly cited as the origin of the rational basis test for due 
process issues, but in Footnote 4 it recognized that laws impacting rights such as 
free speech or impacting minority rights might get a higher level of review. 
Prepositions are stinky little words, and one should never end a sentence with 
one for it is considered only slightly less gauche than blowing your nose on your 
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sweeping that it is at the core of even modern cases such as Raich. 
Congress had the power to regulate commerce “with” foreign nations 
and the Indian tribes but comparatively it had the power to regulate 
“commerce among the several states.” It is of interest that the framers 
used the preposition “with” for foreign commerce and “among” with 
regard to interstate commerce, but it is hard to draw any conclusions 
from that different choice. “Commerce among the States must, of 
necessity, be commerce with the States,” is how Marshall summed up 
the different prepositions. 59  In practice, however, there is no real 
difference between Congress’ commerce power with foreign nations 
and its power among the several states.60 
																																																																																																																																			
napkin. And what devils they are, suddenly converting pronouns from the first 
or second person to the third person; if a she does not become a her after a 
preposition, it is a mark of bad grammar that trips up even the most literate 
among us. See The I’s Have It, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2009), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/24/opinion/24oconner.html?_r=1 
[https://perma.cc/7JF5-C4ST] (“Since his election [] president [Obama] has 
been roundly criticized by bloggers for using “I” instead of “me” in phrases like 
“a very personal decision for Michelle and I” or “the main disagreement with 
John and I” or “graciously invited Michelle and I.”). 
58 The number one definition of among in Dictionary.com is “in, into, or through 
the midst of; in association or connection with; surrounded by: He was among 
friends.” Among, DICTIONARY.COM, 
http://www.dictionary.com/browse/among?s=t [https://perma.cc/ZR6H-PUFV] 
(last visited Feb.17, 2019). While the definition works with the constitutional 
power, the example does not. Synonyms include “between, in the midst of, in 
the middle of, with, in the thick of, surrounded by, betwixt, encompassed by, in 
dispersion through, amid, and amidst.” Among, THESAURUS.COM, 
https://www.thesaurus.com/browse/among [https://perma.cc/QF9U-3VF4] (last 
visited Feb. 17, 2019). And antonyms include “away from, outside, separate.” 
Id. 
59 Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196. 
60 Id. at 193–94 (“It has, we believe, been universally admitted, that these words 
comprehend every species of commercial intercourse between the United States 
and foreign nations. No sort of trade can be carried on between this country and 
any other, to which this power does not extend.”). And Congress’ power over 
foreign commerce certainly includes commerce that begins within the internal 
boundaries of each of the states. See id. at 195 (“If it exists within the States, if a 
foreign voyage may commence or terminate at a port within a State, then the 
power of Congress may be exercised within a State.”). In some ways, Congress’ 
power over foreign commerce is more comprehensive since there are no 
federalist concerns to limit its power over foreign commerce. In other ways, 
Congress’ power is less comprehensive in that, unlike interstate commerce 
power, there could be no claim that Congress’ power over foreign commerce 
gives Congress the right to regulate internal matters of foreign countries. 
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Marshall gives an all-encompassing definition of among. Marshall 
defined among to mean “intermingled with” which to him meant that 
commerce among the several states did not stop at the borders of each 
state but included the interior of the state as well.61 Certainly, among 
could mean intermingled with in that a person might be found among 
those or intermingled with those protesting the separation of children 
at the border, but it is hardly the most logical meaning of among. The 
most logical definition would seem to be the common synonym for 
among, that is, “between” the several states. By picking a broader 
definition, Marshall gives support for congressional regulation of 
matters totally within one state. As he puts it, “Commerce among the 
States, cannot stop at the external boundary line of each State, but may 
be introduced into the interior.”62 Logically, this has to be true. The 
border is but a line in the sand where nothing happens; commerce has 
to cross that line. Or as Marshall reasoned, “Can a trading expedition 
between two adjoining States, commence and terminate outside of 
each? And if the trading intercourse be between two States remote 
from each other, must it not commence in one, terminate in the other, 
and probably pass through a third?”63  One cannot argue with that 
logic, but Marshall took it a step further. 
He acknowledged that among did not include “that commerce, 
which is completely internal, which is carried on between man and 
man in a State, or between different parts of the same State, and which 
does not extend to or affect other States.” 64  Going back to the 
preposition, “Comprehensive as the word ‘among’ is, it may very 
properly be restricted to that commerce which concerns more States 
than one.”65 That is, it did not include “the completely interior traffic 
of a State”66 or “the exclusively internal commerce of a State.”67 
																																																																																																																																			
Congress’ power to regulate commerce with foreign nations includes that 
portion within any state, but its power does not reach into the internal commerce 
of any foreign country. 
61 Id. at 194 (“The subject to which the power is next applied, is to commerce 
‘among the several States.’ The word ‘among’ means intermingled with. A thing 
which is among others, is intermingled with them.”). 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 196. 
64 Id. at 194. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 195. 
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Though among did not include commerce exclusively within one 
state, there was an important qualifying phrase that has carried the day: 
“which does not extend to or affect other States.”68 Out of this would 
come what is called the Affectation Doctrine—“among the several 
states” included local activity that affected other states. To emphasize 
that this qualifying phrase was no accident, Marshall includes the 
Affectation Doctrine in his summary of his definition of among: 
The genius and character of the whole government 
seem to be, that its action is to be applied to all the 
external concerns of the nation, and to those internal 
concerns which affect the States generally; but not to 
those which are completely within a particular State, 
which do not affect other States, and with which it is not 
necessary to interfere, for the purpose of executing 
some of the general powers of the government. The 
completely internal commerce of a State, then, may be 
considered as reserved for the State itself.69 
In short, Congress’ commerce power included (1) “all the external 
concerns of the nation,” (2) “those internal concerns which affect the 
States generally,” but (3) “not to those which are completely within a 
particular state and which do not affect other states,” that is, not to 
“[t]he completely internal commerce of a State.” And this definition of 
among finds itself in the most common framing of Congress’ power to 
regulate interstate commerce: “First, Congress can regulate 
the channels of interstate commerce. Second, Congress has authority 
to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce and 
persons or things in interstate commerce. Third, Congress has the 
power to regulate activities that substantially 
affect interstate commerce.”70 
																																																								
68 Id. at 194 (emphasis added). 
69 Id. at 195. Almost fifty years later, the Court held that Congress had the power 
to regulate steamboat traffic exclusively between points within one state because 
of the impact on interstate commerce. See Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 565 (1870) 
(“So far as she was employed in transporting goods destined for other States, or 
goods brought from without the limits of Michigan and destined to places within 
that State, she was engaged in commerce between the States, and however 
limited that commerce may have been, she was, so far as it went, subject to the 
legislation of Congress.”). The case was based in part on Congress’ power to 
regulate navigable waters, a derivative power flowing from Article III. See 
generally id. 
70 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16–17 (2005) (citations omitted). 
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Despite the internal lack of logic of this summary of the commerce 
power,71  this common statement of Congress’ commerce power as 
restated here by the Raich opinion is the most common modern 
framing and includes both “the external concerns,” which is broken 
into two parts channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce, 
and “those internal concerns,” which is defined as “activities that 
substantially affect interstate commerce.” Gibbons and its modern 
framing mean that Congress has two types of commerce power. First, 
Congress has the ability to regulate anything “in commerce,” that is, 
anything crossing from one state into another state. This is the clearest 
form of federal power, regulating things in commerce. Second, 
Congress has the ability to regulate local activities affecting interstate 
commerce, which are activities totally within one state but affecting 
other states or the national interest. 
IV. AFTER GIBBONS, THE COURT DETOURS ON ITS WAY TO 1937, 
BUT NOT ALWAYS. 
Marshall’s broad view of Congress’ commerce carried the day in 
1937 N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel.72 As discussed later, the 
Court expanded Jones & Laughlin Steel’s view of the commerce 
power with the addition of the rational basis test in Katzenbach v. 
McClung.73 McClung’s rational basis approach was enshrined as the 
law in Raich, but this expansionist view of commerce power was not 
without its detours. The detours were a product of a number of factors, 
but one of the most important was that Congress had done little to 
																																																								
71 This issue is discussed later, but Professor Engdahl captures the illogic perfectly: 
“Chief Justice Rehnquist’s taxonomy of the commerce power—now intoned as a 
ceremonial incantation by every inferior court—is positively dysfunctional. The 
cases involving ‘persons or things in interstate commerce’ certainly 
are Commerce Clause cases, but the ‘instrumentalities’ cases, which 
Chief Justice Rehnquist put in the same category, are really Necessary and 
Proper Clause cases. The same is true for some of the ‘channel’ cases, which 
Chief Justice Rehnquist separated out as category one, and all of the ‘affecting’ 
cases, which he segregated as category three. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s attempt 
at categorization is akin to a zoologist describing vertebrates as comprised of 
three groups—herbivores, mammals, and primates. Such confused classification 
obscures the very distinctions that are essential to understanding and utility.” 
David E. Engdahl, The Necessary and Proper Clause as an Intrinsic Restraint 
on Federal Lawmaking Power, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 107, 115 (1998) 
(citations omitted). 
72 N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
73 Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
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regulate interstate commerce after Gibbons, and the states passed most 
of the regulations.74 The Court opinions upholding state power were 
then corrupted to justify limiting federal power. 
One major detour was in 1895 in United States v. E.C. Knight 
when the Court said that commerce did not include manufacturing75 
and a second detour in 1918 in Hammer v. Dagenhart when the Court 
gave a limited definition of interstate commerce.76 Later, the stream of 
commerce cases detoured around the E.C. Knight detour. Two other 
detours around Gibbons were the direct/indirect test and the doctrine 
of dual federalism. In an incomprehensible way, the direct/indirect test 
limited Congress’ ability to regulate activity affecting interstate 
commerce, and the doctrine of dual federalism twisted the Supremacy 
Clause on its head. All four of these detours are historical oddities and 
later rejected or distinguished in Jones & Laughlin Steel and later 
cases. They, however, controlled the narrative from roughly 1890 to 
1937. 
In E.C. Knight, the Court held that Congress did not have the 
commerce power to regulate a business trust77 with a monopoly78 on 
																																																								
74 See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 121 (1942) (“For nearly a century, 
however, decisions of this Court under the Commerce Clause dealt rarely with 
questions of what Congress might do in the exercise of its granted power under 
the Clause and almost entirely with the permissibility of state activity which it 
was claimed discriminated against or burdened interstate commerce.”). Gibbons 
itself, it might be noted, was not really an attempt to expand Congress’ powers, 
but just a regulation of vessels as originating in the United States, which 
Marshall then used to expand federal commerce power and to limit state 
regulation of interstate commerce. 
75 United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895). There are differences of 
opinion as to where the Court went the wrong way. Justice Thomas argues that 
the Court abandoned the constitutional scheme when it departed from E.C. 
Knight. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 599 (1995) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (“If anything, the ‘wrong turn’ was the Court’s dramatic departure 
in the 1930’s from a century and a half of precedent.”), superseded by statute, 
18 U.S.C. § 922, as recognized in United States v. Dorsey, 418 F.3d 1038 (9th 
Cir. 2005). 
76 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled in part by United States 
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
77 See Trust, SMALL BUS. DEV. CORP., 
https://www.smallbusiness.wa.gov.au/business-advice/business-structure/trust 
[https://perma.cc/K2LB-KSAB] (last visited Jan. 27, 2019) (“A trust is a 
structure where a trustee carries out the business on behalf of the trust’s 
members (or beneficiaries). A trust is not a separate legal entity.”). 
78 See E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. at 9 (“By the purchase of the stock of the four 
Philadelphia refineries with shares of its own stock the American Sugar 
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refined sugar. The Sherman Antitrust Act, 79  passed in 1890 
specifically referred to the commerce power and stated, “Every person 
who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or 
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of 
the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign 
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony.” The Court said that 
manufacturing was not commerce; therefore, it was not subject to the 
federal commerce power.80 The flaw in the Court’s reasoning was that 
even if manufacturing itself was not commerce, Congress under 
Gibbons could regulate anything within one state affecting interstate 
commerce.81 The incorrect holding in E.C. Knight was followed in a 
number of cases.82 
																																																																																																																																			
Refining Company acquired nearly complete control of the manufacture of 
refined sugar within the United States.”). 
79 The E.C. Knight case does not actually refer to the act by this name, but it was 
the commonly used name. Id. 
80 Id. at 13 (“The fact that an article is manufactured for export to another state 
does not of itself make it an article of interstate commerce, and the intent of the 
manufacturer does not determine the time when the article or product passes 
from the control of the state and belongs to commerce.”). 
81 The E.C. Knight decision was buttressed by the 1888 case, Kidd v. Pearson, 
which had held that Iowa could bar the manufacturing of liquors in Iowa, all of 
it sold outside of the state of Iowa. Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888). The 
Court said the fact that “an article was manufactured for export to another state 
does not of itself make it an article of interstate commerce.” Id. at 24. The Kidd 
Court cited Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517 (1886) in support. Kidd, 128 U.S. at 24. 
Coe had held that the town of Errol, New Hampshire had the right to tax logs 
being held in its rivers for transport interstate to Maine. Coe, 116 U.S. 517, 528–
29 (1886). Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, the city could not tax 
interstate commerce, but the Court said, the logs were not interstate commerce 
until the interstate journey actually began. Id. The point of both Kidd and Coe 
was to uphold state power, but E.C. Knight used them to impose a limit on 
federal power. The E.C. Knight court was in error. However accurate either Kidd 
or Coe was with regard to the Dormant Commerce Clause’s limits on state 
power, Congress could still regulate in-state commerce and activities that were 
not interstate commerce if the local activity affected interstate commerce. As the 
Court said a half-century later, “The source of the restraint may be intrastate, as 
the making of a contract or combination usually is” but “[i]f it is interstate 
commerce that feels the pinch, it does not matter how local the operation which 
applies the squeeze.” United States v. Women’s Sportswear Mfg. Ass’n, 336 
U.S. 460, 464 (1949). The case involved an antitrust action against a trade 
organization of jobbers buying and selling fabrics for women’s sportswear. Id. at 
461–62. 
82 Justice Thomas believes that the Court went astray when it ceased to follow E.C. 
Knight. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 598 (1995) (Thomas, J., 
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In Hammer v. Dagenhart, the Court limited Congress’ ability to 
regulate things moving in interstate commerce. The Court held that 
Congress did not have the power to bar the interstate shipment of 
goods manufactured by child labor. Because of E.C. Knight, Congress 
thought that it could not regulate manufacturing using child labor, so it 
sought to regulate the interstate shipment of goods made by child 
labor, what under Gibbons would be the clearest form of commerce 
among the several states, and commerce from one state to another 
state. Hammer stopped this leapfrog over E.C. Knight it its tracks: 
“The making of goods and the mining of coal are not commerce, nor 
does the fact that these things are to be afterwards shipped, or used in 
interstate commerce, make their production a part thereof.” 83  The 
Court distinguished a number of cases that had seemed to allow the 
regulation of anything traveling in interstate commerce.84 
																																																																																																																																			
concurring) (“If federal power extended to these types of production 
‘comparatively little of business operations and affairs would be left for state 
control.’ Id. [E.C. Knight]. . . Whether or not manufacturing, agriculture, or 
other matters substantially affected interstate commerce was irrelevant.”), 
superseded by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922, as recognized in United States v. 
Dorsey, 418 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2005). In a later case, Justice Thomas 
summarized his limiting view of commerce power. See United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I write 
separately only to express my view that the very notion of a ‘substantial effects’ 
test under the Commerce Clause is inconsistent with the original understanding 
of Congress’ powers and with this Court’s early Commerce Clause cases. By 
continuing to apply this rootless and malleable standard, however 
circumscribed, the Court has encouraged the Federal Government to persist in 
its view that the Commerce Clause has virtually no limits. Until this Court 
replaces its existing Commerce Clause jurisprudence with a standard more 
consistent with the original understanding, we will continue to see Congress 
appropriating state police powers under the guise of regulating commerce.”). 
83 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 272 (1918), overruled in part by United 
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
84 See, e.g., Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (holding that Congress could 
pass a law to keep the channels of commerce free from use in the transportation 
of tickets used in the promotion of lottery schemes); Hipolite Egg Co. v. United 
States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911) (sustaining the power of Congress to pass the Pure 
Food and Drug Act which prohibited the introduction into the states by means of 
interstate commerce of impure foods and drugs; Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 
308 (1913) (upholding the constitutionality of the so-called ‘White Slave Traffic 
Act’ that forbade the transportation of a woman in interstate commerce for the 
purpose of prostitution); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917) 
(holding that Congress could prohibit the transportation of women in interstate 
commerce for immoral purposes); James Clark Distilling Co. v. W. Md. Ry. 
Co., 242 U.S. 311 (1917) (upholding the power of Congress over the interstate 
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In attempting to avoid the E.C. Knight limitation on Congress’ 
ability to regulate things affecting interstate commerce, the Court used 
what it called the stream of commerce85 to create a loophole to E.C. 
Knight. If local activity in one state was connected to local activity in 
other states, the Court found that the local activity was in the stream of 
commerce and thus Congress had the power to regulate interstate 
commerce between two states.86 The most famous examples of the 
stream of commerce cases are Swift & Company v. United States87 and 
																																																																																																																																			
transportation of intoxicating liquors. The Hammer court distinguished these 
other cases as involving the need to use a ban on interstate commerce to prevent 
the spread of evil results). In Hammer, there were no evil products being 
transported. The Court also said that the Child Labor Act violated the Tenth 
Amendment in that “[I]t must never be forgotten that the nation is made up of 
states to which are entrusted the powers of local government. And to them and 
to the people the powers not expressly delegated to the national government are 
reserved.” Hammer, 247 U.S. at 275. Here Hammer repeats the error of the 
doctrine of dual federalism. 
85 The enumerated power stream of commerce cases morphed into a due process 
personal jurisdictional issue, but personal jurisdiction, whether a state has 
sufficient contact with a party, is a completely different issue. See World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297–98 (1980) (“The forum State 
does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal 
jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into 
the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by 
consumers in the forum State.”). 
86 Perhaps the best example is found in Congress’ attempt to regulate the deceptive 
practices in stockyards in the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921. The Court 
tied stockyards to the full distribution of meat from pasture to table, it found that 
“The stockyards are not a place of rest or final destination. Thousands of head of 
livestock arrive daily by carload and trainload lots, and must be promptly sold 
and disposed of and moved out, to give place to the constantly flowing traffic 
that presses behind. The stockyards are but a throat through which the current 
flows, and the transactions which occur therein are only incident to this current 
from the West to the East, and from one state to another.” Stafford v. Wallace, 
258 U.S. 495, 515–16 (1922). 
87 Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905). Swift & Co. does not actually 
use the stream of commerce phrase, calling it “a current of commerce.” Id. at 
399. The Court later extravagantly claimed that Swift & Co. “was a milestone in 
the interpretation of the commerce clause of the Constitution. It recognized the 
great changes and development in the business of this vast country and drew 
again the dividing line between interstate and intrastate commerce where the 
Constitution intended it to be. It refused to permit local incidents of great 
interstate movement, which taken alone were intrastate, to characterize the 
movement as such.” Bd. of Trade of City of Chicago v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 35 
(1923). If Swift & Co. was a milestone, its impact was limited. Professor 
Cushman found only four cases before 1937 where the Court upheld a federal 
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Stafford v. Wallace.88 As in E.C. Knight, Swift & Co. was charged 
with violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. The claim was that Swift 
& Co. had rigged bids with competitors in buying livestock in 
Chicago, Omaha, Kansas City, and other cities. Swift & Co.’s defense 
was that the activity in each of the states was not commerce, because 
like manufacturing the activity was totally within one state and did not 
involve the crossing of state lines. Because Swift & Co. eventually 
converted the livestock to fresh meat for human consumption and sent 
it to plants in various states, the Court said that the various interstate 
aspects of the business fell within “the current of commerce” and was 
within Congress’ commerce power.89 
Stafford was an attempt to regulate the stockyards more generally. 
The Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921 gave the Secretary of 
																																																																																																																																			
law under the stream of commerce doctrine. See Barry Cushman, The Structure 
of Classical Public Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1917, 1936 (2008). In addition to 
Swift & Co. and Stafford, Cushman identifies another stockyard’ case, Tagg 
Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.S. 420 (1930), where the Court 
upheld under the Packers and Stockyards Act the right of the Secretary of 
Agriculture to fix the commission of agents selling livestock at the Omaha, 
Nebraska stockyards. The fourth case in this small group was Board of Trade of 
City of Chicago v. Olsen, which upheld the federal Grain Futures Act’s 
restrictions on the Chicago Board of trade, what the Court called “the greatest 
grain market in the world.” Bd. of Trade of City of Chicago, 262 U.S. at 33. 
Referencing Stafford, the Court held, “The sales on the Chicago Board of Trade 
are just as indispensable to the continuity of the flow of wheat from the West to 
the mills and distributing points of the East and Europe, as are the Chicago sales 
of cattle to the flow of stock toward the feeding places and slaughter and 
packing houses of the East.” Id. at 36. The Court also used the stream-of-
commerce phrase in upholding the right of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission (“ICC”) to compel the New York Central Railroad Company to 
install a connecting line to the Erie Barge Canal in Buffalo, New York. The 
Court said that the ICC “intended to confer upon the Commission power to 
regulate the entire stream of commerce. Whereas here interstate and intrastate 
transactions are interwoven, the regulation of the latter is so incidental to and 
inseparable from the regulation of the former as properly to be deemed included 
in the authority over interstate commerce conferred by statute.” United States v. 
N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 272 U.S. 457, 464 (1926) (emphasis added). 
88 Stafford, 258 U.S. 495. Stafford does use the phrase “stream of commerce.” Id. 
at 519. 
89 Swift & Co., 196 U.S. at 398–99 (“When cattle are sent for sale from a place in 
one state, with the expectation that they will end their transit, after purchase, in 
another, and when in effect they do so, with only the interruption necessary to 
find a purchaser at the stockyards, and when this is a typical, constantly 
recurring course, the current thus existing is a current of commerce among the 
states, and the purchase of the cattle is a part and incident of such commerce.”). 
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Agriculture, Secretary Wallace, authority to regulate a whole series of 
“unfair, discriminatory, or deceptive practices.”90 Again, the defense 
was that stockyards involved activity like manufacturing that was 
entirely within one state and not interstate commerce. The Court 
following what it called Swift & Company’s “natural development of 
interstate commerce under modern conditions” and concluded that the 
inherently interstate aspects of the livestock business meant: 
[T]hat such streams of commerce from one part of the 
country to another, which are ever flowing, are in their 
very essence the commerce among the states and with 
foreign nations, which historically it was one of the 
chief purposes of the Constitution to bring under 
national protection and control.91 
Under the streams of commerce logic, Congress could regulate local 
activity within one state not based upon its effect on interstate 
commerce but because it fell within Congress’ power to regulate 
things in commerce.92 The Court avoided its limiting precedent in E.C. 
Knight as to things affecting interstate commerce by creating the 
fiction that a series of local activities in different states was in “the 
stream of commerce” and thus within Congress power to regulate 
things in interstate commerce.93 
																																																								
90 Stafford, 258 U.S. at 513. 
91 Id. at 518–19. 
92  The Hammer limitation on regulating things interstate that were not evil in and 
of themselves was not yet part of the equation. “In each of these instances the 
use of interstate transportation was necessary to the accomplishment of harmful 
results. In other words, although the power over interstate transportation was to 
regulate, that could only be accomplished by prohibiting the use of the facilities 
of interstate commerce to effect the evil intended.” Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 
U.S. 251, 271 (1918).  
93 Part of the explanation for Congress’ more expansive view of commerce likely 
begins with Upton’s Sinclair’s The Jungle exposing the health hazards in the 
meat and packing industry leading to the passage of the federal Food and Drug 
Act and to the Court’s more sympathetic view of the need for federal regulation 
of health-related matters. The Pure Food and Drug Act passed in 1906 for the 
first time regulated food and drugs that moved in interstate commerce and 
forbade the manufacture, sale or transportation of poisonous patent medicines. 
“It arose, with strong White House support, in the wake of exposés by such 
muckrakers as Upton Sinclair and Samuel Hopkins Adams.” Andrew Glass, 
Pure Food and Drug Act Passes, June 23, 1906, POLITICO (June 23, 2014, 12:02 
AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2014/06/fda-theodore-roosevelt-108164 
[https://perma.cc/8Q57-PGT3]. 
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Whatever the reason for the “streams of commerce” clause 
doctrine, it soon died a lingering death, a victim of the same laissez-
faire doctrine that led to the weakening of the commerce power in E.C. 
Knight and Hammer. In 1935, the Court in Schechter Poultry v. United 
States94 held that the doctrine did not apply to commerce that had 
already ended, and in 1936 in Carter v. Carter Coal,95 the Court held 
that it did not apply to commerce that had not yet started. The Carter 
court said it this way: 
The restricted field covered by the Swift and kindred 
cases is illustrated by the Schechter Case. There the 
commodity in question, although shipped from another 
state, had come to rest in the state of its destination, 
and, as the court pointed out, was no longer in a 
current or flow of interstate commerce. The Swift 
doctrine was rejected as inapposite. In the Schechter 
Case the flow had ceased. Here it had not begun. The 
difference is not one of substance. The applicable 
principle is the same.96 
With the Jones & Laughlin Steel case later eviscerating the E.C. 
Knight and the Hammer cases, there was no need for the “stream of 
commerce” fiction as a workaround. The Court will still occasionally, 
including in Raich, mention the “stream of commerce,” but it is no 
longer a meaningful test.97 
																																																								
94 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
Schechter found the National Industrial Recovery Act (“NIRA”), the 
cornerstone of President Franklin Roosevelt’s economic recovery program, 
unconstitutional as beyond the scope of federal commerce power. Id. at 542. The 
NIRA permitted the establishment of codes for fair competition in various 
industries—in the case the “Live Poultry Code”—which regulated everything 
from conditions of employment to the health of chickens sold. Id. at 521–23. 
95 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
96 Id. at 306 (citations omitted). 
97 One of the post-1937 cases to rely on the stream of Commerce Clause logic was 
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n. United States v. South-
Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). Prior to 1944, insurance had 
been held in a number of cases to be within the state’s power to regulate, and 
thus it was argued was beyond Congress’ power. The Court held that the 
regulation of insurance was within Congress’ commerce power “continuous and 
indivisible stream of intercourse among the states composed of collections of 
premiums, payments of policy obligations, and the countless documents and 
communications which are essential to the negotiation and execution of policy 
contracts.” Id. at 541. The stream of commerce language was unnecessary since 
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One of the more incomprehensible detours in the application of 
Gibbons’ broad view of commerce power was the direct/indirect 
limitation on Congress’ ability to regulate local activity affecting 
interstate commerce. Schechter Poultry was one of the most famous 
cases to attempt to limit commerce power to those cases where local 
activities directly affected interstate commerce as opposed to only 
being indirect. In Schechter Poultry, the National Industrial Recovery 
Act, one of President Roosevelt’s most important anti-depression 
measures, attempted to mandate wages and limit hours in the live 
poultry business in New York City, described as the largest such 
market in the United States, with 96% of live poultry coming from 
other states before being consigned to so called commission men. In 
addition to finding that the chickens were not part of the stream of 
commerce because interstate commerce had stopped, the Court also 
held that any impact of the chickens on interstate commerce was 
indirect. The Court said there was “a necessary and well-established 
distinction between direct and indirect effects. The precise line can be 
drawn only as individual cases arise, but the distinction is clear in 
principle.” 98  It believed that if the Commerce Clause reached “all 
enterprises and transactions which could be said to have an indirect 
effect upon interstate commerce, the federal authority would embrace 
																																																																																																																																			
the insurance policies affected interstate commerce or, as the Court said, “They 
concern people living far beyond the boundaries of that state.” Id. at 542. Even 
in Raich, as noted by Justice Stevens’ opinion for the Court, the Ninth Circuit 
had found that the federal law was outside of federal power in part because 
“[T]his limited use is clearly distinct from the broader illicit drug market-as well 
as any broader commercial market for medicinal marijuana-insofar as the 
medicinal marijuana at issue in this case is not intended for, nor does it enter, 
the stream of commerce.” Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005) (quoting 
Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1228 (2003)). Justice Thomas’ dissenting 
opinion summarized the lower court’s holding “The Court of Appeals found that 
respondents’ ‘limited use is clearly distinct from the broader illicit drug market,’ 
because ‘th[eir] medicinal marijuana ... is not intended for, nor does it enter, 
the stream of commerce.’” Id. at 62 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
Justice O’Connor among her other reasons for believing that Congress did not 
have the power to regulate home-grown home consumed medical marijuana 
observed, “Everyone agrees that the marijuana at issue in this case was never in 
the stream of commerce, and neither were the supplies for growing it.” Id. at 50 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting). It was, she said, one of the few narcotics whose 
preparations did not involve at least some of its ingredients moving in interstate 
commerce. 
98 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 546. 
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practically all the activities of the people . . . .”99 It concluded that the 
hours and wages of persons in the live poultry business did not directly 
affect interstate commerce.100 
Carter v. Carter Coal 101  attempted to define the difference 
between direct and indirect effects on interstate commerce. Under the 
Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, Congress gave a 
commission broad authority to regulate, including wage and hour 
provisions. The Court like in Schechter considered the wages and 
hours of coal miners to be indirect.102 Carter conceded that whether 
any particular activity was direct or indirect was “not always easy to 
determine,”103 but it sought to define the difference: 
The word ‘direct’ implies that the activity or condition 
invoked or blamed shall operate proximately—not 
mediately, remotely, or collaterally—to produce the 
effect. It connotes the absence of an efficient 
intervening agency or condition. And the extent of the 
effect bears no logical relation to its character. The 
distinction between a direct and an indirect effect turns, 
not upon the magnitude of either the cause or the effect, 
but entirely upon the manner in which the effect has 
been brought about.104 
																																																								
99 Id. The Court later emphasized the point; “[T]he distinction between direct and 
indirect effects of intrastate transactions upon interstate commerce must be 
recognized as a fundamental one, essential to the maintenance of our 
constitutional system. Otherwise, as we have said, there would be virtually no 
limit to the federal power, and for all practical purposes we should have a 
completely centralized government.” Id. at 548. 
100 Id. (“The persons employed in slaughtering and selling in local trade are not 
employed in interstate commerce. Their hours and wages have no direct relation 
to interstate commerce.”). 
101 Carter, 298 U.S. 238. 
102 Id. at 308-09 (“The employees are not engaged in or about commerce, but 
exclusively in producing a commodity . . . . Such effect as they may have upon 
commerce, however extensive it may be, is secondary and indirect.”). 
103 Id. at 307. 
104 Id. at 307–08. The continuation of this quote does not make it any more 
comprehensible, “If the production by one man of a single ton of coal intended 
for interstate sale and shipment, and actually so sold and shipped, affects 
interstate commerce indirectly, the effect does not become direct by multiplying 
the tonnage, or increasing the number of men employed, or adding to the 
expense or complexities of the business, or by all combined. . . . But the matter 
of degree has no bearing upon the question here, since that question is not—
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This language has the air of mystery to it, perhaps even mysticism, 
similar to Justice Andrews’ definition of proximate cause in his 
dissenting opinion in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Company.105 If 
there is anything that might send shivers through the spine of law 
students and lawyers, it would be comparing anything to the test for 
proximate cause. Like the proximate cause test in torts, the 
direct/indirect test has no easily discernable meaning. Say 
direct/indirect fast, underline it, put it in italics, capitalize it, and tweet 
it to the world some early morning, and it is still devoid of meaning. 
Jones & Laughlin Steel, and Wickard gave it the quiet death that it 
deserved.106 
																																																																																																																																			
What is the extent of the local activity or condition, or the extent of the effect 
produced upon interstate commerce? but—What is the relation between the 
activity or condition and the effect?” Id. at 308. 
105 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 104 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., 
dissenting) (“Was there a direct connection between them, without too many 
intervening causes? Is the effect of cause on result not too attenuated? Is the 
cause likely, in the usual judgment of mankind, to produce the result? Or, by the 
exercise of prudent foresight could the result be foreseen? Is the result too 
remote from the cause, and here we consider remoteness in time and space.”). 
106 See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 122–23 (1942) (“In some cases sustaining 
the exercise of federal power over intrastate matters the term ‘direct’ was used 
for the purpose of stating, rather than of reaching, a result; in others it was 
treated as synonymous with ‘substantial’ or ‘material;’ and in others it was not 
used at all. Of late its use has been abandoned in cases dealing with questions of 
federal power under the Commerce Clause.”). Though dead in the commerce 
power cases, the direct/indirect test continues to have some life in the Dormant 
Commerce Clause cases. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 
(1970) (“Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate 
local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it 
will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive 
in relation to the putative local benefits. . . . Occasionally the Court has candidly 
undertaken a balancing approach in resolving these issues, but more frequently it 
has spoken in terms of ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ effects and burdens.”) (citations 
omitted). In Pike, the Court found that Arizona improperly burdened interstate 
commerce by requiring that its cantaloupes be packed in Arizona, as opposed to 
in California as the grower preferred. Id. at 144-45. Arizona said that it was 
trying to address the fact that consumers falsely believed that Arizona’s 
delicious cantaloupes packed in California were grown in California. Id. at 142-
43. (California only wishes its cantaloupes had such delicacies of flavor.). In 
that the direct/indirect test refuses to fully die, it is like Justice Scalia’s 
complaint about the Lemon test in the free exercise of religion cases—it is 
“some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and 
shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried . . . .” Lamb’s Chapel v. 
Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
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Perhaps the most bizarre of the detours in the application of the 
Gibbon’s test was the concept called Dual Federalism.107 Under the 
concept, there are some powers exclusively in control of the federal 
government, and under the Tenth Amendment, others are exclusively 
under the control of state governments. The doctrine is erroneous 
because Congress can regulate anything, even if it falls within a state’s 
police power when it also falls within one of Congress’ enumerated 
powers.108 
The doctrine can be found in both E.C. Knight and Hammer.109 
The Court’s view in E.C. Knight of the limited scope of commerce was 
in part a product of its view of state police power versus Congress’ 
power. The Court said that the state police power “to protect the lives, 
health, and property of its citizens, and to preserve good order and the 
public morals” was not “surrendered by them to the general 
government” and was “essentially exclusive.” 110  But the Court 
cautioned, “On the other hand, the power of congress to regulate 
																																																								
107 The Court’s most revealing discussion of the dual federalism doctrine is found 
in a spending power case, United States v. Butler, where the Court found that it 
did not have to decide if the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 was within 
Congress spending power, but nonetheless found it unconstitutional because it 
usurped state power. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936) (“We are not 
now required to ascertain the scope of the phrase ‘general welfare of the United 
States’ or to determine whether an appropriation in aid of agriculture falls within 
it. Wholly apart from that question, another principle embedded in our 
Constitution prohibits the enforcement of the Agricultural adjustment Act. The 
act invades the reserved rights of the states. It is a statutory plan to regulate and 
control agricultural production, a matter beyond the powers delegated to the 
federal government.”). Justice O’Connor called Butler a mistake not because of 
its holding as to the spending power, but “rather its crabbed view of the extent of 
Congress’ regulatory power under the Commerce Clause. The Agricultural 
Adjustment Act . . . was regulation that today would likely be considered within 
Congress’ commerce power.” South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 216 (1987) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Dole found that Congress’ 
conditioning receipt of highway funds on a state’s adopting a 21-year-old 
drinking limit was within its spending power. See David E. Engdahl, The 
Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1, 61 (1994). 
108 United States v. Darby. 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941). Jones & Laughlin Steel does 
not address the concept of dual federalism, but it is rejected in Darby. Id. at 114. 
109 See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 274 (1918), overruled in part by 
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (“The grant of authority over a 
purely federal matter was not intended to destroy the local power always 
existing and carefully reserved to the states in the Tenth Amendment to the 
Constitution.”). 
110 United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 11 (1895). 
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commerce among the several states is also exclusive.” 111  As it 
summarized, “That which belongs to commerce is within the 
jurisdiction of the United States, but that which does not belong to 
commerce is within the jurisdiction of the police power of the state.”112 
Of course, E.C. Knight was wrong about state power being exclusive 
over federal power. Under the Supremacy Clause, federal law is 
supreme over state law, but there is no similar rule with regard to state 
law.113 
Despite all of the limiting decisions as to Congress’ commerce 
power during this period, the Court did not consistently rule against 
Congress’ commerce power. During this period, many cases had the 
shadings of the later more modern approach. During the same time 
period that the Court limited Congress’ commerce power in E.C. 
Knight and Hammer, the Court decided other cases that allowed for a 
more expansive view of commerce power. The substantial effects test 
has its origins in Southern Railway Company v. United States.114 A 
																																																								
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 12. 
113 Darby, 312 U.S. at 114 (rejecting the doctrine). It is rejected again later in even 
more forceful language. Id. at 123–24 (“Our conclusion is unaffected by 
the Tenth Amendment which provides: ‘The powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the 
States respectively, or to the people’. The amendment states but a truism that all 
is retained which has not been surrendered.”). See Edward S. Corwin, The 
Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1 (1950), for the most famous 
discussion of the doctrine of dual federalism. Professor Corwin is given credit 
for having coined the phrase “dual federalism.” Paul D. Moreno, “So Long As 
Our System Shall Exist”: Myth, History, and the New Federalism, 14 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 711, 711 n.2 (2005). And he is said to have “famously 
announced” its passing. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, From Sovereignty and Process 
to Administration and Politics: The Afterlife of American Federalism, 123 YALE 
L.J. 1920, 1921 (2014). Professor Bulman-Pozen summarized Corwin’s 
argument, “[H]e argued that the federal system had ‘shifted base in the direction 
of a consolidated national power’ and wondered whether ‘the constituent States 
of the System [could] be saved for any useful purpose.’” Id. (citations omitted). 
But see Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918–19 (1997) (“It is incontestible 
[sic] that the Constitution established a system of ‘dual sovereignty.’ Although 
the States surrendered many of their powers to the new Federal Government, 
they retained ‘a residuary and inviolable sovereignty.’”) (citations omitted). 
Printz was referring only to the Court’s holding in New York v. United States, 
505 U.S. 144 (1992), that under the Tenth Amendment Congress could not 
commandeer state or local agencies to enforce federal laws. 
114 S. Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911). In another case earlier in the 
same year also cited by Jones & Laughlin Steel, the Court upheld a safety 
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federal railway safety act as amended applied to all railroad cars, even 
intrastate ones using an interstate rail line.115 In addressing whether the 
act was constitutional, the Court said the issue was whether there was 
“a real or substantial relation or connection” or a “close or direct 
relation or connection” between intrastate traffic, and “the safety of 
interstate commerce and of those who are employed in its 
movement.”116 For the Court, the answer to this required no more than 
“common knowledge”: “Both classes of traffic are at times carried in 
the same car, and when this is not the case, the cars in which they are 
carried are frequently commingled in the same train and in the 
switching and other movements at terminals” that they are 
“interdependent; for whatever brings delay or disaster to one, or results 
in disabling one of its operatives, is calculated to impede the progress 
and imperil the safety of other trains” and the lack of safety equipment 
“is a menace not only to that train, but to others.”117 
One of the most famous cases allowing for a more expansive view 
of commerce power was the decision in The Shreveport Rate Cases118 
where the Court indirectly upheld the authority of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission (“ICC”) 119  to regulate intrastate commerce 
																																																																																																																																			
measure related to hours of employment. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. 
Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 221 U.S. 612, 622-23 (1911). The act included in 
its coverage employees whose work was strictly for intrastate commerce. Id. at 
616. The railroad was undone by its own argument, that “the interstate and 
intrastate operations of interstate carriers are so interwoven that it is utterly 
impracticable for them to divide their employees” between interstate and 
intrastate work. Id. at 618. Without giving any rationale, the Court held that the 
interwoven operations confirmed that both were subject to Congress’ commerce 
power: “Congress may enact laws for the safeguarding of the persons and 
property that are transported in that commerce, and of those who are employed 
in transporting.” Id. 
115 S. Ry. Co., 222 U.S. at 26 (“[I]t must be held that the original act, as enlarged by 
the amendatory one, is intended to embrace all locomotives, cars, and similar 
vehicles used on any railroad which is a highway of interstate commerce.”). 
116 Id. It is worth noting that the Court uses the modifier direct as synonymous with 
a close relationship, not the direct/indirect metaphysical connection of other 
cases. 
117 Id. at 27. 
118 The Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342 (1914). 
119 The ICC was the first administrative agency to regulate interstate commerce. See 
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 121 (1942) (“It was not until 1887 with the 
enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act that the interstate commerce power 
began to exert positive influence in American law and life. This first important 
federal resort to the commerce power was followed in 1890 by the Sherman 
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between cities within the same state.120 Borrowing from Gibbons, the 
Court said that “Congress is empowered to regulate,-that is, to provide 
the law for the government of interstate commerce”121 and parroting 
McCulloch “to enact ‘all appropriate legislation’ for its ‘protection and 
advancement.’”122 The Court previewing the substantial effects test of 
Jones & Laughlin Steel, held that the ICC’s authority “necessarily 
embraces the right to control their operations in all matters having 
such a close and substantial relation to interstate traffic that the control 
is essential or appropriate to the security of that traffic.”123 
The Court implicitly recognized that the ICC had the power to 
order that the lower in-state rates be raised to be equal to the higher 
ICC approved interstate rates.124 
																																																																																																																																			
Anti-Trust Act and, thereafter, mainly after 1903, by many others.” (footnotes 
omitted)); see also R.R. Comm’n of Wis. v. Chi., B. & Q. R.R. Co., 257 U.S. 
563, 582 (1922) (“The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 379, . . . was 
enacted by Congress to prevent interstate railroad carriers from charging 
unreasonable rates and from unjustly discriminating between persons and 
localities.”). 
120 The Texas railroads in the case were subject to regulation by the Texas Railroad 
Commission for in-state rates and by the ICC for interstate rates. The Shreveport 
Rate Cases, 234 U.S. at 346. The in-state rates were much cheaper. Illustrative, 
the rate from Dallas, Texas for the 147.7 miles to Marshall, Texas near the 
Louisiana border was 37 cents while the in-state rate from Shreveport, Louisiana 
for the 42 miles to Marshall, Texas was 56 cents, over 50% higher for less than 
1/3 the distance. Id. To prevent discriminatory pricing, the ICC ordered that the 
interstate rate be lowered to be the same as the Texas in-state rate. Id. at 347. 
121 Id. at 351. 
122 Id. See also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819). 
123 Id. It was argued that under its commerce power the ICC had no authority to 
consider the in-state rate at all. The Court said, “It is of the essence of this power 
that, where it exists, it dominates. Interstate trade was not left to be destroyed or 
impeded by the rivalries of local government.” Id. at 350. 
124 See JONATHAN D. VARAT & VIKRAM D. AMAR, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 140 (15th ed. 2017). The Court in R.R. Comm’n of Wis. v. Chi., 
B. & Q. R. Co. found that Congress had the commerce power to expand ICC 
authority to regulate travel strictly within one state if it impacted interstate rates. 
R.R. Comm’n of Wis. v. Chi., B. & Q. R.R. Co., 257 U.S. 563, 590–91 (1922). 
In the case, the Wisconsin rate for the intrastate portion of an interstate journey 
was 2 cents per mile versus 3.6 cents for interstate travelers, cutting the 
interstate railroad net income by $6,000,000. Id. at 578–80. Interstate travelers 
going from Chicago to Madison, Wisconsin could buy an interstate ticket to 
Madison or save money by buying an interstate ticket to Milwaukee, Wisconsin 
and a cheaper intrastate ticket from Milwaukee to Madison. The basic holding 
was that interstate travelers between Chicago and interior cities of Wisconsin 
were paying an unfair portion of the cost of passenger travel and that the ICC 
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V. JONES & LAUGHLIN STEEL CORPORATION—1937 AND THE 
COMMERCE POWER EMERGES FROM ITS TWISTY DETOURS 
In 1937, N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel125 along with West 
Coast Hotel v. Parrish 126  started a constitutional revolution. Both 
cases rejected the Court’s earlier imposed limits on governmental 
power, Jones & Laughlin Steel on congressional commerce power, and 
West Coast Hotel on due process limits on state and federal power. 
Cases like E.C. Knight and Hammer limited Congress’ commerce 
power to regulate social and economic issues. A similar line of cases 
imposed substantive due process limits on states and the federal 
government to address social and economic issues. 127  Both the 
Commerce Clause cases and substantive due process cases limiting 
governmental powers were more about imposing a laissez-faire view 
of government, federal or state, as to regulations of private business 
then about commerce power or due process. The Court was open in the 
post-1937 due process cases about how it had misused the Due Process 
Clause in the past and the reason why it was adopting a different 
approach going forward. 128  Jones & Laughlin Steel jettisoned the 
heavy restrictions of the post-Gibbons cases without noting that they 
too were likely manifestations of a similar laissez-faire philosophy.129 
																																																																																																																																			
could increase the intrastate rate. The Court in Chi., B. & Q. R.R. Co. referred to 
its holding as to strictly intrastate commerce rates as “power already indirectly 
exercised as to persons and localities, with approval of this court in the 
Shreveport and other cases.” Id. at 584. 
125 N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
126 W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
127 See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
128 See e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) 
(“The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and 
industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of 
harmony with a particular school of thought. We emphasize again what Chief 
Justice Waite said in Munn v. State of Illinois, ‘For protection against abuses by 
legislatures the people must resort to the polls, not to the courts.’” (citations 
omitted)). In Williamson, the Court found that the state might have had a 
conceivable justification for passing what was likely a needless wasteful 
regulation of the sale of eyeglasses. Id. at 487–88. 
129 Justice Souter’s dissent in Lopez recognized the joint history behind both a 
restrictive view of commerce power and an expansive view of due process 
limits, “These restrictive views of commerce subject to congressional power 
complemented the Court’s activism in limiting the enforceable scope of state 
economic regulation. It is most familiar history that during this same period the 
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Even putting aside the due process cases, there is little doubt that 
1937 is a turning point in American history, unlike few others. 
Congress went from being unable to regulate the economic 
consequences of child labor to being able to regulate the minutest 
aspects of our national economy. 130  The limiting pre-1937 cases 
became as dead as prehistoric dinosaurs snuffed out by some meteor. 
True, the fossils of cases like E.C. Knight and Hammer can still be 
perceived,131 but they have as little real life in them as the etchings in 
dry riverbeds. But it is equally intriguing that the revolution has had 
little advancement, except for the rational basis test moving from 
																																																																																																																																			
Court routinely invalidated state social and economic legislation under an 
expansive conception of Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process . . . . 
The fulcrums of judicial review in these cases were the notions of liberty and 
property characteristic of laissez-faire economics, whereas the Commerce 
Clause cases turned on what was ostensibly a structural limit of federal power, 
but under each conception of judicial review the Court’s character for the first 
third of the century showed itself in exacting judicial scrutiny of a legislature’s 
choice of economic ends and of the legislative means selected to reach them. It 
was not merely coincidental, then, that sea changes in the Court’s conceptions of 
its authority under the Due Process and Commerce Clauses occurred virtually 
together, in 1937, with West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, and NLRB v. Jones & 
Laughlin Steel Corp.” United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 605–06 (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (citations omitted). 
130 The Court in Hammer v. Dagenhart framed the issue as to child labor, “The 
controlling question for decision is: Is it within the authority of Congress in 
regulating commerce among the states to prohibit the transportation in interstate 
commerce of manufactured goods . . .in which . . . children under the age of 
fourteen have been employed or permitted to work.” Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 
U.S. 251, 269 (1918). The Court’s answer was unequivocal, “To sustain this 
statute . . . would sanction an invasion by the federal power of the control of a 
matter purely local in its character, and over which no authority has been 
delegated to Congress in conferring the power to regulate commerce among the 
states.” Id. at 276. Then just two years after Jones & Laughlin Steel in 1937, the 
Court said, “The power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce is plenary 
and extends to all such commerce be it great or small.” N.L.R.B. v. Fainblatt, 
306 U.S. 601, 606 (1939).“The contention that in Commerce Clause cases the 
courts have power to excise, as trivial, individual instances falling within a 
rationally defined class of activities has been put entirely to rest.” Maryland v. 
Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 192–93 (1968), overruled by Nat’l League of Cities v. 
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Twenty-five years later in Katzenbach v. McClung, 
federal commerce power was held to include barring racial discrimination by a 
demonstrably local barbeque joint that had purchased $69,683 its meat from a 
local supplier who had purchased it from outside the State. See Katzenbach v. 
McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964). 
131 Justice Thomas alone regularly reminds us of the fossilized remains of E.C. 
Knight. 
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substantive due process cases to commerce power cases. In the due 
process cases, the rational basis test is little changed from shortly after 
West Coast Hotel.132 
The constitutional revolution of 1937 was indeed a reemergence of 
a broad view of federal commerce power. Giving detail to the 
Affectation Doctrine of Gibbons, the Court in Jones & Laughlin Steel 
emphasized a “substantial effects” test to show how close intrastate 
activities had to be before Congress had the power to regulate it under 
their commerce power. The Court upheld the National Labor Relations 
Act (“NLRA”) of 1935 as being within Congress’ enumerated power 
to regulate local activities affecting interstate commerce.133 The NLRA 
required collective bargaining between the company and the 
employee’s labor union as to activities affecting interstate 
commerce. 134  Jones & Laughlin was a Pittsburg, Pennsylvania 
company and the dispute primarily involved the company’s firing of 
union representatives in its nearby Aliquippa, Pennsylvania plant.135 
Jones & Laughlin argued that no interstate commerce was involved, 
only a dispute as to relations and activities in its manufacturing 
department.136 The Court noted that Jones & Laughlin was “a self-
																																																								
132 Since the first application of the rational basis test in Carolene Products, a year 
after West Coast Hotel, the rational basis test has remained virtually unchanged. 
But since that case, the Court has adopted a number of other tests for cases that 
previously may have fallen within the rational basis test. Strict scrutiny for free 
speech and race classifications likely had their origin before Carolene Products, 
but the higher level of review for classifications based upon gender, alienage, 
and illegitimacy all would have been subject to the rational basis test in 1937. 
The fundamental rights other than free speech are also post-1937 in origin. 
133 N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 31 (1937) (noting that the 
NLRA involved the Affectation Doctrine: “The critical words of this provision, 
prescribing the limits of the Board’s authority in dealing with the labor 
practices, are ‘affecting commerce.’”). The NLRA prevented any person from 
engaging in unfair labor practices “affecting commerce.” Id. at 30. Commerce 
was defined as any “trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication” 
between any states or foreign countries. Id. at 31. “[A]ffecting commerce,” the 
Act said, meant “burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of 
commerce.” Id. 
134 See id. at 24 (“The Board is empowered to prevent the described unfair labor 
practices affecting commerce and the act prescribes the procedure to that end.”). 
135 See id. at 28 (“Practically all the factual evidence in the case, except that which 
dealt with the nature of respondent’s business, concerned its relations with the 
employees in the Aliquippa plant whose discharge was the subject of the 
complaint.”). 
136 Jones & Laughlin Steel’s emphasis was that its Aliquippa plant was a self-
contained operation for making iron and steel products from raw materials. Id. at 
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contained, highly integrated body” that drew “raw materials from 
Michigan, Minnesota, West Virginia, Pennsylvania in part through 
arteries and by means controlled by [Jones & Laughlin].”137 In simple 
terms, a labor dispute in Aliquippa would substantially affect 
commerce all the way from Minnesota to the coal mines of West 
Virginia and the states in between, and that in the final analysis was all 
the Court required. 
Before discussing the substantial effects test, it is important to see 
the approaches discarded by the Court. First, the Court dismissed the 
need to apply the stream of commerce test, 138  saying that it was 
enough that there was a “close and substantial relation to interstate 
commerce.”139 Relying on E.C. Knight,140 the company claimed that 
no interstate commerce was involved. Citing Stafford and its progeny, 
the government sought to distinguish the E.C. Knight line of cases by 
urging “that these activities constitute a ‘stream’ or ‘flow’ of 
commerce, of which the Aliquippa manufacturing plant is the focal 
point, and that industrial strife at that point would cripple the entire 
movement.”141 The Court refused to take the bait, saying that being in 
the stream of commerce was only one type of commerce power case, 
the better approach being whether the federal law bore a substantial 
relationship to interstate commerce.142 The Court seemed not to be 
																																																																																																																																			
27. It argued that “the industrial relations and activities in the manufacturing 
department of respondent’s enterprise are not subject to federal regulation. The 
argument rests upon the proposition that manufacturing in itself is not 
commerce.” Id. at 34 (citations omitted). 
137 Id. at 27. 
138 Id. at 36). 
139 Id. at 37. 
140 Id. at 39. A whole line of cases supporting this claim have been omitted. Later, 
E.C. Knight was separately considered by the Court. 
141 Id. at 35. 
142 Id. at 36–37 (“We do not find it necessary to determine whether these features of 
defendant’s business dispose of the asserted analogy to the ‘stream of 
commerce’ cases. The instances in which that metaphor has been used are but 
particular, and not exclusive, illustrations of the protective power which the 
government invokes in support of the present act. The congressional authority to 
protect interstate commerce from burdens and obstructions is not limited to 
transactions which can be deemed to be an essential part of a ‘flow’ of interstate 
or foreign commerce. Burdens and obstructions may be due to injurious action 
springing from other sources. The fundamental principle is that the power to 
regulate commerce is the power to enact ‘all appropriate legislation’ for its 
‘protection or advancement.’” (citations omitted)). 
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tempted in the least by the government’s reliance on the stream of 
commerce cases, preferring a straight-forward substantial effects 
approach: 
Although activities may be intrastate in character when 
separately considered, if they have such a close and 
substantial relation to interstate commerce that their 
control is essential or appropriate to protect that 
commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress 
cannot be denied the power to exercise that control.143 
Second, the Court acknowledged the direct/indirect test144 but said that 
whether something was direct or indirect was a matter of degree, 
decided by a practical factual evaluation. The Court recognized the 
series of cases where local activities had obviously impacted interstate 
commerce, but the cases had found that the impact was “indirect” as 
opposed to “direct.” The Court paid homage to those cases, saying that 
there had to be some limit on our federalist form of government, that 
federal power to regulate the effects of local activities on interstate 
commerce should not be “so indirect and remote” that it obliterated the 
difference between local and federal government.145 Then in one short 
sentence, the Court changed the direct/indirect test from some mystical 
mumble jumble to an exercise of practical reality: “The question is 
necessarily one of degree.”146 Later picking up that theme, it said that 
to call a disruption of the steel business by a strike “indirect or remote” 
disregarded that such a stoppage “would have a most serious effect 
upon interstate commerce,” that it was obvious that “it would be 
immediate and might be catastrophic.” 147  In calling these effects 
indirect, the Court said, “We are asked to shut our eyes to the plainest 
facts of our national life and to deal with the question of direct and 
																																																								
143 Id. at 37. 
144 Id. at 31–32 (“It is a familiar principle that acts which directly burden or 
obstruct interstate or foreign commerce, or its free flow, are within the reach of 
the congressional power. . . . Whether or not particular action does affect 
commerce in such a close and intimate fashion as to be subject to federal 
control . . . is left by the statute to be determined as individual cases arise.”). 
145 Id. at 37. Three times the Court equates a direct impact with “a close and 
intimate” impact, a seemingly closer relationship than the prevailing substantial 
effect test but if it meant the phrase to be more protective, it did not carry the 
day. Id. at 32, 37, 38. 
146 Id. at 37. 
147 Id. at 41. 
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indirect effects in an intellectual vacuum.”148 In then the deathblow to 
the old direct/indirect test, it concluded, “We have often said that 
interstate commerce itself is a practical conception. It is equally true 
that interferences with that commerce must be appraised by a 
judgment that does not ignore actual experience.”149 In applying the 
Court’s substantial effects test, any impact on interstate commerce was 
to be based upon a practical real-life factual evaluation, not based upon 
some metaphysical concept of direct versus indirect.150 
Third, the Court minimized E.C. Knight’s holding that 
manufacturing was not commerce. Citing other federal antitrust cases, 
the Court said that the defense’s reliance upon E.C. Knight “have been 
so necessarily and expressly decided to be unsound as to cause the 
contentions to be plainly foreclosed and to require no express 
notice.”151 It is not that the Court reversed E.C. Knight’s holding that 
manufacturing was not commerce, but rather that it did not matter if it 
was commerce or not. If the manufacturing substantially affected 
interstate commerce, it was subject to the federal commerce power.152 
																																																								
148 Id. More specifically, the Court did not turn blind eye of the impact on interstate 
commerce of nationally integrated companies, “When industries organize 
themselves on a national scale, making their relation to interstate commerce the 
dominant factor in their activities, how can it be maintained that their industrial 
labor relations constitute a forbidden field into which Congress may not enter 
when it is necessary to protect interstate commerce from the paralyzing 
consequences of industrial war?” Id. 
149 Id. at 41–42. 
150 Cf. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 308 (1936) (“If the production by 
one man of a single ton of coal intended for interstate sale and shipment, and 
actually so sold and shipped, affects interstate commerce indirectly, the effect 
does not become direct by multiplying the tonnage, or increasing the number of 
men employed, or adding to the expense or complexities of the business, or by 
all combined.”). 
151 Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 39. 
152 In Justice Thomas’ defense of the E.C. Knight case and its progeny, he 
disagrees, “If federal power extended to these types of production 
‘comparatively little of business operations and affairs would be left for state 
control.’” United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 598 (1995) (citations omitted) 
(Thomas, J., concurring); see also Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 
(1921) (“It is settled . . . that the power to regulate interstate and foreign 
commerce does not reach whatever is essential thereto. Without agriculture, 
manufacturing, mining, etc., commerce could not exist, but this fact does not 
suffice to subject them to the control of Congress”). “Whether or not 
manufacturing, agriculture, or other matters substantially affected interstate 
commerce was irrelevant.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 598 (citations omitted) (Thomas, 
J., concurring). 
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It cannot be overemphasized what a game changer Jones & 
Laughlin Steel was.153 McCulloch had only required that means to 
accomplish enumerated powers be “appropriate.” Gibbons had said 
that intrastate commerce must “affect” interstate commerce. The 
intervening tests varied from the hostile in E.C. Knight and Hammer to 
the practical in Southern Railway and The Shreveport Rate Cases to 
the metaphysical in Carter and Butler. In Jones & Laughlin Steel, the 
Court ignored Hammer, minimized the stream of commerce cases, 
distinguished E.C. Knight, and reframed the direct/indirect test into the 
substantial effects test, the first meaningful test for Congress’ power to 
regulate intrastate commerce or any other local activity affecting 
interstate commerce. 
The Court was respectful of the concern for our federalist 
system154 but did not mention the dual federalism doctrine per se. As 
to the line between too much power for the central government and too 
little, the Court was subtle if not coy: “The question is necessarily one 
of degree.”155 It thought that Southern Railway and, with the exception 
of E.C. Knight, many of the antitrust cases supported the view that 
intrastate activities with a “close and intimate relation to interstate 
commerce”156 was subject to federal control. Its position could not 
have been clearer: “[I]f Congress deems certain recurring practices 
though not really part of interstate commerce, likely to obstruct, 
restrain, or burden it, it has the power to subject them to national 
supervision and restraint.”157 
The key to the substantial effects test is that it is a practical one,158 
one not dependent upon the manipulations of the stream of commerce 
																																																								
153 Justice Kennedy says it simply, “The case that seems to mark the Court’s 
definitive commitment to the practical conception of the commerce power 
is NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. . . . .” Id. at 573 (citations omitted) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
154 Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 37 (1937) (“Undoubtedly the scope 
of this power must be considered in the light of our dual system of government 
and may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so 
indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex society, would 
effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local 
and create a completely centralized government.”). 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 37. 
157 Id. at 40 (quoting United Mine Workers of Am. v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 
344, 408 (1922)). 
158 In summing up the fact-based nature of its inquiry, the Court concluded, 
“[I]nterstate commerce itself is a practical conception. It is equally true that 
224 UMass Law Review v. 14 | 182 
cases, the vagaries of the direct/indirect test, or the fallacies of dual 
federalism. As the Court said, “In view of respondent’s far-flung 
activities, it is idle to say that the effect would be indirect or remote. It 
is obvious that it would be immediate and might be catastrophic.”159 
The impact on interstate commerce was not to be decided “in an 
intellectual vacuum.”160 The Court minced no words in rejecting a 
laissez-faire view of government power, “When industries organize 
themselves on a national scale, making their relation to interstate 
commerce the dominant factor in their activities, how can it be 
maintained that their industrial labor relations constitute a forbidden 
field into which Congress may not enter when it is necessary to protect 
interstate commerce from the paralyzing consequences of industrial 
war?”161 
																																																																																																																																			
interferences with that commerce must be appraised by a judgment that does not 
ignore actual experience.” Id. at 41–42. The following year in another N.L.R.B. 
case, the Court summarized its holding in Jones & Laughlin Steel, “The question 
that must be faced under the act upon particular facts is whether the unfair labor 
practices involved have such a close and substantial relation to the freedom of 
interstate commerce from injurious restraint that these practices may 
constitutionally be made the subject of federal cognizance through provisions 
looking to the peaceable adjustment of labor disputes.” Santa Cruz Fruit Packing 
Co. v. N.L.R.B., 303 U.S. 453, 467 (1938). 
159 Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 41. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. Just two years later, the Court said that national scale was not determinative. 
See N.L.R.B. v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 606 (1939) (“Nor do we think it 
important, as respondents seem to argue, that the volume of the commerce here 
involved, though substantial, was relatively small as compared with that in the 
cases arising under the National Labor Relations Act which have hitherto 
engaged our attention. The power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce is 
plenary and extends to all such commerce be it great or small.”). Fainblatt, a 
New Jersey operation, made women’s sports garment out of fabrics sent from 
New York and returned to New York dealers or directly to customers in other 
states. Id. at 602–03. The Fainblatt case introduced the concept of class or 
aggregate impact. Though businesses like Fainblatt had an average of only thity-
two employees, the women’s clothing industry consisted of over 3,414 
businesses and ranked ninth in number of workers employed nationally. Id. at 
608 n.2. 
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VI. APPLYING THE SUBSTANTIAL EFFECTS TEST 
The first key case following Jones & Laughlin Steel was United 
States v. Darby.162 Darby did not advance the substantial effects test to 
any significant degree, but it did some important clean-up work. Darby 
involved the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). The FLSA based its 
regulation of minimum wages and maximum hours on two different 
aspects of the federal commerce power. In 1938 when the FLSA was 
passed, Congress was still uncertain as to the scope of its power to 
regulate interstate commerce, so it sought to use both its power over 
things in interstate commerce and its power to regulate local activities 
affecting interstate commerce. Section 1 163  made “unlawful the 
shipment in interstate commerce of any goods” made in violation of 
the acts wage and hour provisions.164 Section 2 made unlawful the 
violation of the act as to “employees engaged in production of goods 
for commerce.”165 
Fred W. Darby operated a lumber company in Georgia using raw 
material from Georgia but shipping much of the finished lumber to 
other states. He paid his employees less than the then twenty-five cents 
minimum wage in violation of the Act. The lower court had found the 
FLSA unconstitutional on the basis of the Hammer case. The Court 
																																																								
162 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). Falling between Jones & Laughlin 
Steel and Darby was Currin v. Wallace, where the Court upheld against an 
enumerated powers challenge the Tobacco Inspection Act of August 23, 1935. 
See Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939). The Act allowed federal inspection of 
tobacco at tobacco auctions one hour prior to the sell, some of the tobacco 
intended for interstate and foreign commerce, some not. See id. at 11 (“Here, the 
transactions on the tobacco market were conducted indiscriminately at virtually 
the same time, and in a manner which made it necessary, if the congressional 
rule were to be applied, to make it govern all the tobacco thus offered for sale.”). 
163 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 45 U.S.C. § 15(a)(1) (repealed 1994). 
164 Darby, 312 U.S. at 110. After Darby, there are no discernable limits on 
Congress ability to regulate goods moving in interstate commerce. 
165 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 45 U.S.C. § 15(a)(2) (repealed 1994). Unlike 
much federal legislation, which required that the Court or some administrative 
agency, such as the N.L.R.B. in Jones & Laughlin Steel, find that some local 
activity affected interstate commerce, the FLSA specifically found that 
violations of the wage and hour by businesses producing goods for shipment in 
interstate commerce did affect interstate commerce. As the Darby court points 
out, earlier acts, such as the Safety Appliance Act and the Railway Labor Act 
had also made similar findings. Darby, 312 U.S. at 120. This aspect of Darby 
became important in the first round of the rational basis cases as represented by 
Katzenbach v. McClung. 
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reversed Hammer.166 Section 1 was premised entirely on Congress’ 
power to regulate goods in commerce, “While manufacture is not of 
itself interstate commerce the shipment of manufactured goods 
interstate is such commerce and the prohibition of such shipment by 
Congress is indubitably a regulation of the commerce.”167 Regulation 
of goods in commerce knew of no limits: “The power of Congress 
over interstate commerce ‘is complete in itself, may be exercised to its 
utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are 
prescribed by the constitution.’” 168  If it was interstate commerce, 
Congress could regulate it. There is no clearer form of federal 
commerce power. 169  Any motive of Congress to use interstate 
commerce as a cover for regulating some local activity was 
irrelevant.170 The fact that the federal law might interfere with local 
police power was meaningless: “It is no objection to the assertion of 
the power to regulate interstate commerce that its exercise is attended 
																																																								
166 Darby, 312 U.S. at 116 (“The distinction on which the [Hammer] decision was 
rested that Congressional power to prohibit interstate commerce is limited to 
articles which in themselves have some harmful or deleterious property—a 
distinction which was novel when made and unsupported by any provision of 
the Constitution—has long since been abandoned.”). 
167 Id. at 113. 
168 Id. at 114 (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824)). 
169 Whether merely crossing state lines should always bring into play federal 
commerce power is an issue worthy of discussion, but it is beyond the scope of 
this article which involves Congress’ ability to regulate activity that does not 
cross state lines. The issue was raised in N.L.R.B. v. White Swan Co., but the 
case was resolved on procedural grounds. N.L.R.B. v. White Swan Co., 313 
U.S. 23, 26 (1941) (“Where a local business, such as a laundry, is located in a 
city on a state line, and is not engaged in interstate commerce, except in so far as 
it may collect articles to be serviced and may make deliveries to customers 
living across the state line, is such business, by reason of such collections and 
deliveries, deemed engaged in ‘commerce’ within the meaning of [the NLRA] 
so that an unfair labor practice on its part would be an unfair labor practice 
‘affecting commerce’ . . . .”). For an argument that Congress power to regulate 
things crossing state lines goes too far, see Barry Friedman & Genevieve 
Lakier, “To Regulate,” Not “To Prohibit”: Limiting the Commerce Power, 
2012 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 290 (2012) (“In short, the reasoning of these cases 
became strained and completely formalistic. The mere fact that a good or a 
person crossed a state line was deemed sufficient to give Congress the power to 
ban it.”). 
170 Darby, 312 U.S. at 114 (“Such regulation is not a forbidden invasion of state 
power merely because either its motive or its consequence is to restrict the use 
of articles of commerce within the states of destination and is not prohibited 
unless by other Constitutional provisions.”). 
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by the same incidents which attend the exercise of the police power of 
the states.”171 
As for Section 2, “with respect to all employees engaged in the 
production of goods for interstate commerce,” since the employees 
were not actually engaged in interstate commerce, the issue was 
whether the production was “so related to the commerce and so affects 
it as to be within the reach of the power of Congress to regulate it.”172 
The Court said, starting with McCulloch and Gibbons that Congress’ 
power extended “to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate 
commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to make 
regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate 
end, the exercise of the granted power of Congress to regulate 
interstate commerce.”173 The Court rejected the fallacy of E.C. Knight, 
that since local activity was within the scope of state power, it could 
not be regulated by Congress: “In the absence of Congressional 
legislation on the subject state laws which are not regulations of the 
commerce itself or its instrumentalities are not forbidden even though 
they affect interstate commerce. But it does not follow that Congress 
may not by appropriate legislation regulate intrastate activities where 
they have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”174 Other than 
shortening the Jones & Laughlin Steel phrase from “close and 
substantial” to just “a substantial effect,” the Darby case does not 
expand the test. Darby did go beyond Jones & Laughlin Steel in 
defending the test’s constitutional validity. The Darby court said, “But 
long before the adoption of the National Labor Relations Act, this 
																																																								
171 Id. This language, despite its sparseness, is in effect a rejection of the doctrine of 
dual federalism. But if there was any doubt about the Court’s meaning, Darby 
explicitly rejected the dual federalism doctrine. Id. at 124 (“The [tenth] 
amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not been 
surrendered.”); see Consol. Edison Co. of New York v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 
219–20 (1938) (“It does not follow, however, because these operations of the 
utilities are of vast concern to the people of the City and State of New York, that 
they do not also involve the interests of interstate and foreign commerce in such 
a degree that the Federal Government was entitled to intervene for their 
protection.”); see also Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S 1, 11–12 (1939) (“Congress is 
not to be denied the exercise of its constitutional authority in prescribing 
regulations merely because these may have the quality of police regulations.”). 
172 Darby, 312 U.S. at 117. 
173 Id. at 118. 
174 Id. at 119 (citations omitted). This holding is a further rejection of dual 
federalism. Just because something fell within state power did not preclude 
federal power. 
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Court had many times held that the power of Congress to regulate 
interstate commerce extends to the regulation through legislative 
action of activities intrastate which have a substantial effect on the 
commerce or the exercise of the Congressional power over it.” 175 
Darby also mentioned the importance of the class or aggregate impact 
of smaller business on interstate commerce, which becomes a key to 
modern commerce power.176 
Perhaps the most maligned substantial effects case was Wickard v. 
Filburn.177 Wickard upheld the Agricultural Adjustment Act (“AAA”) 
																																																								
175 Id. at 119–20. Darby’s original contribution to this debate was with respect to 
other enumerated powers: “Congress . . . may choose the means reasonably 
adapted to the attainment of the permitted end, even though they involve control 
of intrastate activities. Such legislation has often been sustained with respect to 
powers, other than the commerce power granted to the national government, 
when the means chosen, although not themselves within the granted power, 
were nevertheless deemed appropriate aids to the accomplishment of some 
purpose within an admitted power of the national government.” Id. at 121. 
Examples included the Lever Act passed during World I that allowed the 
President to limit the use of food additives in the manufacture of beer, which 
was found within the War Powers. See Jacob Ruppert, Inc. v. Caffey, 251 U.S. 
264 (1920). A federal ban on the prescribing of “intoxicating malt liquors for 
medicinal purposes” was found within the enumerated power under Section 2 of 
the Eighteenth Amendment to pass “appropriate legislation” as to the prohibition 
of alcoholic beverages in Section 1 of the Eighteenth Amendment. See James 
Everard’s Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545, 554 (1924). A more obtuse citation 
was Westfall v. United States, which found that a crime involving a state bank 
fell within the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. Westfall v. United States, 274 U.S. 
256 (1927). The case itself does not deal with whether the Federal Reserve 
Board itself fell within any enumerated power. See generally McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
176 See Darby, 312 U.S. at 123 (“Congress [in the FLSA] has made no distinction as 
to the volume or amount of shipments in the commerce or of production for 
commerce by any particular shipper or producer. It recognized that in present 
day industry, competition by a small part may affect the whole and that the total 
effect of the competition of many small producers may be great. The legislation 
aimed at a whole embraces all its parts.” (citations omitted)). 
177 The case of Wickard v. Filburn has become the shibboleth for overreaching 
federal power. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). Mr. Filburn was 
subject to a financial penalty of 49 cents a bushel, or $117.11 in all. Id. at 114–
15. The penalty was actually far more severe because the crop could not be sold 
without a compliance certificate. See id. At 60 pounds per bushel, this would be 
14,340 pounds too much wheat, almost 3 1/2 truckloads in a Ford F250. See 
Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REV. 674, 674 (1995) 
(Professor Merritt frames it humorously by quoting from her law school student 
musical spoof sung to the tune of “Convoy.” “His name was farmer Filburn, we 
looked in on his wheat sales. We caught him exceeding his quota. A criminal 
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of 1938 that fixed a quota on the acreage and the amount of various 
commodities that a farmer could grow.178 As for Farmer Filburn, he 
planted twenty-three acres producing 462 bushels of wheat, 
considerably over his allotted eleven acres and an excess of 239 
bushels of wheat. The AAA went beyond the FLSA in Darby in that 
Darby involved lumber either in commerce or intended for interstate 
transportation, while Wickard involved wheat grown on Farmer 
Filburn’s farm primarily intended for consumption on his farm by his 
animals and his family.179 There was no evidence that any part of 
																																																																																																																																			
hard as nails. He said, ‘I don’t sell none interstate.’ I said, ‘That don’t mean cow 
flop. We think you’re affecting commerce.’ And I set fire to his crop, HOT 
DAMN! Cause we got interstate commerce Ain’t no where to run! We gone 
regulate you That’s how we have fun. You made a call last Thursday long 
distance to Bayonne. We gone put you out of business, an’ disconnect your 
phone. COMMERCE!”); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 151 (1971) 
(“Decisions which followed [Gibbons] departed from that view; but by the time 
of United States v. Darby, and Wickard v. Filburn, the broader view of the 
Commerce Clause announced by Chief Justice Marshall had been restored.” 
(citations omitted)); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 552 
(2012) (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)) (“Wickard has long 
been regarded as ‘perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause 
authority over intrastate activity,’ . . . .”). But see Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 
183, 196 n.27 (1968), overruled by Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 
833 (1976) (“Neither here nor in Wickard had the Court declared that Congress 
may use a relatively trivial impact on commerce as an excuse for broad general 
regulation of state or private activities. The Court has said only that where a 
general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de 
minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of no 
consequence.”). 
178 See United States v. Stangland, 242 F.2d 843, 845 (7th Cir. 1957) (“As 
announced in Wickard v. Filburn, the general purpose of 
the Agricultural Adjustment Act, insofar as it relates to wheat, is to control 
production in order to avoid the problems resulting from deficits or surpluses. In 
furtherance of this objective, the Secretary of Agriculture is required to establish 
a national acreage allotment for each successive wheat crop, which, in turn, is 
apportioned among the farms of the nation.” (citations omitted)). 
179 See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 114. Farmer Filburn’s practice was “to sell a portion of 
the crop,” but the rest was used “to feed part to poultry and livestock on the 
farm,” “in making flour for home consumption,” and “the rest for the following 
seeding.” Id. In an earlier challenge to the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the 
Court, using the stream of commerce fiction, found the case within Congress’ 
ability to regulate things in commerce. See Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38, 47 
(1939) (“The statute does not purport to control production. It sets no limit upon 
the acreage which may be planted or produced and imposes no penalty for the 
planting and producing of tobacco in excess of the marketing quota. It purports 
to be solely a regulation of interstate commerce, which it reaches and affects at 
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Farmer Filburn’s excess wheat had moved or was ever intended to 
move in interstate commerce.180 The Court readily acknowledged that 
Congress was pushing the envelope, “Even today, when this power has 
been held to have great latitude, there is no decision of this Court that 
such activities may be regulated where no part of the product is 
intended for interstate commerce or intermingled with the subjects 
thereof.”181 
Despite Wickard’s criticism, reading Justice Jackson opinion in 
Wickard is a textbook example of lucidity of reasoning and writing 
after the long historical slug through cases like E.C. Knight and 
Hammer. It is like waking up from a horrible dream. In one recurring 
dream I have, I am helping to herd sheep into a corral, but they keep 
escaping from a back gate, and no one will listen to me. In Wickard, 
all the back gates are closed. 182  Every law professor has his own 
hypothetical, often involving vegetables from someone’s backyard 
garden,183  to emphasize Wickard’s overreach. Wickard is criticized 
																																																																																																																																			
the throat where tobacco enters the stream of commerce,—the marketing 
warehouse.”). 
180 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 114. There was actually no evidence as what was to be 
done with the crop from his excess acreage. Id. (“The intended disposition of the 
crop here involved has not been expressly stated.”). It is worth noting that 
Wickard does not cite to Jones & Laughlin Steel, that Darby is its benchmark 
case. Id. at 118. The Court does, however, quote the “close and substantial” 
relationship language as found in the Shreveport Rate Cases. Id. at 123. 
181 Id. at 120. It was enough under the act that it was “available for marketing.” Id. 
at 119. There was no requirement that “any part of the wheat either within or 
without the quota is sold or intended to be sold.” Id. 
182 See id. at 124–25. The Court rejected the E.C. Knight open gate around the 
Commerce Clause, “Whether the subject of the regulation in question was 
‘production,’ ‘consumption,’ or ‘marketing’ is, therefore, not material for 
purposes of deciding the question of federal power before us.” Id. at 124. The 
direct/indirect back gate was also closed, “But even if appellee’s activity be 
local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its 
nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on 
interstate commerce and this irrespective of whether such effect is what might at 
some earlier time have been defined as ‘direct’ or ‘indirect.’” Id. at 125. 
183 Justice O’Connor seemed to reject this legal trope. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 
1, 51 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Wickard, then, did not extend 
Commerce Clause authority to something as modest as the home cook’s herb 
garden.”). Perhaps because of my long career in Malibu, California, my go to 
hypothetical involves the federal government’s regulating avocado seeds 
germinating in a glass jar secured by three strategically placed toothpicks, not 
one of these seeds having ever verifiably survived to actually grow into a 
producing tree. See generally Will Brokaw, Growing an Avocado Tree From a 
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because no goods ever actually move in interstate commerce, and 
because the most de minimis of grain was said to impact the interstate 
and foreign price of wheat. Although not the first case to use the 
concept, Wickard is usually associated with the use of the class or 
aggregate impact doctrine to satisfy the substantial effects test.184 In 
Wickard, the facts are persuasive that the class impact of homegrown 
and home-consumed wheat on the price of interstate and foreign 
commerce was substantial, if not dramatic. 
The demonization of Wickard as judicial overreach is unjustified. 
There were ample facts supporting the Court’s decision. Unlike in 
other Commerce Clause cases where the Court has taken judicial 
notice of facts supporting the substantial impact on interstate 
commerce, 185   in Wickard the opposing parties had “stipulated a 
summary of the economics of the wheat industry.”186 Three key facts 
emerged. First, the interstate commerce in wheat was “large and 
important.”187 Second, there was a large international market in wheat 
that much impacted interstate commerce.188 Third, homegrown and 
home-consumed wheat was far from a trivial factor in the market. The 
Court said that the consumption of homegrown wheat “constitutes the 
																																																																																																																																			
Seed, http://www.willsavocados.com/index.php/grow-avocado-tree 
[https://perma.cc/PJ8N-Y29D] (last visited Mar. 16, 2019) (“Ungrafted” trees 
(like those grown inside from seeds) rarely produce fruit.”). 
184 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 549 (2012) 
(“Congress’s power, moreover, is not limited to regulation of an activity that by 
itself substantially affects interstate commerce, but also extends to activities that 
do so only when aggregated with similar activities of others.” (citing Wickard, 
317 U.S. at 127–128)). 
185 See e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 252 (1964) 
(“While the Act as adopted carried no congressional findings the record of its 
passage through each house is replete with evidence of the burdens that 
discrimination by race or color places upon interstate commerce.”); Katzenbach 
v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964) (“Here, of course, Congress had included 
no formal findings. But their absence is not fatal to the validity of the statute, for 
the evidence presented at the hearings fully indicated the nature and effect of the 
burdens on commerce which Congress meant to alleviate.” (citations omitted)). 
186 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125. 
187 Id. Its problems were national in scope. Id. (“Although wheat is raised in every 
state but one, production in most states is not equal to consumption.”). 
188 Id. (“Largely as a result of increased foreign production and import restrictions, 
annual exports of wheat and flour from the United States during the ten-year 
period ending in 1940 averaged less than 10 per cent of total production, while 
during the 1920’s they averaged more than 25 per cent.”). 
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most variable factor in the disappearance of the wheat crop,”189 that it 
had a variability factor of 20%.190 The bottom line is that when the 
price of wheat was high, farmers sold it in the interstate and foreign 
markets. When it was cheap, they fed it to their livestock and made 
flour for home consumption.191 
The class or aggregate impact of homegrown and home-consumed 
wheat could hardly be more obvious. On the other hand, the impact of 
Farmer Filburn’s 239 extra bushels would be like a grain of sand 
compared with the total production of wheat in the United States.192 It 
is hard to argue with the fact that in determining whether any 
particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce, that the 
aggregate impact of the class of like activities has to be considered. 
That is surely the basis of all legislation. There might be little harm in 
ignoring a stop sign in some distant point in the wheat fields of Kansas 
with visibility in all directions, but if widely ignored, there would be 
traffic chaos. Wickard was not the first case to use the aggregate or 
class impact test, but it still remains its most famous example. The 
Court’s finding that the class or aggregate impact of all homegrown 
home-consumed wheat had enough of an impact on interstate 
commerce seems supported by the facts. 
Interestingly, the Court nowhere mentions Jones & Laughlin Steel 
but rather emphasized the holding of The Shreveport Rate Cases in 
1914, that intrastate rates could be revised “because of the economic 
effects which they had upon interstate commerce,”193 that local matters 
having “a close and substantial relation to interstate traffic”194 were 
subject to federal power. Justice Jackson also quoted then current 
																																																								
189 Id. at 127. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 128 (“But if we assume that it is never marketed, it supplies a need of the 
man who grew it which would otherwise be reflected by purchases in the open 
market. Home-grown wheat in this sense competes with wheat in commerce.”). 
192 See Wheat Facts, NAT’L ASS’N OF WHEAT GROWERS, 
https://www.wheatworld.org/wheat-101/wheat-facts/ [https://perma.cc/FN9L-
5GZY] (last visited Mar. 21, 2019) (“In 2008/2009, U.S. farmers grew nearly 
2.4 billion bushels of wheat on 63 million acres of land”); see also Top Wheat 
Producing Countries, WORLD ATLAS, https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/top-
wheat-producing-countries.html [https://perma.cc/9JLQ-RS7L] (last visited 
Mar. 21, 2019) (stating that the United States is currently fourth in wheat 
production trailing (3) Russia, (2) India and (1) China). 
193 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 123. 
194 Id. (quoting the Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342, 351 (1914)). 
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Chief Justice Stone’s description of federal power in the 1942 case of 
United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Company: 
The commerce power is not confined in its exercise to 
the regulation of commerce among the states. It extends 
to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate 
commerce, or the exertion of the power of Congress 
over it, as to make regulation of them appropriate 
means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the 
effective execution of the granted power to regulate 
interstate commerce. . . . Hence the reach of that power 
extends to those intrastate activities which in a 
substantial way interfere with or obstruct the exercise 
of the granted power.195 
The quoted test is an interesting one in that Chief Justice Stone 
referred to regulating local activities as an “appropriate means to the 
attainment of a legitimate end,”196 which as discussed later, is close to 
a rational basis test. Of course, Stone also refers to the substantial 
effects test. Finally, Wickard itself concludes in the language of the 
substantial effects test, 
The stimulation of commerce is a use of the regulatory 
function quite as definitely as prohibitions or 
restrictions thereon. This record leaves us in no doubt 
that Congress may properly have considered that wheat 
consumed on the farm where grown if wholly outside 
the scheme of regulation would have a substantial effect 
in defeating and obstructing its purpose to stimulate 
trade therein at increased prices.197 
The case most representing the overreach of commerce power is not 
Wickard but the 1971 case Perez v. United States. 198  In Perez, 
Congress made loan sharking a federal crime subject to as much as 
																																																								
195 Id. at 124 (quoting United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 
(1942)). The Court in Wrightwood held that Congress could regulate the local 
sale of milk because it competed with milk shipped interstate. Wrightwood 
Dairy Co., 315 U.S. at 125. 
196 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941) (where Chief Justice Stone 
first used this framing of the test). 
197 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128–29. 
198 Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971). 
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twenty years in prison. 199  Unlike what is common with regard to 
federal criminal statutes, there was no “jurisdictional peg”200 to tie 
loan sharking to the channels of interstate commerce or to any effect 
on interstate commerce. 201  Congress did include a declaration of 
																																																								
199 See United States v. Perez, 426 F.2d 1073, 1074 (2d Cir. 1970) (“The statute 
was enacted as Title II of the Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968 and 
amended Title 18 of the United States Code by adding Chapter 42, sections 891–
96, which deal with ‘Extortionate Credit Transactions.’”). 
200 See id. at 1075. Jurisdictional peg is a common concept, not actually dealing 
with jurisdiction but with Congress’ specifically tying a law to its commerce 
power. Jurisdictional peg is the phrase used by the Second Circuit in the opinion 
in Perez. Id. (“We will concede at the outset that almost all federal criminal 
statutes are so drafted that the connection with federal interests—the federal 
jurisdictional peg—must be proved in each case because such connection is 
incorporated into the definition of the offense.”). As examples of jurisdictional 
pegs, the lower court in Perez mentioned the Hobbs Act (“obstructing or 
affecting interstate commerce or movements of commodities in commerce by 
robbery or extortion”), the Interstate Communications Act (“ . . . transmitting 
kidnapping or extortion threats by means of interstate commerce”), and an 
interstate prostitution act (“transporting women in interstate commerce for 
prostitution, etc.”). Id. at 1075, 1075 n.1. See also Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 
1222, 1231 (9th Cir. 2003) (“a ‘jurisdictional hook’ (i.e., limitation) that would 
limit the reach of the statute to a discrete set of cases that substantially affect 
interstate commerce.”). The Supreme Court in Perez mentions as an example of 
protecting against the misuse of the channels of interstate commerce one of the 
more interesting examples of the use of jurisdictional pegs, the Lindberg Act 
passed after the kidnapping of the Lindberg baby. The Lindberg Act had a three-
part jurisdictional peg, (1) either that the kidnapped victim “is willfully 
transported in interstate or foreign commerce,” (2) the kidnapper “travels in 
interstate or foreign commerce” or (3) that the kidnapper “uses the mail or any 
means, facility, or instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce.” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1201(a)(1) (2006). The Supreme Court mentions two other jurisdictional pegs 
as examples of protecting instrumentalities of interstate commerce, the 
destruction of an aircraft “used, operated, or employed in interstate, overseas, or 
foreign air commerce,”, and theft from interstate shipments “in interstate or 
foreign commerce.” Perez, 402 U.S. at 150 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 32 (2006); 18 
U.S.C. § 659 (2012)). 
201 Perez categorized the commerce power cases: “The Commerce Clause reaches, 
in the main, three categories of problems. First, the use of channels of interstate 
or foreign commerce which Congress deems are being misused, as, for example, 
the shipment of stolen goods or of persons who have been kidnaped. Second, 
protection of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, as for example, the 
destruction of an aircraft, or persons or things in commerce, as, for example, 
thefts from interstate shipments. Third, those activities affecting commerce. It is 
with this last category that we are here concerned.” Perez, 402 U.S. at 150 
(citations omitted). This three-part category is widely used by the Supreme 
Court but in the more common form found in Lopez. See United States v. Lopez, 
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“Findings and purpose” to the Act, which stated that, “Organized 
crime is interstate and international in character” involving “billions of 
dollars each year,” and that much of that illicit income “is generated 
by extortionate credit transactions,” that is, loan sharking.202 Further, 
the findings continued, loan sharking was both carried out using 
interstate and foreign commerce “to a substantial extent” and even 
when strictly intrastate, “they nevertheless directly affect interstate and 
foreign commerce.”203 
But the law did not require the trial court to find any interstate 
activities to make it a federal crime.204 To compound the problem, the 
actual crime in Perez could hardly have been more local in nature. 
Perez, apparently a New Yorker, had loaned $3,000 to a New York 
City butcher to build a local butcher shop. The butcher had attempted 
but failed to get more conventional financing. The only even remote 
reference to the broader world of loan sharking was that Perez 
“threatened [the butcher] with hospitalization, harm to his family, the 
attention of persons higher in the moneylending chain, as well as an 
ominous ‘or else,’ if repayments should not be promptly 
forthcoming.”205 It was enough for the federal crime that Perez was a 
loan shark, which he undoubtedly was. Other than Perez’ assertion that 
he might bring the unpaid loan to “the attention of persons higher in 
the moneylending chain,” there was no evidence that Perez had any 
																																																																																																																																			
514 U.S. 549, 588–89 (1995). Only the third category is emphasized in this 
article. 
202 Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968, Pub.L. No. 90-321, § 201, 82 Stat. 
146, 159 (1968). 
203 The findings also mentioned that loan sharking had an adverse impact on the 
Bankruptcy Act, bankruptcy power being an alternative federal enumerated 
power. Id. 
204 18 U.S.C. § 891(6) (“An extortionate extension of credit is any extension of 
credit with respect to which it is the understanding of the creditor and the debtor 
at the time it is made that delay in making repayment or failure to make 
repayment could result in the use of violence or other criminal means to cause 
harm to the person, reputation, or property of any person.”). Indeed, no part of 
the actual law referenced any aspect of interstate commerce. But see Perez, 426 
F.2d at 1082 (“The statute here questioned is unprecedented in making a federal 
crime of conduct related to interstate commerce only by an assumed effect on 
such commerce. In all previous federal criminal statutes proof of some specific 
connection with interstate commerce such as movement across state lines or the 
use of some instrumentality of interstate commerce, such as the mails, has been 
required.” (Hays, J., dissenting)). 
205 Perez, 426 F.2d at 1074. 
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association with organized crime or any other interstate connections, 
but that hardly mattered. No part of the law required any connection to 
interstate commerce, and no part of the transaction involved interstate 
commerce.206 
The Court’s emphasis in Perez was the class or aggregate impact, 
“Petitioner is clearly a member of the class which engages in 
‘extortionate credit transactions’ as defined by Congress and the 
description of that class has the required definiteness.” 207  After 
discussing Heart of Atlanta Motel and McClung, but without 
mentioning the rational basis test for which those cases are 
noteworthy, it picked up the class impact theme again, “In emphasis of 
our position that it was the class of activities regulated that was the 
measure, we acknowledged that Congress appropriately considered the 
‘total incidence’ of the practice on commerce.”208 And then concluded, 
“Where the class of activities is regulated and that class is within the 
reach of federal power, the courts have no power ‘to excise, as trivial, 
individual instances’ of the class.”209 
The Court then followed this up with a series of conclusions: 
“Extortionate credit transactions, though purely intrastate, may in the 
judgment of Congress affect interstate commerce.” 210  It continued, 
“The findings by Congress are quite adequate on that 
ground.” 211  Congressional hearings showed that “The loan shark 
racket provides organized crime with its second most lucrative source 
of revenue, exacts millions from the pockets of people, coerces its 
victims into the commission of crimes against property, and causes the 
takeover by racketeers of legitimate businesses.”212 And finally, far 
from being just a local crime, “Loan sharking in its national setting is 
one way organized interstate crime holds its guns to the heads of the 
																																																								
206 See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 337 (1971) (interpreting the possession 
portion of the federal law making it a crime for a felon “who receives, possesses, 
or transports in commerce or affecting commerce,” to require the government to 
show some connection to interstate commerce). The Court in Bass reserved the 
question as to whether the commerce power required such a connection. See 
generally id. 
207 Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 153 (1971). 
208 Id. at 154 (footnote omitted). 
209 Id. 
210 Id. This is the closest Perez comes to mentioning or applying the rational basis 
test. 
211 Id. at 155. 
212 Id. at 156. 
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poor and the rich alike and syphons funds from numerous localities to 
finance its national operations.”213 Although the Perez majority did not 
mention the rational basis test, this use of congressional hearings to 
justify the claimed impact on interstate commerce is reminiscent of the 
use of committee hearings in rational basis due process cases.214 
There are two difficulties with the Perez opinion. First, the class or 
aggregate impact reasoning does not work. There was no showing that 
Perez was part of any out of state or organized crime syndicate.215 An 
impact of zero can be multiplied by infinity, and it is still zero. Justice 
Stewart, the lone dissenter, framed it well; “But under the statute 
before us a man can be convicted without any proof of interstate 
movement, of the use of the facilities of interstate commerce, or of 
facts showing that his conduct affected interstate commerce.” 216 
Second, there is nothing about the crime of loan sharking that 
distinguishes it from all other crimes. Why was there a need to define 
prostitution in terms of interstate travel if supporting organized crime 
was enough to fall within Congress’ commerce power?217 Here again, 
Justice Stewart hit it on the head, “But it is not enough to say that loan 
sharking is a national problem, for all crime is a national problem . . . 
And the circumstance that loan sharking has an adverse impact on 
interstate business is not a distinguishing attribute, for interstate 
business suffers from almost all criminal activity, be it shoplifting or 
violence in the streets.”218 
Because Wickard involved a measly extra 239 bushels of 
homegrown and home-consumed wheat, it seems to exemplify 
																																																								
213 Id. at 157. 
214 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 148 (1938) (relying 
largely on congressional hearings). In Carolene Products, the seminal due 
process case, the Court stated that “The Filled Milk Act was adopted by 
Congress after committee hearings, in the course of which eminent scientists and 
health experts testified.” Id. 
215 See Perez, 402 U.S. at 147–48. The Supreme Court facts say that Miranda, a 
butcher, obtained an extortionist loan of $3,000 from Perez, both borrower and 
lender presumably from New York but neither residency is actually stated. See 
id. The Court mentions a threat of Perez to turn the collection over “to people 
who would not be nice but who would put him in the hospital if he did not pay” 
but that threat also contained no reference to out-of-state residency. See id. 
216 Id. at 157 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
217 See Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 317–18 (1913) (considering the 
constitutionality of a law that forbade the transportation of a woman in interstate 
commerce for the purpose of prostitution). 
218 Perez, 402 U.S. at 157–58 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
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commerce power overreach. But the class impact in Wickard was 
undeniable, a 20% variable in what was a volatile international market. 
Perez involved organized crime’s second most leading source of 
income, so the impact on interstate commerce seems obvious beyond 
comment. But Perez loaned $3,000 to a local butcher, all aspects 
occurring in New York City, and however brutal Perez’ threats were, it 
is hard to see the federal interest.219 No matter the pot of money going 
to organized crime across the country, there was no evidence tying 
Perez to any part of that national class or aggregate impact.220 
Furthermore, in Wickard, only the federal government had the 
power to control the supply of wheat in the international and national 
market.221 Any individual state could have regulated only the wheat in 
that state. In Perez on the other hand, New York State would have had 
the ability to prosecute Perez for his threat of physical violence against 
the New York City butcher. There was absolutely no need for the 
federal government to step into the case, further congesting federal 
courts with what were essentially local crimes.222 Unlike something 
like the Lindberg Act, which criminalized the transportation of a 
kidnap victim across interstate lines,223 where any one state authority 
																																																								
219 See United States v. Perez, 426 F.2d 1073, 1083 (2d Cir. 1970) (Hays, J., 
dissenting). The opinion in the Second Circuit was no more helpful as to any 
out-of-state connection, but the dissenting Justice Hays summarized the case, 
“Here Congress has sought to use the Commerce Clause as a basis for criminal 
sanctions on purely local activity.” Id. 
220 See generally Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (suggesting an alternative 
explanation for Perez is that it would have been too difficult to prove the federal 
crime if some actual connection to organized crime was required). 
221 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125–26 (1942). The marketing of wheat was 
international in scope, with Argentina, Australia, Canada, and the United States 
being the four largest exporters. Id. In stipulations by the parties, it was revealed 
that wheat was raised in all but one. Id. at 125. Sixteen states had a surplus of 
wheat, and thirty-two states and the District of Columbia produced less than 
they consumed. Id. 
222 The lower court in Perez stated that Congress in its findings refuted that 
organized crime was a subject more appropriate for the states. Perez, 426 F.2d at 
1080 (“The legislative history also shows recognition by Congress that the states 
alone cannot control organized crime, including loan-sharking, while federal 
efforts are better able to do so.” (footnote omitted)). 
223 See United States v. Wills, 234 F.3d 174, 176 (4th Cir. 2000) (“The 
Federal Kidnapping Act was enacted by Congress to stem an increasing tide 
of interstate kidnappings and to curb an epidemic of criminals who purposely 
took advantage of the lack of coordination among state law enforcement 
agencies.”). The Federal Kidnapping Act currently provides: “(a) Whoever 
unlawfully seizes, confines, inveigles, decoys, kidnaps, abducts, or carries away 
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might have trouble following, federal power did not enhance in any 
way the prosecution of Perez. Even assuming that loan sharking was 
the national problem that the government claimed, that could have 
been addressed by funding state programs addressing the issue. There 
was no need for the federal government to involve itself in what was 
every way a local issue. Perez, not Wickard, is the poster child of 
federal overreach. 
VII. THE RATIONAL BASIS TEST BECOMES PART OF THE 
COMMERCE POWER 
Nothing seems to be more local than racism, but Heart of Atlanta 
Motel v. United States224 found that racial discrimination by places of 
accommodation against persons traveling interstate rationally related 
to interstate commerce and was subject to federal regulation. 
Katzenbach v. McClung225 took the reasoning a step further and found 
that racial discrimination by restaurants serving only local customers 
but who bought some portion of their supplies in interstate commerce 
impacted interstate commerce and was subject to federal control. One 
can quickly see the logic of Heart of Atlanta Motel, that a black 
businesswoman would have great difficulty traveling interstate in her 
business dealings because of racial discrimination by hotels and 
motels. It is harder to see the interstate impact of racial discrimination 
against local black families by racist restaurants who did not serve 
interstate travelers. This is not intended to deemphasize the odium of 
such discrimination, but just to raise doubt about the impact on 
interstate commerce. 
Both Heart of Atlanta Motel and McClung as companion cases, 
involved the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 
was a workaround to avoid the 1883 Civil Rights Cases, 226 which had 
held that Congress did not have the power to remedy private violations 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 227  The Civil Rights Cases held 
																																																																																																																																			
and holds for ransom or reward or otherwise any person . . . when— (1) the 
person is willfully transported in interstate or foreign commerce . . .”). Id. at 176 
– 77 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)). 
224 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
225 Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
226 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
227 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., 379 U.S. at 284 (“The Senate Committee laid 
emphasis on the Commerce Clause. The use of the Commerce Clause to 
surmount what was thought to be the obstacle of the Civil Rights Cases is 
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unconstitutional the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which criminalized 
racial discrimination by private places of public accommodation and 
other public uses. 228  The Court in the Civil Rights Cases gave a 
limiting construction to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment says that “No State . . . shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the 
laws.”229 Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the 
power “to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this 
article.” 230  The Civil Rights Cases said that Section 5 meant that 
Congress could pass legislation only as to “state action” in violation of 
the substantive provisions, not as in the Civil Rights Act “private 
acts.”231 Racial discrimination by the private Grand Opera House in 
New York was certainly odious, but it did not come within federal 
power under Section 5 because no state action was involved.232 Since 
																																																																																																																																			
mentioned.” (Douglas, J., concurring) (citations omitted)); see also U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); see also U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIV, § 5 (giving Congress the right to pass “appropriate legislation” to enforce 
“the provisions of this article.”). 
228 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3. The law applied to “the full and equal 
enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, 
public conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other places of public 
amusement” and provided for civil damages of $500 per offense and criminal 
penalties of a fine of up to $1,000 and imprisonment of “not less than 30 days 
nor more than one year.” Id. at 20. 
229 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
230 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
231 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 22 (“And so in the present case, until 
some State law has been passed, or some State action through its officers or 
agents has been taken, adverse to the rights of citizens sought to be protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment, no legislation of the United States under said 
amendment, nor any proceeding under such legislation, can be called into 
activity, for the prohibitions of the amendment are against State laws and acts 
done under State authority.”). 
232 Id. at 11 (“It is State action of a particular character that is prohibited. Individual 
invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the [fourteenth] 
amendment.”); see also James M. McGoldrick, The Civil Rights Cases: The 
Relevancy of Reversing a Hundred Plus Year Old Error, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
451 (1998) (arguing that the Civil Rights Cases were wrongly decided and 
should be reversed). 
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the Civil Rights Cases precluded the use of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to bar private racial discrimination, Congress sought to justify the 
reach of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to include private racial 
discrimination as based upon its commerce power.233 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 barred discrimination in places of 
public accommodation “on the ground of race, color, religion, or 
national origin.”234 Public accommodations included places of lodging, 
restaurants, and cinemas,235 which affected interstate commerce. As to 
lodgings, the Act declared that “any inn, hotel, motel, or other 
establishment which provides lodging to transient guests” affected 
commerce per se.236 In other words, if the trial court found that a 
covered hotel discriminated as to race against an interstate traveler, the 
Act was violated. There was no requirement that the court find any 
impact on interstate commerce. Congress had found that the impact on 
commerce from such actions per se affected interstate commerce. 
While many prior federal laws required the courts to find some effect 
on interstate commerce, in some others, Congress had made a per se 
finding. Heart of Atlanta Motel was the first to make this aspect of the 
law a determinative feature.237 
																																																								
233 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was based on both commerce power and its power 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Act applied “if [the covered business 
establishments’] operations affect commerce, or if discrimination or segregation 
by it is supported by State action.” Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 
379 U.S. 241, 247 (1964). There was no allegation of state action as to the 
privately owned Heart of Atlanta Motel except by Justice Douglas who in a 
concurring opinion argued that there was sufficient state action to bring the law 
within Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 282 (Douglas, J., 
concurring) (“That definition [of state action] is within our decision of Shelley 
v. Kraemer for the ‘discrimination’ in the present cases is ‘enforced by officials 
of the State,’ i.e., by the state judiciary under the trespass laws.”). 
234 Id. at 247. 
235 Id. at 247–48. In the Act, a cinema was charmingly called a “motion picture 
house.” Id. at 247. The jurisdictional peg for motion picture houses was for the 
films “which move in commerce.” Id. at 248. 
236 Id. at 247. The Court does not use the term per se, but that it is clearly what it 
has it mind; see also The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 23 (“It proceeds ex 
directo to declare that certain acts committed by individuals shall be deemed 
offenses, and shall be prosecuted and punished by proceedings in the courts of 
the United States. It does not profess to be corrective of any constitutional 
wrong committed by the States; it does not make its operation to depend upon 
any such wrong committed.”). 
237 An early such law with a per se finding was the FLSA upheld in Darby. 
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After an extended discussion of its commerce power cases, the 
Court concluded, with echoes of the substantial effects test, “Thus the 
power of Congress to promote interstate commerce also includes the 
power to regulate the local incidents thereof, including local activities 
in both the States of origin and destination, which might have a 
substantial and harmful effect upon that commerce.”238 Applying the 
substantial effects test, including the aggregate impact, there is little 
doubt that racial discrimination against interstate travelers would have 
a substantial and harmful impact on interstate commerce.239 
But the Court did not leave it there. It added that the question was 
“whether Congress had a rational basis”240 for its per se holding that 
racial discrimination by hotels serving interstate travelers always 
affected interstate commerce. The Court said that there was no need to 
see any evidence of this as congressional hearings on the evils of racial 
discrimination against interstate travelers had amply demonstrated that 
there was such a rational basis.241 The Court offered no explanations or 
																																																								
238 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., 379 U.S. at 258. 
239 Justice Black’s concurring opinion had a note of caution but ultimately yielded 
to the class impact test, “I recognize too that some isolated and remote 
lunchroom which sells only to local people and buys almost all its supplies in 
the locality may possibly be beyond the reach of the power of Congress to 
regulate commerce, just as such an establishment is not covered by the present 
Act. But in deciding the constitutional power of Congress in cases like the two 
before us we do not consider the effect on interstate commerce of only one 
isolated, individual, local event, without regard to the fact that this single local 
event when added to many others of a similar nature may impose a burden on 
interstate commerce by reducing its volume or distorting its flow.” Id. at 275 
(Black, J., concurring). For Justice Black, the Court finally went too far in 
Daniel v. Paul, involving racial exclusion as to the Lake Nixon Club, a 232 acre 
swimming and boating amusement area 12 miles west of Little Rock, Arkansas. 
See Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969). He thought there was little chance that 
interstate travelers would find their way there, “While it is the duty of courts to 
enforce this important Act, we are not called on to hold nor should we hold 
subject to that Act this country people’s recreation center, lying in what may be, 
so far as we know, a little ‘sleepy hollow’ between Arkansas hills miles away 
from any interstate highway. This would be stretching the Commerce Clause so 
as to give the Federal Government complete control over every little remote 
country place of recreation in every nook and cranny of every precinct and 
county in every one of the 50 States. This goes too far for me.” Id. at 315 
(Black, J., dissenting). 
240 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., 379 U.S. at 258. 
241 Id. The Court referred to “evidence” in support of the harm to interstate 
commerce, “One need only examine the evidence which we have discussed 
above to see that Congress may—as it has—prohibit racial discrimination by 
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precedents for the need to only find a rational basis. The Court brought 
the rational basis test into the commerce power cases without preamble 
or explanation. Since it is likely that it could easily be shown that such 
racial discrimination against interstate travelers did substantially 
impact interstate commerce, the rational basis test added little or 
nothing to the holding in Heart of Atlanta Motel. Its companion case, 
Katzenbach v. McClung is a different matter. 
In McClung, the Court dealt with another provision of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, this time that portion of the Act that said 
discrimination by restaurants that purchased a “substantial” 242 amount 
of its supplies in interstate commerce had a per se impact on interstate 
commerce. 243  In the case, Ollie’s Barbeque, a local Birmingham, 
Alabama barbeque joint, was not alleged to have served any interstate 
travelers; rather, it was alleged that it had purchased some 46% 
($69,683) of its food from a local supplier who in turn procured it from 
out of state.244 Ollie’s racism was open and notorious, serving only 
whites in the interior portions of the restaurant but offering blacks 
service in a backdoor takeout window. To the government’s argument 
that the class or aggregate impact of racial discrimination by such 
restaurants affected interstate commerce, Ollie’s argument was that it 
was not part of such a class, that its overt racism led it to sell far more 
barbeque than if it fully integrated its restaurant, a result that would 
																																																																																																																																			
motels serving travelers, however ‘local’ their operations may appear.” Id. But 
the Court’s reference to “evidence” was not to any congressional findings, of 
which there were none, but to testimony of various parties to House and Senate 
congressional committees. Id. at 252–53. 
242 The government’s indictment was challenged because it used the word “some,” 
“This use of the word ‘some’, say defendants, is insufficient because the act uses 
the term ‘substantial’ . . . .” McClung v. Katzenbach, 233 F. Supp. 815, 818 
(N.D. Ala.), rev’d 379 U.S. 294 (1964). The lower court found that a substantial 
amount had moved in interstate commerce. But the lower court had found no 
substantial effect on interstate commerce, “If Congress has the naked power to 
do what it has attempted in title II of this act, there is no facet of human behavior 
which it may not control by mere legislative ipse dixit that conduct ‘affect(s) 
commerce’ when in fact it does not do so at all, and rights of the individual to 
liberty and property are in dire peril.” Id. at 825. 
243 Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 298 (1964). The act stated that any 
“restaurant . . . principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the 
premises” did per se affect commerce under the Act “if . . . it serves or offers to 
serve interstate travelers or a substantial portion of the food which it serves . . . 
has moved in commerce.” Id. 
244 Id. at 296. 
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have led to a loss of white patrons.245 It is the simplicity of this evil 
claim that made the rational basis test far more important in McClung 
than in Heart of Atlanta Motel. 
As in Heart of Atlanta Motel, the law did not require that the Court 
find any substantial effect on interstate commerce. Rather, Congress 
had specifically said that restaurants buying a substantial amount of 
their supplies in interstate commerce did per se affect interstate 
commerce. The Supreme Court conceded “The volume of food 
purchased by Ollie’s Barbecue from sources supplied from out of state 
was insignificant when compared with the total foodstuffs moving in 
commerce.”246 Nonetheless, the Court relied on the aggregate impact 
doctrine of Wickard, “That appellee’s own contribution to the demand 
for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the 
scope of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken 
together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from 
trivial.”247 It said that racial discrimination was nationwide in scope 
and that “Congress appropriately considered the importance of that 
connection with the knowledge that the discrimination was but 
‘representative of many others throughout the country, the total 
incidence of which if left unchecked may well become far-reaching in 
its harm to commerce.’”248 The Court did not address Ollie’s claim 
that he was not part of a class adversely impacting interstate commerce 
since, if he did not engage in such racial discrimination, he would lose 
his white customers. 
The Court noted that it was not uncommon for Congress to declare 
that certain activity per se impacted interstate commerce as it had done 
in the Darby case.249 But the Court in McClung made a leap of logic 
that the Darby case did not make. Darby had said, “In passing on the 
validity of legislation of the class last mentioned [where Congress had 
made a per se finding] the only function of courts is to determine 
whether the particular activity regulated or prohibited is within the 
reach of the federal power.”250 But Darby did not say what test was to 
																																																								
245 Id. at 297 (“The court below concluded that if it were required to serve Negroes 
it would lose a substantial amount of business.”). 
246 Id. at 300–01. 
247 Id. at 301 (quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127–28 (1942)). 
248 Id. (quoting Polish Nat’l All. of U.S. v. N.L.R.B., 322 U.S. 643, 648 (1944)). 
249 Darby itself was not the first. Darby, in addition to “the present act,” mentioned 
“the Safety Appliance Act . . . and the Railway Labor Act.” United States v. 
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 120 (1941). 
250 Id. at 120–21. 
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be used to determine if such a per se finding fell “within the reach of 
the federal power.” There is no reason to believe that it would not have 
been the substantial effects test that Darby was applying.251 McClung 
said that the mere fact that Congress had made a per se finding of 
effect on interstate commerce “does not preclude further examination 
by this Court,”252 but essentially in applying the rational basis test it 
did preclude just that. Following Heart of Atlanta Motel, the further 
examination was only to see if Congress “in light of the facts and 
testimony before them, have a rational basis for finding a chosen 
regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce.”253 No 
formal findings were required to show this rational basis.254 Given the 
results of congressional hearings, the Court concluded that Congress 
“had a rational basis for finding that racial discrimination in 
restaurants had a direct and adverse effect on the free flow of interstate 
commerce.” 255  It concluded, “The absence of direct evidence 
connecting discriminatory restaurant service with the flow of interstate 
food, a factor on which the appellees place much reliance, is not, given 
the evidence as to the effect of such practices on other aspects of 
commerce, a crucial matter.”256 Most of the congressional hearings 
dealt with the impact of racial discrimination on interstate travelers. 
The Court then claimed that its interpretation of the commerce power 
																																																								
251 In describing Congress’ commerce power, Darby does use language similar to 
the rational basis test, “[Congress’ power] extends to those activities intrastate 
which so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress 
over it as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of 
a legitimate end, the exercise of the granted power of Congress to regulate 
interstate commerce.” Id. at 118 (citing McCulloch’s use of “appropriate” as a 
synonym for “necessary and proper” (McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 
(1819)). Darby then states a paragraph later what the appropriate test was, “But 
it does not follow that Congress may not by appropriate legislation regulate 
intrastate activities where they have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.” 
Id. at 119. 
252 McClung, 379 U.S. at 303. 
253 Id. at 303–04. 
254 Id. at 304. The Court cited to United States v. Carolene Products Company, the 
quintessential rational basis due process case. United States v. Carolene Prods. 
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). Carolene had found that a ban on the sale of 
skim milk to which coconut oil had been added rationally related to legitimate 
governmental ends. Id. 151–52. Congressional hearings, the Court said, amply 
supported the government’s health and fraud concerns. Id. 
255 Id. at 304. 
256 Id. at 304–05. 
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was consistent with history, “The power of Congress in this field is 
broad and sweeping; where it keeps within its sphere and violates no 
express constitutional limitation it has been the rule of this Court, 
going back almost to the founding days of the Republic, not to 
interfere.”257 
The first Supreme Court case to apply the rational basis to a 
Commerce Clause case after Heart of Atlanta Motel and McClung was 
Maryland v. Wirtz258 in 1976. The dearth of any attempt to find some 
actual substantial impact on commerce in Wirtz indicates the impact of 
the rational basis test on the commerce power and its impact on 
fundamental concepts of federalism. Wirtz was of primary importance 
because it upheld against a Tenth Amendment challenge to Congress’ 
right to impose the federal maximum hour and minimum wage of the 
FLSA on state and local employees.259 In a 1961 amendment to the 
FLSA, Congress had eliminated an exemption in the original act for 
state and local government employees “of hospitals, institutions, and 
schools.”260 Essentially, Wirtz held that if Congress had commerce 
power, it could impose the same laws it imposed on private entities on 
states and political subdivisions of states. It was only limitations on the 
enumerated power that protected concepts of federalism. The 1961 
amendment had expanded the reach of Congress’ commerce power to 
regulate not just employees connected to interstate commerce, but to 
all employees of any “enterprise” engaged in interstate commerce.261 
																																																								
257 Id. at 305. 
258 Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), overruled by Nat’l League of Cities v. 
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
259 Id. at 201. Justice Douglas’ dissent summarized this issue, “The Court’s opinion 
skillfully brings employees of state-owned enterprises within the reach of the 
Commerce Clause; and as an exercise in semantics it is unexceptionable if 
congressional federalism is the standard. But what is done here is nonetheless 
such a serious invasion of state sovereignty protected by the Tenth Amendment 
that it is in my view not consistent with our constitutional federalism.” Id. 
(Douglas, J., dissenting). Wirtz was overruled by National League of Cities v. 
Usery, on Tenth Amendment grounds, which in turn was overruled by Garcia v. 
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority. Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 
426 U.S. 833 (1976) overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 
469 U.S. 528 (1985). Garcia held, as Wirtz had, that if Congress had the 
enumerated power, in both cases commerce power, the Tenth Amendment did 
not preclude it from applying generally applicable laws not just to private 
entities but also to state and local entities. 
260 Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 187. 
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The result was to include no additional companies, but some additional 
employees. 
In Wirtz, the Court described Darby both in terms of the substantial 
effects test and the rational basis test. The first step in Darby, the Wirtz 
court said, was its finding that Congress can “by appropriate 
legislation regulate intrastate activities where they have a substantial 
effect on interstate commerce.”262 The second step was to determine if 
there was such a substantial effect.263 Here, Congress had specifically 
found a per se substantial effect.264 Third, since Congress had made 
that specific finding, the Court had only a final task: “But where we 
find that the legislators . . . have a rational basis for finding a chosen 
regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce, our 
investigation is at an end.”265 Wirtz then concluded summarily, “There 
was obviously a ‘rational basis’ for the logical inference that the pay 
and hours of production employees affect a company’s competitive 
position.”266 As for the expansion of the FLSA to include employees 
who did no work in interstate commerce but who worked for 
enterprises that did, the Court said, “The class of employers subject to 
the Act was not enlarged by the addition of the enterprise concept. The 
definition of that class is as rational now as it was when Darby was 
decided.”267 Other than the conclusion that there was a rational basis 
																																																																																																																																			
261 Id. The Court said that the change from employees engaged in interstate 
commerce to enterprises engaged in interstate commerce did not make a 
constitutional difference, “Thus the effect of the 1961 change was to extend 
protection to the fellow employees of any employee who would have been 
protected by the original Act, but not to enlarge the class of employers subject to 
the Act.” Id. at 188. It said that the enterprise concept was “settled by the 
reasoning of Darby itself and is independently established by principles stated in 
other cases.” Id. 
262 Id. at 189 (quoting United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 119 (1941)). 
263 Id. 
264 Id. at 190 (citing Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303–04 (1964)) 
265 Id. at 190 (quoting McClung, 379 U.S. at 303–04). 
266 Id. at 190. The quotations around rational basis are in the original. Wirtz also 
referenced that “other cases have found a ‘rational basis’ for statutes regulating 
labor conditions in order to protect interstate commerce from labor strife.” Id. at 
191. The only citation was to Jones & Laughlin Steel, which did not apply that 
test. 
267 Id. at 193. 
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for the enterprise concept, there was no attempt to apply the rational 
basis test.268 
Wirtz does not expand the Darby substantial effects test or the 
rational basis test, but it does reinforce the basic approach of the Court. 
First, the general rule is that Congress has the commerce power to 
regulate intrastate commerce or any other local activity if it 
substantially affects interstate commerce. Second, if commerce power 
is challenged, it is the trial court’s job to determine if the local activity 
substantially affects interstate commerce. As has been seen in Jones & 
Laughlin Steel, that is a practical factual evaluation. 269  Third, if 
Congress makes a per se finding that certain local activity will always 
substantially affect interstate commerce, then the trial courts job is 
only to determine if those per se local activities occurred and then to 
decide if Congress had a rational basis for believing that the local 
activities did substantially impact interstate commerce. It is not the 
trial court’s job to determine if there was in fact some substantial 
impact, only to determine if Congress could rationally or conceivably 
believe that there was. Finally, if Congress does not make a per se 
finding, then only the practical factual evaluation of the substantial 
effects test comes into play, not the rational basis test. 
Hodel v. Indiana, 270  in 1981, applied the rational basis test in 
commerce cases to a federal law requiring corrective measures to 
restore surface land subject to strip mining and was alleged to be in 
violation of the commerce power in addition to numerous other 
constitutional provisions.271 As to the commerce claim, the Court said, 
“It is established beyond peradverture [sic] that ‘legislative Acts 
adjusting the burdens and benefits of economic life come to the Court 
with a presumption of constitutionality . . . .’”272 For this proposition, 
																																																								
268 Id. at 195 (“It is therefore clear that a ‘rational basis’ exists for congressional 
action prescribing minimum labor standards for schools and hospitals, as for 
other importing enterprises.”). 
269 See N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41–42 (1937) (“We 
have often said that interstate commerce itself is a practical conception. It is 
equally true that interferences with that commerce must be appraised by a 
judgment that does not ignore actual experience.”). 
270 Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981). 
271 Id. at 320 (“The complaints alleged that the Act contravenes the Commerce 
Clause, the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Tenth Amendment, and the Just 
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”). 
272 Id. at 323. 
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the Court cited Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Company,273 which 
was strictly a statement about the rational basis Due Process Clause, 
not commerce power. Bringing the presumption of the 
constitutionality of economic legislation from due process cases to 
commerce power cases was an important turn in commerce cases. 
Citing McClung and Heart of Atlanta Motel, Hodel said that a court 
could “invalidate legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause only 
if it is clear that there is no rational basis for a congressional finding 
that the regulated activity affects interstate commerce.” 274  It then 
misapplied the class or aggregate impact test, saying that the volume 
of commerce actually affected was not a relevant inquiry, “The 
pertinent inquiry therefore is not how much commerce is involved but 
whether Congress could rationally conclude that the regulated activity 
affects interstate commerce.” 275  The Court misused language 
in N.L.R.B. v. Fainblatt concerning the class impact test to support this 
proposition, “The power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce 
is plenary and extends to all such commerce be it great or small.”276 Of 
																																																								
273 Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976). In Usery, coal mine 
operators claimed that it violated their due process rights to impose liability for 
miners who were disabled by black lung’s disease prior to the act being passed 
and prior to the awareness of the cause of the disease. Id. at 1. 
274 Hodel, 452 U.S. at 323–24. For a similar conclusion as to the Congress’ 
commerce power, see the related case, Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & 
Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981), where it was found that, 
“The court must defer to a congressional finding that a regulated activity affects 
interstate commerce, if there is any rational basis for such a finding.” See also 
Preseault v. I.C.C., where the Court found that a “tracks to trails” program 
whereby unused railroad lines were converted to walking trails was within 
federal commerce power without much support at all: “We evaluate this claim 
under the traditional rationality standard of review: we must defer to a 
congressional finding that a regulated activity affects interstate commerce ‘if 
there is any rational basis for such a finding,’ Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining 
& Reclamation Assn., Inc., and we must ensure only that the means selected by 
Congress are ‘reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution.’” 
Preseault v. I.C.C., 494 U.S. 1, 17 (1990) (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel v. 
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)). Preseault, although it made no attempt to 
truly address the commerce power issue, is worth noting since the federal law, 
unlike Katzenbach and the other rational basis cases, made no findings that 
certain local activities would per se affect interstate commerce. 
275 Hodel, 452 U.S. at 324. This holding misused language in N.L.R.B. v. Fainblatt 
concerning the class impact test to support this proposition. Of course, the 
volume of commerce is important, but not just the volume of one person, the 
volume of the class impact. 
276 N.L.R.B. v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 606 (1939). 
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course the volume of commerce is important, but not just the volume 
of one person, the volume of the class impact. Going further, the Court 
said that it was not necessary that each provision in an act had an 
impact on interstate commerce, but that in a “complex regulatory 
program” it was “enough that the challenged provisions are an integral 
part of the regulatory program and that the regulatory scheme when 
considered as a whole satisfies this test.”277 While there is a certain 
logic to the Court’s point about complex regulatory businesses—it 
would make no sense to require that each part of a complex law impact 
interstate commerce—there was virtually no precedent for the point.278 
VIII. A RETURN TO THE SUBSTANTIAL EFFECTS TEST 
Two of the most famous recent commerce power cases are United 
States v. Lopez279 and United States v. Morrison.280 Both were the first 
cases by the Supreme Court since Jones & Laughlin Steel was decided 
in 1937 finding that federal laws were outside the scope of Congress’ 
commerce power. Lopez found that Congress did not have the 
commerce power to criminalize the possession of a gun on or near a 
public or private school. Morrison held that Congress did not have the 
commerce power to provide a civil remedy for gender-motivated 
violence. In neither case did Congress require some jurisdictional tag 
connecting the acts to interstate commerce, and in both the Supreme 
Court applied the substantial effects test, 281  not the rational basis 
test. 282  On a more practical note, both cases involved unnecessary 
																																																								
277 Hodel, 425 U.S. at 329 n.17. 
278 Id. The Court cited to many of the key commerce cases as support for this 
proposition—Heart of Atlanta Motel, McClung, Perez, Wickard, and Darby—
but none of the language cited to actually supports the proposition. Most relate 
at most to the class or aggregate impact doctrine. See, e.g., United States v. 
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123 (1941). 
279 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
280 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
281 See Lopez, (“We conclude, consistent with the great weight of our case law, that 
the proper test requires an analysis of whether the regulated activity 
‘substantially affects’ interstate commerce.”); see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 
610 (“Reviewing our case law, we noted that ‘we have upheld a wide variety of 
congressional Acts regulating intrastate economic activity where we have 
concluded that the activity substantially affected interstate commerce.’”). 
282 Lopez acknowledged the rational basis test, but did not apply it. Lopez quoting 
Jones & Laughlin Steel warned that commerce power should not be so extended 
as to “obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local and 
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federal laws, which paralleled state laws. Whether constitutional or 
not, there was no need whatsoever to make a federal crime out of what 
were already state crimes. 
The Court in Lopez identified the three categories of federal 
commerce power first used by the Court in Perez: 
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of 
interstate commerce. 
Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect 
the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons 
or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat 
may come only from intrastate activities. 
Finally, Congress’ commerce authority includes the 
power to regulate those activities having a 
substantial relation to interstate commerce, i.e., those 
activities that substantially affect interstate 
commerce.283 
Because this language is so widely quoted or paraphrased by the 
courts, including the Raich case,284 it is important to distinguish it 
																																																																																																																																			
create a completely centralized government.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 (quoting 
N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)). After 
summarizing Darby and Wickard, Lopez then inserted the rational basis test, 
“Since that time, the Court has heeded that warning and undertaken to decide 
whether a rational basis existed for concluding that a regulated activity 
sufficiently affected interstate commerce.” Id. The Court also referred to the 
rational basis test in responding to Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion, “Justice 
Breyer rejects our reading of precedent and argues that ‘Congress . . . could 
rationally conclude that schools fall on the commercial side of the line.’” Id. at 
565. The only other mention of the rational basis test in the case is in Justice 
Souter’s dissenting opinion. Id. at 603 (Souter, J., dissenting). The first mention 
of the rational basis test in Morrison was in Justice Souter’s dissenting opinion 
in that case, “But the sufficiency of the evidence before Congress to provide 
a rational basis for the finding cannot seriously be questioned.” Morrison, 529 
U.S. at 634 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
283 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59 (citations omitted). It is easy to agree with what 
seems to be Justice Scalia’s claim that the reference to these three categories 
seems more rote than instructive, “[O]ur cases have mechanically recited that 
the Commerce Clause permits congressional regulation of three categories.” 
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 33 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
284 Given that Raich did not remotely involve items crossing state lines, it is 
understandable that Raich has the most barebones statement of these categories, 
“First, Congress can regulate the channels of interstate commerce. Second, 
Congress has authority to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate 
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from the substantial effects test. In both of the first two categories, the 
Court is referring to Congress’ power to regulate commerce between 
two states, not local activities affecting interstate commerce. The 
regulation of commerce between two states is the clearest instantiation 
of the federal power.285 Unfortunately, there is no obvious distinction 
between the channels category and the instrumentality category. 
Further, the Court illustrates the instrumentalities categories using 
cases involving the effect on interstate commerce, further confusing 
the distinctions. 
As to the channels of interstate commerce, Lopez used Darby,286 
the transportation of goods made by a person paid less than required 
by the FLSA, and Heart of Atlanta Motel,287 the movement of persons 
																																																																																																																																			
commerce, and persons or things in interstate commerce. Third, Congress has 
the power to regulate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.” Id. 
at 16–17 (citations omitted). Supporting Justice Scalia’s point about mechanical 
references, the Raich case indicates what often happens to Supreme Court 
precedents. Perez and Lopez cited historical examples that supported the 
categories, while Raich just cited the categories without any historical context. 
The problem is that the first two categories make little enough sense even with 
the historical references, and make virtually none without them. But since the 
reversal of Hammer, few have questioned federal power to regulate anything 
crossing state lines. But see Friedman & Lakier, supra note 169, at 258–59 
(“This article calls for a reexamination of the long-standing, yet inadequately 
examined, assumption that Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce 
necessarily includes the power not only to (as the Raich Court put it) ‘protect’ 
interstate markets but also to ‘eradicate’ them.”). 
285 See Raich, 545 U.S. at 34 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The first two categories are 
self-evident, since they are the ingredients of interstate commerce itself. . . . 
[U]nlike the channels, instrumentalities, and agents of interstate commerce, 
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce are not themselves part of 
interstate commerce, and thus the power to regulate them cannot come from the 
Commerce Clause alone.”). 
286 Lopez appears to cite to the following language in Darby, “Congress, following 
its own conception of public policy concerning the restrictions which may 
appropriately be imposed on interstate commerce, is free to exclude from the 
commerce articles whose use in the states for which they are destined it may 
conceive to be injurious to the public health, morals or welfare, even though the 
state has not sought to regulate their use.” United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 
114 (1941) (citations omitted). Among other cases, Darby cited The Lottery 
Case (Champion v. Ames), 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (lottery tickets crossing state 
lines), Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911) (adulterated foods 
crossing state lines) and Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913) (women 
transported across interstate lines for immoral purposes). 
287 The reference seems to be to this language, “‘Commerce among the states, we 
have said, consists of intercourse and traffic between their citizens, and includes 
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across state lines, as examples. Perez had been a bit more detailed and 
framed the issue in terms of the misuse of interstate commerce, which 
seems a bit more helpful: “First, the use of channels of interstate or 
foreign commerce which Congress deems are being misused, as, for 
example, the shipment of stolen goods or of persons who have been 
kidnaped.”288 Perez used as an example of protecting the channels of 
interstate commerce, the Lindbergh Act, which made it a crime for 
either the victim to be transported or the kidnapper to travel across 
state lines.289 
As for the second category, the instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce, Lopez gave as examples The Shreveport Rate Cases and 
Southern Railway, both problematic examples of power over 
instrumentalities in interstate commerce since both involved the 
regulation of local activities affecting interstate commerce, not the 
regulation of things crossing state lines. The Shreveport Rate Cases 
had held that the ICC could consider intrastate rates in Texas because 
of their impact on interstate commerce from Louisiana into Texas.290 
Southern Railway had held that Congress could, under the federal 
Railway Safety Act, regulate safety on intrastate railroad cars because 
the railroad company had so intermingled its intrastate and interstate 
business that it was impossible to tell them apart.291 Nonetheless, the 
Court’s point seems to be that Congress has great power in protecting 
instrumentalities crossing state lines. The Court makes this clear with 
																																																																																																																																			
the transportation of persons and porperty [sic].’ . . . Nor does it make any 
difference whether the transportation is commercial in character.” Heart of 
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964) (citations 
omitted). 
288 Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971) (citations omitted). 
289 Id. 
290 See The Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342, 358–59 (1914) (“This is plainly 
the case when the Commission finds that unjust discrimination against interstate 
trade arises from the relation of intrastate to interstate rates as maintained by a 
carrier subject to the act. Such a matter is one with which Congress alone is 
competent to deal . . . .”). 
291 See S. Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20, 26 (1911), in which the Court 
asked, “Or, stating it in another way, Is there such a close or direct relation or 
connection between the two classes of traffic, when moving over the same 
railroad, as to make it certain that the safety of the interstate traffic and of those 
who are employed in its movement will be promoted in a real or substantial 
sense by applying the requirements of these acts to vehicles used in moving the 
traffic which is intrastate as well as to those used in moving that which is 
interstate?” The Court gave an affirmative answer. Id. 
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two examples mentioned in Perez, the destruction of an aircraft “used, 
operated, or employed in interstate, overseas, or foreign air 
commerce,” and theft from interstate shipments “in interstate or 
foreign commerce.”292 
The Court’s distinction between channels and instrumentalities of 
interstate commerce seems unhelpful to a strong degree, but luckily it 
is of no great importance to distinguish between the two, since both 
fall within federal power. What is important is that they are both 
examples of Congress protecting the actual crossing of state lines and 
not local activities affecting interstate commerce. 
Lopez then turned to the issue at hand, “activities that substantially 
affect interstate commerce.” The majority opinion although 
referencing both McClung and Heart of Atlanta Motel emphasized the 
substantial effects test:293 
First, we have upheld a wide variety of congressional 
Acts regulating intrastate economic activity where we 
have concluded that the activity substantially affected 
interstate commerce. Examples include the regulation 
of intrastate coal mining; intrastate extortionate credit 
transactions, restaurants utilizing substantial interstate 
supplies, inns and hotels catering to interstate 
guests, and production and consumption of homegrown 
wheat. These examples are by no means exhaustive, but 
the pattern is clear. Where economic activity 
substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation 
regulating that activity will be sustained.294 
The law in Lopez, banning the possession of a gun on or near schools, 
made no attempt to tie the crime to any aspect of interstate commerce; 
																																																								
292 Perez, 402 U.S. at 150 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 32, 659).  
293 After discussing Jones & Laughlin Steel, Darby, and Wickard, the Court briefly 
mentioned the rational basis line of cases. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 
557 (1995). But there was no attempt to apply or distinguish the rational basis 
test. 
294 Id. at 559–60 (citations omitted). Justice Kennedy called Perez, Heart of Atlanta 
Motel, and McClung “[l]ater examples of the exercise of federal power where 
commercial transactions were the subject of regulation . . .” Id. at 573. He 
seemed to dismiss them as being significant advancements, “These and like 
authorities are within the fair ambit of the Court’s practical conception of 
commercial regulation and are not called in question by our decision today.” Id. 
at 573–74. (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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failing to make use of what are commonly called jurisdictional pegs.295 
It was also totally devoid of any connection to “any sort of economic 
enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms,” what the 
Court called “commerce.” 296  Since no economic enterprise or 
commerce was involved, the Court said that the class or aggregate 
impact doctrine did not apply: “It cannot, therefore, be sustained under 
our cases upholding regulations of activities that arise out of or are 
connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the 
aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.”297 This emphasis 
on commercial activity as opposed to other activity may be defensible, 
but it is not necessarily supported by precedent.298 Certainly, in the 
pure commerce cases involving the crossing of state lines, the 
commerce power was not limited to economic activity. But even in the 
																																																								
295 The federal crime, the Court said, “contains no jurisdictional element which 
would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in 
question affects interstate commerce.” Id. at 561. Nor did the facts raise any 
issues as to interstate commerce: “Respondent was a local student at a local 
school; there is no indication that he had recently moved in interstate commerce, 
and there is no requirement that his possession of the firearm have any concrete 
tie to interstate commerce.” Id. at 567. 
296 Id. at 561. 
297 Id. 
298 Justice Souter in dissent did not think the distinction workable. Id. at 608 
(Souter, J., dissenting) (“The distinction between what is patently commercial 
and what is not looks much like the old distinction between what directly affects 
commerce and what touches it only indirectly.”); see Friedman & Lakier, supra 
note 169, at 256 (“Commencing with United States v Lopez, the Supreme Court 
drew a line resting on the distinction between ‘economic’ and ‘non-economic’ 
activity. That line quickly withered.”). The difficulty in applying the distinction 
between economic or commercial and the opposite is suggested by Melissa Irr in 
her instructive article on the role of congressional findings. See Melissa 
Irr, United States v. Morrison; An Analysis of the Diminished Effect of 
Congressional Findings in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and a Criticism of 
the Abandonment of the Rational Basis Test, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 815, 834 
(2001) (“If a statute similar to the one in Wickard were before the current Court, 
it would likely find the statute unconstitutional under the 
current CommerceClause [sic] framework. The production of wheat is not an 
inherently economic activity.”). Irr may or may not be correct as to the 
Morrison’s court view of Wickard, but surely she is incorrect as to Wickard 
being “not an inherently economic activity.” Id. at 834. Home grown and 
consumed wheat was 20% of a multibillion dollar business in the United States. 
But Irr may be correct on the bigger issue. Id. (“The Court’s focus on the 
economic or noneconomic nature of the regulation is unworkable in 
the Commerce Clause context and may result in the striking down of statutes 
that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”). 
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Heart of Atlanta Motel and McClung’s rational basis cases involving 
racial discrimination, the emphasis was on the economic harm299 of 
racial discrimination on interstate travelers and on goods purchased in 
interstate commerce.300 In his dissent to Lopez, Justice Breyer makes a 
strong argument against the commercial and noncommercial 
distinctions, equating them to E.C. Knight’s comparison of 
manufacturing versus commerce, or the direct/indirect test. The issue 
was not nomenclature, he said, but the actual practical effect on 
interstate commerce. 301  He also argued that given the real impact 
education has on the economy, Lopez was the wrong case to make that 
distinction. Nonetheless, one can accept the Court’s conclusion in 
Lopez without accepting its commercial and noncommercial 
distinctions. 
The government’s assertion that guns on school grounds did 
impact interstate commerce was met with something close to derision. 
The government argued that guns on or near schools might result in 
violent crime and that violent crime impacts interstate commerce; first, 
in that its costs are substantial; second, that violent crime might make 
persons unwilling to travel to parts of the country that might be 
perceived as unsafe; and third, that guns in schools are a substantial 
																																																								
299 But see Lopez, 514 U.S. at 628 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The majority clearly 
cannot intend such a distinction to focus narrowly on an act of gun possession 
standing by itself, for such a reading could not be reconciled with either the civil 
rights cases (McClung and Daniel) or Perez—in each of those cases the specific 
transaction (the race-based exclusion, the use of force) was not itself 
‘commercial.’”). 
300 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 279 (1964) 
(Douglas, J., concurring) (arguing against a commerce power approach and 
stating that his “reluctance is not due to any conviction that Congress lacks 
power to regulate commerce in the interests of human rights. It is rather my 
belief that the right of people to be free of state action that discriminates against 
them because of race, like the ‘right of persons to move freely from State to 
State’ ‘occupies a more protected position in our constitutional system than does 
the movement of cattle, fruit, steel and coal across state lines.’” (citations 
omitted)). Justice Douglas favored federal power under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, “A decision based on the Fourteenth Amendment 
would have a more settling effect, making unnecessary litigation over whether a 
particular restaurant or inn is within the commerce definitions of the Act or 
whether a particular customer is an interstate traveler. Under my construction, 
the Act would apply to all customers in all the enumerated places of public 
accommodation. And that construction would put an end to all obstructionist 
strategies and finally close one door on a bitter chapter in American history.” Id. 
at 280. 
301 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 627–28 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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threat to the learning environment which results in less productive 
citizens. The Court said that under the government’s “costs of crime” 
logic, “Congress could regulate not only all violent crime, but all 
activities that might lead to violent crime, regardless of how tenuously 
they relate to interstate commerce.” 302  And under its “national 
productivity” logic, “Congress could regulate any activity that it found 
was related to the economic productivity of individual citizens: family 
law (including marriage, divorce, and child custody), for example.”303 
Finally, with the Court’s slippery slope concerns running rampant, it 
said that it would be “difficult to perceive any limitation on federal 
power, even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education 
where States historically have been sovereign. Thus, if we were to 
accept the Government’s arguments, we are hard pressed to posit any 
activity by an individual that Congress is without power to 
regulate.”304 
The majority’s concluding paragraph is an anthem to fading 
principles of federalism and is worth quoting in full: 
To uphold the Government’s contentions here, we 
would have to pile inference upon inference in a 
manner that would bid fair to convert congressional 
authority under the Commerce Clause to a general 
police power of the sort retained by the States. 
Admittedly, some of our prior cases have taken long 
steps down that road, giving great deference to 
congressional action. See [Hodel, Perez, McClung, 
Heart of Atlanta Motel]. The broad language in these 
opinions has suggested the possibility of additional 
expansion, but we decline here to proceed any further. 
To do so would require us to conclude that the 
Constitution’s enumeration of powers does not 
presuppose something not enumerated, cf. Gibbons v. 
Ogden, and that there never will be a distinction 
between what is truly national and what is truly local, 
cf. Jones & Laughlin Steel. This we are unwilling to 
do.305 
																																																								
302 Id. at 564. 
303 Id. 
304 Id. 
305 Id. at 567–68 (citations omitted). 
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Many of the historic issues related to federal power are here, the 
House that Jack built concerns of President Jefferson, the intrusion on 
state powers of the E.C. Knight and Hammer era, the recognition of 
the overreaching scope of the rational basis cases, and the respect for 
the foundational cases of Gibbons and Jones & Laughlin Steel.306 
Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion, in which Souter, Stevens, and 
Ginsburg joined, relied on the rational basis test. He described nicely 
how the rational basis test changed the role of the courts in commerce 
power cases: 
[T]he Constitution requires us to judge the connection 
between a regulated activity and interstate commerce, 
not directly, but at one remove. Courts must give 
Congress a degree of leeway in determining the 
existence of a significant factual connection between 
the regulated activity and interstate commerce—both 
because the Constitution delegates the commerce power 
directly to Congress and because the determination 
requires an empirical judgment of a kind that a 
legislature is more likely than a court to make with 
accuracy. The traditional words “rational basis” 
capture this leeway. Thus, the specific question before 
us, as the Court recognizes, is not whether the 
“regulated activity sufficiently affected interstate 
commerce,” but, rather, whether Congress could have 
had “a rational basis” for so concluding.307 
																																																								
306 Id. at 578 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (putting the issue in grander terms of the 
importance of federalism, “Although it is the obligation of all officers of the 
Government to respect the constitutional design, the federal balance is too 
essential a part of our constitutional structure and plays too vital a role in 
securing freedom for us to admit inability to intervene when one or the other 
level of Government has tipped the scales too far.” (citations omitted)). 
307 Id. at 616–17 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). In order to reconcile the 
rational basis Commerce Clause cases to history, Justice Breyer undertakes a 
somewhat quixotic attempt to change the vocabulary: “[T]he power to regulate 
Commerce . . . among the several States, encompasses the power to regulate 
local activities insofar as they significantly affect interstate commerce. . . . I use 
the word significant because the word substantial implies a somewhat narrower 
power than recent precedent suggests. But to speak of substantial effect rather 
than significant effect would make no difference in this case.” Id. at 615–16 
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
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Breyer made clear the difference between the substantial effects test of 
Jones & Laughlin Steel and how it is applied in the rational basis line 
of cases. In the former, the Court made the practical factual 
determination that commerce had been substantially impacted. In the 
latter, the question was only whether Congress might rationally have 
found such a substantial impact, not whether there was in fact one, or 
indeed even if Congress itself had found one.308 And given the ease of 
passing the rational basis test, the conclusion for the dissent was 
forgone, “Upholding this legislation would do no more than simply 
recognize that Congress had a ‘rational basis’ for finding a significant 
connection between guns in or near schools and (through their effect 
on education) the interstate and foreign commerce they threaten.”309 
Perhaps no case better illustrates the human dimensions of the 
limits on commerce power than United States v. Morrison. In the case, 
the victim said that she had been raped by two football players at 
Virginia Tech. In response to the school’s failure to punish her 
attackers and to protect her, she filed a civil action in federal court 
alleging damages under the federal Violence Against Women’s Act of 
1994 (“VAWA”), which provided for compensatory and punitive 
damages for violence motivated by gender bias.310 The Supreme Court 
affirmed the lower courts’ dismissal of her action as being beyond the 
scope of Congress’ power, either under the Commerce Clause or 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Congress’ power under 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect against equal 
protection violations was limited to state actions, not to the private 
actions in the case, however horrific.311 The Court could find no state 
action in the case. That holding is beyond the scope of this Article. 
																																																								
308 Id. at 618 (explaining that “[T]here is no special need here for a clear indication 
of Congress’ rationale.”). The Court’s job, Breyer said, was only to ask 
“whether Congress could have had a rational basis for finding a significant (or 
substantial) connection between gun-related school violence and interstate 
commerce.” Id. 
309 Id. at 631. 
310 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 605–06 (2000). The Act stated that 
“All persons within the United States shall have the right to be free from crimes 
of violence motivated by gender” and declared that any person who committed 
such a crime was “liable to the party injured, in an action for the recovery of 
compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and such 
other relief as a court may deem appropriate.” Id. at 605. 
311 Id. at 621 (summarizing the precedents, “Shortly after the Fourteenth 
Amendment was adopted, we decided two cases interpreting the Amendment’s 
provisions, United States v. Harris, and the Civil Rights Cases. In Harris, the 
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As to the commerce power, the law itself had no jurisdictional 
pegs 312  but did include “gender motivated violence . . . affecting 
interstate commerce”313 The Court cited Lopez for the applicable law, 
“Where economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, 
legislation regulating that activity will be sustained.”314 Following the 
logic of its Lopez case, the Court doubled down on the importance of 
commercial versus noncommercial activity: 
Gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any 
sense of the phrase, economic activity. While we need 
not adopt a categorical rule against aggregating the 
effects of any noneconomic activity in order to decide 
these cases, thus far in our Nation’s history our cases 
have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate 
activity only where that activity is economic in 
nature.315 
																																																																																																																																			
Court considered a challenge to § 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. That section 
sought to punish ‘private persons’ for ‘conspiring to deprive any one of the 
equal protection of the laws enacted by the State.’ We concluded that this law 
exceeded Congress’ § 5 power because the law was ‘directed exclusively against 
the action of private persons, without reference to the laws of the State, or their 
administration by her officers.’ . . . We reached a similar conclusion in the Civil 
Rights Cases. In those consolidated cases, we held that the public 
accommodation provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which applied to 
purely private conduct, were beyond the scope of the § 5 enforcement power.” 
(citations omitted)). 
312 Id. at 612. The Court said, just as it did in the School Gun Act in Lopez, that the 
VAWA contained no jurisdictional element that might indicate some connection 
to commerce. “Such a jurisdictional element may establish that the enactment is 
in pursuance of Congress’ regulation of interstate commerce.” Id. The Court 
compared the civil remedy in VAWA with the criminal provision of the VAWA, 
which states: “A person who travels across a State line or enters or leaves Indian 
country with the intent to injure, harass, or intimidate that person’s spouse or 
intimate partner, and who, in the course of or as a result of such travel, 
intentionally commits a crime of violence and thereby causes bodily injury to 
such spouse or intimate partner, shall be punished as provided in subsection 
(b).” 18 U.S.C. § 2261(a)(1) (1994) (amended 2013). The criminal provision is 
cited by Morrison apparently to contrast its use of the crossing state lines 
jurisdictional peg as compared with no jurisdictional peg in the civil provision. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 n.5. 
313 34 U.S.C. § 12361 (1994). 
314 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560). 
315 Id. at 613. 
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The presence of substantial congressional findings of impact on 
interstate commerce, unlike the Lopez case that had none, did not sway 
the Court: “But the existence of congressional findings is not 
sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce 
Clause legislation. As we stated in Lopez, ‘[S]imply because Congress 
may conclude that a particular activity substantially affects interstate 
commerce does not necessarily make it so.’” 316  Rather, the Court 
continued, “Whether particular operations affect interstate commerce 
sufficiently to come under the constitutional power of Congress to 
regulate them is ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative question, 
and can be settled finally only by this Court.”317 
In terms of the impact on interstate commerce, the Court was not 
impressed with the congressional findings: 
The reasoning that petitioners advance seeks to follow 
the but-for causal chain from the initial occurrence of 
violent crime (the suppression of which has always 
been the prime object of the States’ police power) to 
every attenuated effect upon interstate commerce. If 
accepted, petitioners’ reasoning would allow Congress 
to regulate any crime as long as the nationwide, 
aggregated impact of that crime has substantial effects 
on employment, production, transit, or consumption. 
Indeed, if Congress may regulate gender-motivated 
violence, it would be able to regulate murder or any 
other type of violence since gender-motivated violence, 
as a subset of all violent crime, is certain to have lesser 
economic impacts than the larger class of which it is a 
part.318 
The Court said more broadly that Congress could not “regulate 
noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct’s 
aggregate effect on interstate commerce.” 319  The Constitution 
required, it said, “a distinction between what is truly national and what 
is truly local.” 320  The Court concluded, “The regulation and 
punishment of intrastate violence that is not directed at the 
																																																								
316 Id. at 614 (citations omitted). 
317 Id. (citations omitted). 
318 Id. at 615. 
319 Id. at 617. 
320 Id. at 617–18. 
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instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in interstate commerce 
has always been the province of the States.”321 Unlike Lopez, where 
the majority at least mentioned the rational basis approach, Morrison 
left it to the dissent to raise the issue. 
The dissenting opinion by Justice Souter, in which Stevens, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer joined, framed the role of the courts versus 
Congress in its most complete form: 
Congress has the power to legislate with regard to 
activity that, in the aggregate, has a substantial effect 
on interstate commerce. The fact of such a substantial 
effect is not an issue for the courts in the first 
instance, but for the Congress, whose institutional 
capacity for gathering evidence and taking 
testimony far exceeds ours. By passing legislation, 
Congress indicates its conclusion, whether explicitly or 
not, that facts support its exercise of the commerce 
power. The business of the courts is to review the 
congressional assessment, not for soundness but simply 
for the rationality of concluding that a jurisdictional 
basis exists in fact.322 
Souter’s dissent extensively reviewed Congress’ finding of the 
economic consequence of gender based violence concluding, “[T]he 
sufficiency of the evidence before Congress to provide a rational basis 
for the finding cannot seriously be questioned.”323 The dissent’s main 
complaint was not that the Court had found no substantial effect on 
interstate commerce, but that the Court was replacing the rational basis 
test with categorical preferences for economic effects on interstate 
commerce over noneconomic effects. Souter also objected to the 
Court’s concern for the fact that the VAWA “addresses conduct 
traditionally subject to state prohibition under domestic criminal law, a 
fact said to have some heightened significance when the violent 
conduct in question is not itself aimed directly at interstate commerce 
or its instrumentalities.”324 As the dissent pointed out, the Court had 
long since rejected the dual federalism notion that somehow areas 
																																																								
321 Id. at 618. The Court conveniently overlooked Perez in its summary of crimes 
affecting interstate commerce. 
322 Id. at 628 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
323 Id. at 634 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
324 Id. at 645 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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traditionally within state power limited congressional commerce 
power: “Again, history seems to be recycling, for the theory of 
traditional state concern as grounding a limiting principle has been 
rejected previously, and more than once.”325 
Although many themes run throughout Lopez and Morrison, at the 
most simple level, the majority found that neither law involved local 
activities with a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Meanwhile, 
the dissent found that Congress could have rationally believed that 
there was a substantial effect.326 
IX. RAICH AND THE ASCENDENCY OF THE RATIONAL BASIS TEST 
In Gonzalez v. Raich, the Court held that the federal government 
had the commerce power to regulate in-state grown marijuana for in-
state medicinal use, and that Congress could rationally believe that 
even such local activity might substantially affect interstate 
commerce.327 California’s Compassionate Use Act of 1996, allowed 
the use of marijuana for medicinal purposes. The federal Controlled 
Substance Act (“CSA”) passed in 1970 treated marijuana as a 
Schedule 1 drug, the most dangerous category, disallowing its use for 
any purpose. Whatever the wisdom of the CSA, if the CSA was within 
federal commerce power, it preempted the inconsistent state law.328 
																																																								
325 Id. 
326 Id. at 660 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (taking a very holistic approach to reaching 
this conclusion, Breyer stated, “We live in a Nation knit together by two 
centuries of scientific, technological, commercial, and environmental change. 
Those changes, taken together, mean that virtually every kind of activity, no 
matter how local, genuinely can affect commerce, or its conditions, outside the 
State—at least when considered in the aggregate. And that fact makes it close to 
impossible for courts to develop meaningful subject-matter categories that 
would exclude some kinds of local activities from ordinary Commerce Clause 
‘aggregation’ rules without, at the same time, depriving Congress of the power 
to regulate activities that have a genuine and important effect upon interstate 
commerce. Since judges cannot change the world, the ‘defect’ means that, 
within the bounds of the rational, Congress, not the courts, must remain 
primarily responsible for striking the appropriate state/federal balance.” 
(citations omitted). 
327 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005). 
328 Id. at 29. See generally Robert A. Mikos, Preemption Under the Controlled 
Substances Act, 16 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 5, 15 (2013) (“In sum, courts 
have applied a broad conflict preemption rule under the CSA. This rule finds 
state law preempted if it requires violation of federal law or otherwise 
undermines Congress’s objective of curbing marijuana consumption.”). 
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Federal agents from the Drug Enforcement Administration 
(“DEA”) came to the home of one marijuana user and destroyed all six 
of her cannabis plants.329 Ms. Raich used marijuana for cancer pain 
provided to her free by two caregivers.330 Ms. Raich and others filed a 
preliminary injunction to prevent the United States Attorney 
General331 from enforcing the CSA as to marijuana that is “cultivated 
using only water and nutrients originating from within California, and 
that it is grown exclusively with equipment, supplies, and materials 
manufactured within the borders of the state.”332  Despite the local 
nature of the marijuana use, the federal government argued that “(1) 
controlled substances manufactured and distributed intrastate cannot 
be differentiated from controlled substances manufactured and 
distributed interstate; and (2) federal control of the intrastate incidents 
of the traffic in controlled substances is essential to the effective 
control of the interstate incidents of such traffic.”333 The district court 
found the CSA as applied was within Congress’ commerce power. The 
Ninth Circuit reversed.334 
																																																																																																																																			
Professor Mikos argues for a more limited view of preemption in CSA cases, 
requiring a direct conflict. Id. 
329 Raich, 545 U.S. at 7. Both county and federal agents raided one Ms. Monson’s 
home. Id. The county agents concluded that her use marijuana was entirely 
legal, but after a three-hour standoff, the federal agents seized and destroyed all 
six of her plants. Id. 
330 Id. Raich had to rely on two caregivers, listed as “John Does” in the case, who 
provided her marijuana free of charge. Id. 
331 Id. The United States Attorney General at the time the case was filed was John 
Ashcroft, later superseded by Alberto Gonzales. 
332 Raich v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 918, 921 (N.D. Cal.), rev’d, 352 F.3d 1222 
(9th Cir. 2003), vacated and remanded sub nom. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 
(2005). This was the claim of Ms. Raich. Id. The petitioner whose plants were 
seized was even more local, coming from plants in her own backyard. Id. 
333 Id. at 926. 
334 Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated and remanded sub 
nom. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). The Ninth Circuit relied heavily on 
its own precedent. United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1115–16 (9th Cir. 
2003) (In McCoy, while painting Easter eggs and consuming large quantities of 
alcohol, a sexually explicit picture of Mrs. McCoy and her ten-year-old daughter 
was taken. Turned in for processing at the U.S. Navy Exchange in San Diego, 
the McCoys were investigated by the NCIS, the FBI, and the San Diego police 
and eventually charged with violating federal law making it a crime to possess 
child pornography made with products from out of the state, in the case a Canon 
Sureshot 60 camera and Kodac film. A jury acquitted Mr. McCoy. Mrs. McCoy 
pleaded guilty subject to her appeal of the constitutional issues.). The Ninth 
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Emphasizing the economic versus noneconomic logic of the Lopez 
case, the Ninth Circuit said, “The cultivation, possession, and use of 
marijuana for medicinal purposes and not for exchange or distribution 
is not properly characterized as commercial or economic activity. 
Lacking sale, exchange or distribution, the activity does not possess 
the essential elements of commerce.”335 The Ninth Circuit made no 
effort to determine if there was any substantial effect on commerce, 
instead relying on a finding in another Ninth Circuit case, “Medical 
marijuana, when grown locally for personal consumption, does not 
have any direct or obvious effect on interstate commerce. Federal 
efforts to regulate it considerably blur the distinction between what is 
national and what is local.”336 
In Raich, the Supreme Court’s analysis of the law begins with a 
concise statement of the substantial effects test, “Our case law firmly 
establishes Congress’ power to regulate purely local activities that are 
part of an economic ‘class of activities’ that have a substantial effect 
on interstate commerce.” 337  Wickard, the Court noted, had a 
“striking”338 similarity to Raich. Both involved “a fungible commodity 
for which there is an established, albeit illegal, interstate market”339 
and “the likelihood that the high demand in the interstate market will 
draw such marijuana into that market.” 340  The Court may have 
overstated this claim of a striking similarity since any similarity seems 
more forced than real. Based upon the agreed findings of the parties in 
																																																																																																																																			
Circuit found that the “possession of home-grown child pornography not 
intended for distribution or exchange” was “not, in any sense of the phrase, 
economic activity” and that there was no “relationship, attenuated or otherwise, 
between the regulated activity and interstate commerce—and certainly not the 
type of direct or substantial relationship necessary to justify the invocation by 
Congress of its Commerce power . . . .” Id. at 1123–24. Making the connection 
to the marijuana in Raich, the Ninth Circuit said, “As the photograph 
in McCoy stood in contrast to the commercial nature of the larger child 
pornography industry, so does the medicinal marijuana use at issue in this case 
stand in contrast to the larger illicit drug trafficking industry.” Raich, 352 F.3d at 
1230. 
335 See Raich, 352 F.3d at 1235. 
336 Id. at 1233 (quoting Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 647 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(Kozinski, J., concurring)). 
337 Raich, 545 U.S. at 17. 
338 Id. at 18. 
339 Id. 
340 Id. at 19. 
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Wickard,341 it involved a variability factor of 20% in a highly volatile 
market. 342  Raich involved only congressional findings and the 
common sense 343  likelihood that some homegrown marijuana for 
homegrown use would find its way interstate.344 Perez is the better 
comparison.345 For purposes of enforcement, distinguishing between 
marijuana grown in California for use in California from marijuana 
shipped in interstate commerce would be at least as difficult as 
distinguishing loan sharking unaffiliated with organized crime from 
that going into the pockets of organized crime. 
More unforgivable is the Court’s misstatement of the rule of law 
used in Wickard, the case that fairly or unfairly stands for an extreme 
application of the substantial effects test, especially as to the class 
impact. 346  Instead, in the Court’s framing, “In Wickard, we had no 
																																																								
341 Id. at 53 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasizing this difference with Wickard, 
“Critically, the Court was able to consider ‘actual effects’ because the parties 
had ‘stipulated a summary of the economics of the wheat industry.’ . . . With 
real numbers at hand, the Wickard Court could easily conclude that ‘a factor of 
such volume and variability as home-consumed wheat would have a substantial 
influence on price and market conditions’ nationwide.” (citations omitted)). 
342 Id. at 20. Responding to Raich’s arguments, the Court seemed to concede that 
the differences with Wickard, though not controlling, were substantial if not 
striking. In Wickard (1) small farmers by law were excluded; (2) Wickard 
involved commercial activity to the highest degree; and (3) the class impact on 
the interstate and international price of wheat was significant. Id. 
343 Id. at 28–29 (“The congressional judgment that an exemption for such a 
significant segment of the total market would undermine the orderly 
enforcement of the entire regulatory scheme is entitled to a strong presumption 
of validity. Indeed, that judgment is not only rational, but ‘visible to the naked 
eye,’ under any commonsense appraisal of the probable consequences of such an 
open-ended exemption.” (citations omitted)). 
344 Id. at 20. The Court seemed to acknowledge the disconnect, “And while it is true 
that the record in the Wickard case itself established the causal connection 
between the production for local use and the national market, we have before us 
findings by Congress to the same effect.” Id. 
345 Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971). The federal law criminalized all 
loansharking without requiring any interstate Commerce Clause connection. Id. 
at 146–47. Though the Court in Perez does not mention it, a possible rational 
would be that to require an interstate connection to organized crime would make 
it impossible to prosecute much loan sharking, since any connection would be 
vague and spidery at best. 
346 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127 (1942). The class impact in Wickard was 
far from some conceivable fact. The parties had stipulated that it varied by “an 
amount greater than 20 per cent of average production,” the single biggest 
variance by far. Id. 
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difficulty concluding that Congress had a rational basis for believing 
that, when viewed in the aggregate, leaving home-consumed wheat 
outside the regulatory scheme would have a substantial influence on 
price and market conditions.” 347  This then leads to its final 
comparison, “Here too, Congress had a rational basis for concluding 
that leaving home-consumed marijuana outside federal control would 
similarly affect price and market conditions.”348 Wickard, of course, 
was decided in 1942, some twenty-two years before the rational basis 
test became part of the Court’s approach to Congress’ commerce 
power.349 
Then, as this Article begins, Raich wraps it up: (1) the Court’s role 
in determining the scope of Congress’ commerce power was “a modest 
one,” (2) the test was not whether Ms. Raich’s and the use by others of 
homegrown, home-consumed marijuana “taken in the aggregate, 
substantially affect interstate commerce in fact,” but (3) “only whether 
a “rational basis” exists for so concluding.”350 And from there it was a 
short journey to find that Congress might rationally have believed that 
there were “enforcement difficulties that attend distinguishing between 
marijuana cultivated locally and marijuana grown elsewhere”351 and 
that there were “concerns about diversion into illicit channels,”352 that 
the law “ensnares some purely intrastate activity is of no moment.”353 
And unlike Lopez and Morrison, which involved noneconomic 
criminal matters, the Court said, Raich involved “quintessentially 
																																																								
347 Raich, 545 U.S. at 19. 
348 Id. 
349 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S 100 (1941) (the rational basis test is sometimes 
dated to this case). Darby was one of the early cases where Congress made a per 
se finding that certain things would affect interstate commerce. Darby said only 
that such a per se finding would have to fall within federal power, not that the 
test was the rational basis test: “In passing on the validity of legislation of the 
class last mentioned [where Congress makes a per se finding] the only function 
of courts is to determine whether the particular activity regulated or prohibited is 
within the reach of the federal power.” Id. at 120–21. 
350 Raich, 545 U.S. at 22. 
351 Id. at 40 (Scalia, J., concurring) (summarizing the majority’s point well, 
“[M]arijuana that is grown at home and possessed for personal use is never more 
than an instant from the interstate market-and this is so whether or not the 
possession is for medicinal use or lawful use under the laws of a particular 
State.”). 
352 Id. at 22. 
353 Id. 
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economic” 354  regulations of “the production, distribution, and 
consumption of commodities for which there is an established, and 
lucrative, interstate market.” 355  The Court’s penultimate sentence 
before remanding the case is almost plaintive in its acknowledgment of 
the weaknesses of the rational basis approach, “But perhaps even more 
important than these legal avenues is the democratic process, in which 
the voices of voters allied with these respondents may one day be 
heard in the halls of Congress.”356 It is no great insight to say that to 
hope that Congress might, in this polarized age, do any such thing is 
akin to hoping that global warming will reverse itself and year-long 
wildfires in the west and tornadoes in the east will become a distant 
memory. 
The dissent of Justice O’Connor, in which Chief Justice Roberts 
and Justice Thomas joined, applied a four-factor test from Lopez and 
Morrison.357 First, economic activity substantially affecting interstate 
commerce fell within federal power. A criminal statute “having 
nothing to do with commerce or any sort of economic enterprise”358 
and was “not an essential part” of a larger regulatory scheme did 
not.”359 Second, the law contained no jurisdictional peg, which might 
establish some connection to interstate commerce.360 Third, although 
legislative findings are not required for purposes of the commerce 
power, their absence is “telling” especially when any impact on 
interstate commerce is not “visible to the naked eye.”361 And fourth, 
any claim of impact on interstate commerce was too attenuated, which 
																																																								
354 Id. at 25. 
355 Id. at 26. 
356 Id. at 33. 
357 Id. at 44–45 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (describing the four factors: “First, we 
observed that our ‘substantial effects’ cases generally have upheld federal 
regulation of economic activity that affected interstate commerce . . . . Second, 
we noted that the statute contained no express jurisdictional requirement 
establishing its connection to interstate commerce. . . . Third, we found telling 
the absence of legislative findings about the regulated conduct’s impact on 
interstate commerce. . . . [Fourth], we rejected as too attenuated the 
Government’s argument that firearm possession in school zones could result in 
violent crime which in turn could adversely affect the national economy.”). 





2019 The Commerce Clause 269 
if accepted would convert the commerce power into a general police 
power.362 Justice O’Connor concluded, “In my view, the case before 
us is materially indistinguishable from Lopez and Morrison when the 
same considerations are taken into account.” 363  Justice O’Connor 
barely acknowledged the Court’s use of the rational basis test, saying 
almost in passing that if it was enough that regulating medical 
marijuana was “a rational part of regulating” the relevant market that 
“the Court’s definition of economic activity for purposes of Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence threatens to sweep all of productive human 
activity into federal regulatory reach.”364 Perhaps an indication of how 
entrenched the rational basis test was in the commerce cases, she did 
not specifically reject it as the correct test.365 
Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion was the sixth vote in favor of 
the federal law, and it is hard to decide whether his separate approach 
was puzzling or brilliant.366 He said that the substantial effects test was 
not actually part of the Commerce Clause but derived from the 
																																																								
362 Id. at 44–45 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
363 Id. at 45 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O’Connor validly points out that the 
CSA could easily have excluded marijuana for medical or even recreational use, 
but it is hard to see how that point has anything to do with commerce power. 
She also claimed that “dual sovereignty animate[s] our Commerce Clause 
cases,” especially “in areas of criminal law and social policy” where States had 
long had power. Id. at 48 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Dual Sovereignty has been 
a long rejected view of federal power and it is even harder to accept her 
assertion that “state autonomy” was a relevant factor. Id. 
364 Id. at 49 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
365 Id. Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion did not mention the rational basis test at 
all. Justice Thomas in his separate and somewhat strident dissent mentions one 
case in which the Court applied the rational basis test but does not specifically 
object to its use. He does object to the manipulation of the substantial effects test 
to include noneconomic factors, “If the majority is to be taken seriously, the 
Federal Government may now regulate quilting bees, clothes drives, and potluck 
suppers throughout the 50 States.” Id. at 69 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice 
Thomas is exaggerating, but given his visceral disagreement with the substantial 
effects test, it would seem that he might have objected to the rational basis 
expansion of that test. 
366 See Bradford C. Mank, After Gonzales v. Raich: Is the Endangered Species Act 
Constitutional Under the Commerce Clause?, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 375, 379 
(2007). Professor Mank seemed to have the same ambivalence, “Not joining the 
majority opinion in Raich, Justice Scalia wrote an interesting and potentially 
influential concurring opinion that relied on the Constitution’s Necessary and 
Proper Clause to justify regulation of medical marijuana under 
the Commerce Clause.” Id. Interesting seems exactly the opposite of influential. 
270 UMass Law Review v. 14 | 182 
Necessary and Proper Clause. 367  And he thought that his insight 
expanded commerce power: 
And the category of “activities that substantially affect 
interstate commerce,” is incomplete because the 
authority to enact laws necessary and proper for the 
regulation of interstate commerce is not limited to 
laws governing intrastate activities that substantially 
affect interstate commerce. Where necessary to make a 
regulation of interstate commerce effective, Congress 
may regulate even those intrastate activities that do not 
themselves substantially affect interstate commerce.368 
It is hard to see how viewing the necessary and proper as a separate 
test would expand Congress’ commerce power beyond the substantial 
effects test. The substantial effects test is the necessary and proper test 
in the context of the commerce power. The substantial effects test in 
Jones & Laughlin Steel was that Court’s test for local activities 
affecting interstate commerce. It was that Court’s finding that a refusal 
to engage in collective bargaining, a local activity, would have a 
necessary and proper or appropriate relationship to interstate 
commerce.369 
																																																								
367 Raich, 545 U.S. at 34 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia went back to United 
States v. Coombs for support for this, “Any offence which thus interferes with, 
obstructs, or prevents such commerce and navigation, though done on land, may 
be punished by congress, under its general authority, to make all laws necessary 
and proper to execute their delegated constitutional powers.” United States v. 
Coombs, 37 U.S. 72, 74 (1838). In Coombs, the issue was whether Congress 
could make theft from a beach-stranded vessel not in navigable waters a crime 
under the Commerce Clause. It could. Id. at 78–79. 
368 Raich, 545 U.S. at 34–35. (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
369 N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 36–37 (1937). In the 
sentences just before stating its “close and substantial” test, the Court in Jones & 
Laughlin Steel did not directly cite but it did use terms from Chief Justice 
Marshall opinions in McCulloch v. Maryland and Gibbons v. Ogden in 
describing federal enumerated power and the Necessary and Proper Clause: 
“The fundamental principle is that the power to regulate commerce is the power 
to enact ‘all appropriate legislation’ for its ‘protection or advancement’ . . . That 
power is plenary and may be exerted to protect interstate commerce ‘no matter 
what the source of the dangers which threaten it.’” Id. (emphasis added). 
Compare with Marshall in McCulloch rejecting a narrow view of the Necessary 
and Proper Clause, “This could not be done, by confiding the choice of means to 
such narrow limits as not to leave it in the power of congress to adopt any which 
might be appropriate, and which were conducive to the end.” McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 415 (1819) (emphasis added). And his definition of 
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But then Justice Scalia may have been just typically brilliant. It 
may be that Justice Scalia’s point is that the Necessary and Proper 
Clause in addition to expanding Congress’ power to regulate local 
activity substantially affecting interstate commerce also increases the 
ability of Congress to expand its power to regulate its power over 
things moving in interstate commerce. The majority opinion in United 
States v. Comstock370 seemed to support that view.371 The Court in 
Comstock emphasized that Congress had the power under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause to incarcerate civilly “a mentally ill, 
sexually dangerous federal prisoner beyond the date the prisoner 
would otherwise be released.”372 In Comstock, the named plaintiff373 
had been convicted of receipt of child pornography in interstate 
commerce. The majority ultimately held that the civil extension of 
Comstock’s sentence was necessary and proper to whatever federal 
power—as to Comstock himself, Congress’ power to protect the 
misuse of the channels of interstate commerce—supported the initial 
criminal conviction. In sum, the Necessary and Proper Clause expands 
Congress’ power to regulate things actually in interstate commerce. 
																																																																																																																																			
commerce power in Gibbons could not be more sweeping, “If, as has always 
been understood, the sovereignty of Congress, though limited to specified 
objects, is plenary as to those objects, the power over commerce with foreign 
nations, and among the several States, is vested in Congress as absolutely as it 
would be in a single government, having in its constitution the same restrictions 
on the exercise of the power as are found in the constitution of the United 
States.” Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 197 (1824) (emphasis added). 
370 United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126 (2010). 
371 Id. at 129. The government in its brief said that the government did not rely on 
the Commerce Clause, but contended that “[T]he court need not reach the 
Commerce Clause issue to decide the case, arguing that Congress had the 
authority to enact [the commitment law] pursuant to the Necessary and Proper 
Clause,” that the civil commitment power “flow[ed] from Congress’s power to 
criminalize that conduct in the first place.” United States v. Comstock, 507 F. 
Supp. 2d 522, 530 (E.D.N.C. 2007), aff’d, 551 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 
2009), rev’d, 560 U.S. 126, rev’d, 627 F.3d 513 (4th Cir. 2010). 
372 United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. at 129. 
373 Id. at 131–32. The Comstock case was a consolidation for five different persons 
convicted of federal crimes contesting additional civil commitment beyond their 
criminal sentence. Comstock’s conviction was for receipt of child pornography 
via a computer, that is using “any visual depiction using any means or facility of 
interstate or foreign commerce or that has been mailed,” a very typical federal 
jurisdictional peg based upon the power to regulate things actually in interstate 
commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2008). 
272 UMass Law Review v. 14 | 182 
After discussing the Necessary and Proper Clause, the ultimate 
holding by the Court in Comstock was that whatever federal power 
supported Comstock’s initial conviction would also support his civil 
commitment. The federal power was the purest form of the commerce 
power, involving the transportation across interstate lines of child 
pornography. Justice Scalia’s and the Comstock court’s fascination 
with the Necessary and Proper Clause in a Commerce Clause case is 
misplaced in cases involving the effect of local activity on interstate 
commerce. The substantial effects test is the specific necessary and 
proper test in a commerce power case negating the need to apply a test 
as vague and uncertain as the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
X. SEBELIUS, THE RATIONAL BASIS TEST: THE ONLY CLEAR 
WINNER 
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius374 is not 
narrowly speaking a rational basis commerce power case, but the test 
is the only clear winner in the case. The majority found that the 
Affordable Care Act’s (“ACA”) 375  individual mandate, a provision 
requiring that most persons have some form of health insurance, was 
not within Congress’ commerce power because it regulated inactivity, 
not activity. The Court claimed that in the history of the Commerce 
Clause it had never allowed the regulation of inactivity, thus there was 
no need to apply either the substantial effects test or the rational basis 
test. With Chief Justice Roberts making a quick change of hand, 
worthy of the most talented close-up magician, his opinion for the 
majority concluded that the individual mandate fell within Congress’ 
taxing power. Given that the Court claimed in the history of the 
commerce power cases it had never encountered the regulation of 
inactivity, including the inability of Farmer Filburn to grow wheat 
above a certain allotment, the case seems singularly unimportant both 
in terms of the ACA and the Commerce Clause. The ACA, with the 
exception of the abuse of spending power,376 was upheld, and since the 
																																																								
374 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
375 The ACA is commonly called “Obamacare” by both its supporters and its 
distractors. 
376 Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 675–76. Using its spending power to impose conditions, 
the law required that states dramatically increase the number of indigent persons 
eligible for Medicaid coverage subject to a state’s loss of all federal 
contributions for covered state expenses, not just for the new coverage. The 
Court said that “Medicaid spending accounts for over 20 percent of the average 
State’s total budget, with federal funds covering 50 to 83 percent of those costs.” 
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Court in its history had never had to deal with the impact of inactivity 
on commerce, whether the Court was wrong or right on that distinction 
as to Congress’ commerce power seems of little notice.377 
Despite the Court not applying either the substantial effects test or 
the rational basis test, the case is instructive as to the rational basis 
test. Only Chief Justice Roberts in announcing the opinion for the 
Court, in which Justices Breyer and Kagan joined in part, did not 
mention the rational basis test. The Chief Justice recognized that 
Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce “extends to activities 
that ‘have a substantial effect on interstate commerce’” 378  and also 
“extends to activities that do so only when aggregated with similar 
																																																																																																																																			
Id. at 581. The Court felt that the threat of loss as to high percentage of 20% of a 
state’s overall budget was too coercive to be passed under Congress’ spending 
power, “In this case, the financial ‘inducement’ Congress has chosen is much 
more than ‘relatively mild encouragement’—it is a gun to the head.” Id. The 
Court may for the first time since South Dakota v. Dole also have breathed new 
life into limits on Congress’ spending power, which may ultimately be viewed 
as another winner. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (The Court found 
unexceptional Congress’ use of its power to spend money for interstate 
highways to require that all states adopt a twenty-one-year-old drinking limit). 
377 Friedman & Lakier, supra note 169, at 256 (“Whatever one thinks of the 
decision on its merits, this is not a line Congress has needed to cross for over 
two hundred years, which is reason enough to doubt it will have much 
significance.”). But see Randy E. Barnett, No Small Feat: Who Won the Health 
Care Case (and Why Did So Many Law Professors Miss the Boat)?, 65 FLA. L. 
REV. 1331 (2013). Professor Barnett, listed as one of the attorneys in both Raich 
and Sebelius on the side challenging federal power, “Had we not contested this 
power grab, Congress’s regulatory powers would have been rendered limitless. 
They are not.” Id. at 1333. In answer to his own question, Professor Barnett 
posits, “Why did so many law professors miss the mark in predicting this 
reasoning? Part of the explanation is, of course, that law professors largely exist 
in an ideological bubble in which folks like me are either nonexistent or can be 
dismissed as marginal because we are so few in number.” Id. at 1346. Despite 
Professor Barnett’s celebratory dance in the end zone, the line between 
inactivity and activity is surely as specious as the historical line between direct 
and indirect impact on commerce. What should be important is that the 
individual mandate impacted billions of dollars of economic costs in the health 
field, not some indefensible line between activity and inactivity. As Chief 
Justice Roberts seemed to concede, it is a line no economist would respect: “To 
an economist, perhaps, there is no difference between activity and inactivity; 
both have measurable economic effects on commerce. But the distinction 
between doing something and doing nothing would not have been lost on the 
Framers, who were ‘practical statesmen,’ not metaphysical philosophers.” 
Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). 
378 Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 549. 
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activities of others.” 379  While the Chief Justice did not apply the 
rational basis test, the concurring opinion of Justice Ginsburg, joined 
by Justices Sotomayor, Breyer, and Kagan, on the judgment but 
dissenting as to the commerce power holding, was as complete an 
adoption of the rational basis test as is possible: 
[W]e owe a large measure of respect to Congress when 
it frames and enacts economic and social legislation. 
(“[S]trong deference [is] accorded legislation in the 
field of national economic policy.”) (“This [C]ourt will 
certainly not substitute its judgment for that of 
Congress unless the relation of the subject to interstate 
commerce and its effect upon it are clearly non-
existent.”) When appraising such legislation, we ask 
only (1) whether Congress had a “rational basis” for 
concluding that the regulated activity substantially 
affects interstate commerce, and (2) whether there is a 
“reasonable connection between the regulatory means 
selected and the asserted ends.” In answering these 
questions, we presume the statute under review is 
constitutional and may strike it down only on a “plain 
showing” that Congress acted irrationally.380 
Perhaps even more telling as to the ascendency of the rational basis 
test, the dissent of Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Kennedy, Thomas, 
and Alito, conceded, though almost begrudgingly, that the rational 
basis test was the correct test, except that it was inapplicable to 
inactivity, “It is true enough that Congress needs only a ‘rational basis’ 
for concluding that the regulated activity substantially affects interstate 
commerce. But it must be activity affecting commerce that is 
regulated, and not merely the failure to engage in commerce.”381  
																																																								
379 Id. 
380 Id. at 602–03 (citations omitted). The Court cited to the usual commerce power 
suspects, Raich, McClung, and Heart of Atlanta Motel among others, but also to 
Carolene Products, the seminal rational basis case Due Process Clause case. 
381 Id. at 657–58 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal citations and quotation marks 
omitted). 
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XI. SWIMMING AGAINST THE TIDE—FIVE REASONS WHY THE 
RATIONAL BASIS TEST IS THE WRONG TEST FOR THE 
COMMERCE POWER 
There are few arguments made against the rational basis test in 
commerce power cases, even at the scholarly level.382 That failure is 
somewhat ironic in view of the fact that the rational basis test 
sometimes encounters criticism, even in the due process and equal 
protection cases where it began.383 Still, one can see why the rational 
basis test has perhaps fewer critics in the commerce power cases than 
even in due process cases. The logic behind the low level of review in 
the due process and equal protection cases is that economic matters do 
not need judicial protection but should depend upon the political 
																																																								
382 See, e.g., Friedman & Lakier, supra note 169, at 290. This article argues for 
limits as to Congress’ most obvious power, the power to cross state lines, on the 
grounds that the power to regulate does not necessarily include the power to ban 
altogether, but the article barely mentions the rational basis test. Professor 
Friedman and Ms. Lakier use the term rational basis only once. Id. at 297; see 
also Mank, supra note 366, at 384 (Professor Mank, who exaggerates the 
Court’s use of the test stated, “From 1937 until 1995, the Supreme Court applied 
a very lenient rational basis standard for reviewing congressional legislation 
under the Commerce Clause, and upheld in every case congressional regulation 
of intrastate activities even if the activities had only indirect impacts on 
interstate commerce.”). But see Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. 
McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1801 
(2012) (They believe that even the rational basis test is too restrictive of 
legislative actions, “To reject rational basis review is not to hold that the 
government may pass irrational laws. Rather, it is to hold that laws passed by the 
people’s representatives, according to the constitutional prescriptions for 
enacting laws, are per se reasonable. Our protection against irrationality is 
institutional and democratic, not theoretical and judicial. The Constitution does 
not authorize courts to interfere with validly enacted laws that do not violate a 
stated limit on the government.”). 
383 See Clark Neily, No Such Thing: Litigating Under the Rational Basis Test, 1 
N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 898, 899 (2005) (“The purpose of this essay is to help 
expose the rational basis test for the sham that it is and to show how application 
of the test in actual litigation perverts our system of justice.”); see also Jeffrey 
D. Jackson, Putting Rationality Back into the Rational Basis Test: Saving 
Substantive Due Process and Redeeming the Promise of the Ninth Amendment, 
45 U. RICH. L. REV. 491, 493 (2011) (“The rational basis test as it currently 
stands is too weak. By allowing any plausible reason for the legislation to 
suffice, whether or not it was a true reason for the legislation, and by asking 
only whether lawmakers could have thought that it was reasonably related to the 
subject it purported to advance, the Court has essentially made 
the rational basis test the equivalent to no test at all.”). 
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processes to seek any needed legislative adjustments. Perhaps the most 
widely quoted statement of this comes from Williamson v. Lee 
Optical: 
The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down 
state laws, regulatory of business and industrial 
conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, 
or out of harmony with a particular school of thought. 
We emphasize again what Chief Justice Waite said in 
Munn v. State of Illinois, ‘For protection against abuses 
by legislatures the people must resort to the polls, not 
to the courts.’384 
With a few significant exceptions, 385  the commerce power cases 
involve only economic issues while due process and equal protection 
rational basis cases often involve some of the most important practical 
and personal concerns in one’s daily life.386 
There are at least five reasons why the rational basis test is the 
wrong test for determining Congress’ commerce power. First, the 
overwhelming weight of precedents supports the substantial effects 
test as the correct test. The substantial effects test has carried the day 
in history.387 Even in the cases that also apply the rational basis test, 
																																																								
384 Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) 
(citations omitted). 
385 The racism in Heart of Atlanta Motel and Katzenbach and the gender violence in 
Morrison are exceptions from the normal economic issues, although the 
economic aspects of both cannot be discounted. 
386 These include housing, Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992); support for 
needy children, Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); protection from 
disproportionate racial impact, Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); 
medical coverage for indigent women for everything from pregnancies, 
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), abortions, Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 
297 (1980); decisions as to life and death, Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997); 
job security, Massachusetts Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976); and 
equality of education, San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 
(1973). 
387 Based upon a Westlaw search, there are almost 150 Supreme Court cases, 
including every Commerce Clause case mentioned in this Article decided after 
1937, and over 1,500 federal cases that cite to Jones & Laughlin Steel. See, e.g., 
Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 576 (1942) (“The 
commerce power is plenary, [Footnote 5—Jones & Laughlin Steel] may deal 
with activities in connection with production for commerce and as said in the 
Darby case, may extend to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate 
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the substantial effects test is included as part of the test. The 
substantial effects test had its full reveal in 1937 in Jones & Laughlin 
Steel (“a close and substantial relation”388), but even during the several 
decades prior to 1937 when the Court had pretty much lost its way in 
terms of the Congress’ commerce power, a few cases used similar 
language in finding the commerce power. The substantial effects test 
was first used by the Court as early as 1911 in Southern Railway (“a 
real or substantial relation or connection”389) and again in 1914 in The 
Shreveport Rate Cases (“a close and substantial relation” 390 ) to 
describe the connection required between intrastate railroads and 
interstate railroads to justify regulation by the ICC. 
The test in Jones & Laughlin Steel is even respectful of the origins 
of the Affectation Doctrine in McCulloch in 1819. Jones & Laughlin 
Steel said that intrastate activities could be regulated if they so 
substantially affect interstate commerce “that their control is essential 
or appropriate to protect that commerce.” Both “essential” 391  and 
“appropriate” 392  are used as synonymous terms in McCulloch to 
																																																																																																																																			
commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to make regulation 
of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise of 
the granted power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.” (internal 
quotations omitted)). See, e.g., United States v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422 
U.S. 271, 280 (1975) (“Similarly, the Court’s opinion 
in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., two years later, had emphasized that 
congressional authority to regulate commerce was not limited to activities 
actually ‘in commerce,’ but extended as well to conduct that substantially 
affected interstate commerce.”). See, e.g., Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 
U.S. 52, 56–57 (2003) (“Nor is application of the FAA defeated because the 
individual debt-restructuring transactions, taken alone, did not have a substantial 
effect on interstate commerce. Congress’ Commerce Clause power may be 
exercised in individual cases without showing any specific effect upon interstate 
commerce if in the aggregate the economic activity in question would represent 
a general practice . . . subject to federal control. Only that general practice need 
bear on interstate commerce in a substantial way.” (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted)). 
388 N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937). 
389 S. Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20, 26 (1911). 
390 The Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342, 351 (1914). 
391 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 413 (1819) (“If reference be had to its 
[the word necessary] use, in the common affairs of the world, or in approved 
authors, we find that it frequently imports no more than that one thing is 
convenient, or useful, or essential to another.” (emphasis added)). 
392 See id. at 421 (“Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the 
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to 
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explain what “necessary and proper” meant in terms of expanding 
Congress’ enumerated powers. 
Second, the rational basis test has been used in only a handful of 
Supreme Court commerce power cases starting with Heart of Atlanta 
Motel and McClung in 1964, and, of the two, likely only in McClung 
did it make a difference.393 It can hardly be doubted that the Court on 
its own would have found that the racist denial of food and lodging to 
interstate travelers substantially affected interstate commerce.394 There 
was no need to add to the substantial effects test that the Court’s job 
was only to find if Congress might rationally believe that such odious 
treatment of racial minorities traveling in interstate commerce 
substantially affected interstate commerce. The rational basis test puts 
the Court a step removed from the operative test. Under the rational 
basis test, the Court need only find that it is conceivable 395  that 
Congress might have believed that commerce was substantially 
affected, not that it actually was. Instead of the Court actually deciding 
in a practical kind of way if local activity affected interstate 
commerce, under the rational basis test the Court only looks to see if 
Congress might have conceivably believed there was such an effect. In 
																																																																																																																																			
that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the 
constitution, are constitutional.” (emphasis added)). 
393 It is also unlikely that the rational basis test was needed in Hodel to find that 
strip mining substantial affected interstate commerce. 
394 It seems a little churlish to point out that Ollie’s did not actually purchase any 
goods in interstate commerce but that it only purchased goods from a supplier 
that had purchased goods in interstate commerce. 
395 See F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993). This case raised an 
equal protection rational basis issue as to the exclusions of some commonly 
owned buildings from FCC regulations. “The question before us is whether there 
is any conceivable rational basis justifying this distinction for purposes of the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.” Id. at 309 (emphasis added). “In 
areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither 
proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights 
must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any 
reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the 
classification.” Id. at 313 (emphasis added). “[T]hose attacking the rationality of 
the legislative classification have the burden ‘to negative 
every conceivable basis which might support it,’ . . . . ‘[I]t is entirely irrelevant 
for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for the challenged 
distinction actually motivated the legislature.’” Id. at 315 (citations omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
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Heart of Atlanta Motel, there was no need to take the task of finding a 
substantial effect away from the Court to uphold the law.396 
McClung is another story. It is far from obvious that the overt 
racism by Ollie’s Barbeque, even as multiplied by the class impact 
doctrine, actually impacted the amount of food shipped in interstate 
commerce. Almost certainly, no interstate travelers were involved.397 
Moving the Court one step away in the case of Ollie’s may have saved 
that part of the law. And if it took the rational basis test to give 
Congress the power to address the evils of racism in local restaurants, 
then its use in modifying the substantial effects test is perhaps 
justified. 398  McClung in this way was unlike Lopez and Morrison 
where there was no need for federal remedies to address issues already 
addressed for the most part at the state and local level. In McClung, if 
there was no federal power, then there was no remedy at the state level 
given the endemic regional racism of the time. One can applaud the 
																																																								
396 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 255 (1964). The 
Court first stated the issue in terms similar to Jones & Laughlin Steel before 
later inserting the rational basis test, “In short, the determinative test of the 
exercise of power by the Congress under the Commerce Clause is simply 
whether the activity sought to be regulated is ‘commerce which concerns more 
States than one’ and has a real and substantial relation to the national interest.” 
And after discussion of the various barriers that blacks faced in traveling 
interstate, it concluded, “Thus the power of Congress to promote interstate 
commerce also includes the power to regulate the local incidents thereof, 
including local activities in both the States of origin and destination, which 
might have a substantial and harmful effect upon that commerce.” Id. at 258. 
Only then did the Court mention the rational basis test. Id. 
397 In the days before Yelp made all of us both more careful and more 
adventurous—we are willing to go outside of the normal interstate choices if 
enough stars are aligned—but that was not the case in the 1960’s. Then we 
looked for proven mediocrity—thank you, McDonalds—and convenience. No 
one was risking food poisoning on a long road trip. 
398 Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303–04 (1964). As urged by Justice 
Douglas, the Court could have taken a more direct route and upheld the civil 
rights law as being within Congress’ power to protect due process and equal 
protection rights under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court 
might even have held that interstate travelers were protected under the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Griffin v. 
Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 105 (1971) (“Our cases have firmly established that 
the right of interstate travel is constitutionally protected, does not necessarily 
rest on the Fourteenth Amendment, and is assertable against private as well as 
governmental interference.”). The Court’s logic in Griffin was that Congress had 
the inherent power to protect attributes of federal citizenship, including the right 
to travel interstate, without any reference to Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment or the state action limitations of Section 1. 
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Court’s twisting the commerce power precedents to address the serious 
evil of local racism, but the Court should have limited the rational 
basis test to McClung alone. There was no reason to drag it out in any 
other case, and certainly not in the Raich case. 
The Court’s explanation for using the rational basis test in Heart of 
Atlanta Motel and McClung is not even remotely persuasive. The 
Court said that since Congress had made the per se finding that racism 
by businesses serving interstate travelers and by businesses buying 
goods in interstate commerce hurt interstate commerce, the Court’s job 
was not to apply the substantial effects test, but only to see if Congress 
had a rational basis for the per se finding of such an effect.399 Congress 
had made such per se findings many times in the past dating back at 
least as far back as 1941 in the Darby case, upholding the FLSA.400 
And Darby itself pointed out that the FLSA was not the first such law 
to do that. Still, Darby applied the substantial effects test of Jones & 
Laughlin Steel.401 It nowhere suggested that some lesser test might be 
appropriate just because Congress may have tried to preempt the 
Court’s role with its per se finding. If anything, Congress’ universal 
finding that all such cases impacted interstate commerce should have 
required a higher level of review.402 
																																																								
399 McClung, 379 U.S. at 303–04. Only in McClung does the Court actually attempt 
to defend—and that more a conclusion than a defense—the rationale for 
applying the rational basis test, “But where we find that the legislators, in light 
of the facts and testimony before them, have a rational basis for finding a chosen 
regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce, our investigation is 
at an end.” Id. 
400 See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 125 (1941). The Court acknowledges 
that when sometimes Congress decides for itself that a particular activity will 
affect interstate commerce that the Court will have to decide if it “is within the 
reach of federal power.” Id. at 120–21. 
401 Id. at 119. The Court in Darby not only cited to the Jones & Laughlin Steel’s 
test, but it said the substantial effects test had even an older history, “But long 
before the adoption of the National Labor Relations Act, this Court had many 
times held that the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce extends to 
the regulation through legislative action of activities intrastate which have 
a substantial effect on the commerce or the exercise of the Congressional power 
over it.” Id. at 119-20. 
402 Compare Darby, 312 U.S. 100, with Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
In Gitlow, the Court said that if the law made certain types of speech a crime, 
the Court was not to apply the clear and present danger test to see if the law was 
consistent with the First Amendment. The clear and present danger test, it said, 
had “no application to those like the present, where the legislative body itself 
has previously determined the danger of substantive evil arising from utterances 
of a specified character.” Id. at 671. Compare Darby, 312 U.S. 100, with Dennis 
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Third, the rational basis test and the substantial effects test are 
incompatible. The key to the substantial effects test is that it requires a 
practical evaluation403 of the actual impact on interstate commerce, 
including the class or aggregate impact of any similarly situated 
entities. It is a well-balanced test with all the cards on the table. 
Applied correctly, it gives Congress the power to address all issues 
involving more than one state, and certainly all of those issues with 
which the individual states are incompetent to handle.404 But it does 
impose some limits. Congress cannot simply indulge its tendency to 
pass any law that might enhance the visibility or stature of members of 
Congress whether needed or not.405 The rational basis test, on the other 
hand, imposes no limits. That is its appeal. In the due process and 
equal protection cases, the test allows the Court to wipe its hands of 
																																																																																																																																			
v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). The Court in Dennis said that of course 
the Court in such a case had to apply the clear and present danger test: “[W]here 
an offense is specified by a statute in nonspeech or nonpress terms, a conviction 
relying upon speech or press as evidence of violation may be sustained only 
when the speech or publication created a ‘clear and present danger’ of 
attempting or accomplishing the prohibited crime . . . .” Id. at 505. 
403 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 573 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(“The case that seems to mark the Court’s definitive commitment to the practical 
conception of the commerce power is NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. . . . 
.” (citations omitted)). 
404 One of the virtues of the substantial effects test is its simplicity. The test was not 
advanced historically by the attempt to artificially distinguish between direct and 
indirect effects on interstate commerce any more than it is helped modernly by 
distinctions between economic or noneconomic effects and certainly not by the 
specious attempt to distinguish between activities and inactivities. If no 
economist would accept the distinction, then why should we believe that the 
“practical statesmen” that made up the framers of our constitution would have 
countenanced such a distinction? 
405 See Henry J. Friendly, Federalism: A Foreword, 86 YALE L.J. 1019, 1026–27 
(1977). The legendary Judge Friendly said, “Considerably more troubling to me, 
from the standpoint of policy and even from that of constitutionality, has been 
what seems a knee-jerk tendency of Congress to seek to remedy any serious 
abuse by invoking the commerce power as a basis for the expansion of the 
federal criminal law into areas of scant federal concern.” E.g., United States v. 
Bishop, 66 F.3d 569 (3d Cir. 1995), as amended (Sept. 29, 1995). The statement 
of Representative Jim Ramstad, then a Republican representative from 
Minnesota, in support of a federal carjacking law, “People are outraged and 
terrified by the heinous carjacking epidemic currently upon us. How can any 
civilized nation tolerate the brutal killing of a mother dragged 2 miles to her 
death, while desperately trying to reach for her infant child inside her 
commandeered car? How can any civilized people tolerate such despicable, 
outrageous criminal acts? They cannot and they will not.” Id. at 579 n.12. 
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any responsibilities. Absent fundamental rights or suspect 
classifications, the Court upholds another law as rational and does not 
look back at the havoc it might have left in its wake.406 Under the 
Court’s combined rational basis and substantial effects test, the Court 
accepts as conceivable that Congress may have applied a practical 
evaluation whether it did or not.407 
																																																								
406 See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). How did the Court sleep at 
night when it turned its back on hungry children in allowing the state with little 
or no justification to cap aid to families with dependent children based upon the 
number of kids, denying larger families a basic sustenance? See Saenz v. Roe, 
526 U.S. 489 (1999). Compare this Court’s approach where it struck down on 
Fourteenth Amendment privileges and immunities grounds a California law that 
gave new residents the much lower welfare aid for the first year of California 
residency that they had received in their former state. To California’s assertion 
that it did so out of fiscal motives to save 10.9 million dollars per year, the Court 
answered, “An evenhanded, across-the-board reduction of about 72 cents per 
month for every beneficiary would produce the same result.” Id. at 506. The 
higher level of review of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, instead of the rational basis test, turned the Court from Scrooge to 
King Solomon. See 1 Kings 3:16-28 (where Israeli King Solomon exposed the 
false mother in a disputed child custody case by ordering that the baby be cut in 
half). 
407 In most cases the conflict between the substantial effects case and the rational 
basis test would not have to come into play. The Court does not, but in most 
cases, it could first determine if there was, in fact, a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce. If there were, it could then conclude that Congress might 
rationally believe that. Only in cases where there was in fact no substantial 
effect would the Court have to turn to the rational basis test. See United States v. 
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). This Court created a similar but less dramatic 
conflict in its rule statement. There, Justice Ginsburg for the Court stated the test 
for gender discrimination in alternative terms, either that such laws had to 
substantially relate to some important governmental interest or have some 
exceedingly persuasive jurisdiction. It is possible that both statements mean the 
same thing, but it looks like Justice Ginsburg might have been nudging the test 
for gender discrimination to something closer to the compelling state interest 
test for racial discrimination. Still, other than adding a note of confusion, both 
tests give a high level of protection against state-based gender discrimination. 
See Justice Rehnquist’s mild complaint in his concurring opinion as to the 
exceedingly persuasive justification test, “It is unfortunate that the Court thereby 
introduces an element of uncertainty respecting the appropriate test.” Id. at 559 
(Rehnquist, J., concurring). The conflict can largely be avoided by the Court 
first determining if any gender classification did substantially advance some 
important governmental interest. If it did not, as is likely in most cases, the 
Court will never have to reach whether there is also some exceedingly 
persuasive justification. 
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Fourth, our federal courts should be reserved for preeminent 
federal interests, not bogged down with the minutia of daily 
governance that should be reserved for the state courts. Of course, it is 
not just the federal courts, but also the whole of the federal justice 
system from the FBI to the United States Marshal’s Office to the 
federal penitentiaries that are preempted from their primary 
responsibility of protecting the nation as a whole.408 There are many 
examples.409  Although not technically speaking a commerce power 
case, Bond v. United States,410 a 2011 case, involved such an issue. 
The dispute could not have been more local. Ms. Bond was happy for 
her close friend’s pregnancy until she learned that the father was Ms. 
Bond’s husband.411 Ms. Bond used her access to dangerous chemicals 
at her local place of employment412 to try to harm her now not-so-close 
																																																								
408 As for one of the five respondents in Comstock, Marvin Vigil, the government’s 
petition to certify him as a sexually dangerous person mentioned in no particular 
order the following federal resources: (1) the United States District Court, (2) 
appointment of a psychiatrist or psychologist, (3) the Special Assistant U.S. 
Attorney, (4) the Federal Bureau of Prisons, Certificate Review Panel, (5) the 
U.S. Marshal, (6) the Federal Public Defender, (7) the Senior U.S. District 
Judge, and (8) the Federal Courthouse in the (9) Terry Sanford Federal Building, 
Raleigh, North Carolina. Certification of a Sexually Dangerous Person, United 
States v. Vigil, No. 06157–051 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 22, 2006), 
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/324328/vigil-marvin-
certification.pdf [https://perma.cc/6JK4-U5UG]. As for the need for the federal 
law in Comstock, the government in its Petition for Certiorari acknowledged, 
“many of the criminal acts that sexually dangerous persons might be expected to 
commit would violate state law” but claimed that federal law criminalized many 
others. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, United States v. Comstock, 2009 WL 
907847, at *25 n.12 (2009). 
409 E.g., Bishop, 66 F.3d at 571. The Third Circuit upheld on both rational basis and 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce grounds a federal law-making 
carjacking a federal crime. The Third Circuit said that the “issue is the power of 
Congress to criminalize ‘carjacking’—the armed theft of an automobile from the 
presence of another by force and violence or by intimidation.” Id. A better 
question has been suggested, “[W]as there some pocket of local government in 
this country that had fallen under some perverted Amish anti-car influence and 
thus local car owners needed the federal government to step in and protect their 
unhindered access to drive unmolested to Orlando, Florida?” See 
McGoldrick, supra note 11, at 32. 
410 Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844 (2014). 
411 See United States v. Bond, 581 F.3d 128, 131 (3d Cir. 2009), rev’d, 564 U.S. 
211 (2011). 
412 Other caustic chemicals were purchased on the Internet, so some interstate 
commerce was involved. 
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friend, by rubbing caustic chemicals on various objects that the 
pregnant woman might touch. After several dozen attempts, Ms. Bond 
finally inflicted on her victim a minor burn on her hand from 
chemicals Ms. Bond had smeared on the victim’s front door.413 The 
victim called the federal authorities. Ms. Bond was indicted by a 
Philadelphia federal grand jury for possessing and using a chemical 
weapon in violation of a federal law that had been passed to fulfill a 
treaty obligation,414  bringing Congress’ treaty power into play and 
only indirectly its commerce power.415 Whatever the source of federal 
power, it is hard to believe that this crime raised any issues not 
adequately dealt with at the state level. If trying to harm someone with 
a dangerous chemical is not a crime in the Keystone State, it is not the 
happy place it claims to be.416 Likely, nothing is going to curb the 
desire of Congress to appear to be doing something, whether based in 
reality or not, but at the very least, the substantial effects test’s more 
limited view of the federal commerce power as compared with the 
																																																								
413 See Bond, 572 U.S. at 844. 
414 See Bond, 581 F.3d at 132. Under the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, 
Congress was obligated to pass implementing legislation. The Supreme Court 
reversed the Third Circuit’s decision that Ms. Bond did not have standing to 
raise the Tenth Amendment enumerated powers issue. The Court said that 
principles of federalism were intended to protect both state sovereignty and 
individual rights, the latter through the diffusion of power between the federal 
government and the states. 
415 Id. The Court does not acknowledge that this use of the treaty power without 
support of the commerce power raised again an issue the Court first discussed in 
Missouri v. Holland. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). Holland upheld 
the federal Migratory Bird Act of 1918 based upon Congress’ treaty power, even 
though the law might at the time have been outside the then scope of its 
commerce power. A limiting view of Holland’s language as to treaty power can 
be found in Reid v. Covert. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). A plurality 
opinion by Justice Black in Reid said that laws passed pursuant to treaty powers 
were, of course, limited by the other provisions in the Constitution. See 
generally Thomas Healy, Is Missouri v. Holland Still Good Law? Federalism 
and the Treaty Power, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1726 (1998). 
416 See ‘Pennsylvania. Pursue Your Happiness:’ Officials Unveil New State Slogan, 
NBC PHILADELPHIA (Mar. 9, 2016, 6:57 AM) 
https://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/business/Pennsylvania-Pursue-Your-
Happiness-Officials-Unveil-New-State-Slogan-371406511.html 
[http://perma.cc/66FY-MJRP]. Pennsylvania has reportedly changed her state 
slogan to “Pennsylvania. Pursue Your Happiness,” a reference to its role as the 
site for the signing of the U.S. Constitution, which is a bit less assertive than 
“America Starts Here,” but not as maudlin as “You’ve Got a Friend in 
Pennsylvania,” both earlier slogans of Pennsylvania. Id. 
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rational basis test imposes a somewhat more significant institutional 
barrier. 
Fifth, the substantial effects test is more consistent with notions of 
federalism than is the rational basis test. In the sentence immediately 
following its statement of the “substantial effects” test, the Court in 
Jones & Laughlin Steel raised the federalism issue: 
Undoubtedly the scope of this power must be 
considered in the light of our dual system of 
government and may not be extended so as to embrace 
effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote 
that to embrace them, in view of our complex society, 
would effectually obliterate the distinction between 
what is national and what is local and create a 
completely centralized government. The question is 
necessarily one of degree.417 
What level of federal commerce power is more consistent with 
protecting the vibrancy of state power is a matter of degree. The 
rational basis test as a source of federal commerce power is several 
degrees off. 
Much has been written about our system of federalism, and at the 
Supreme Court level, perhaps none more so than by Justice 
Kennedy.418 His first significant effort was in his concurring opinion 
with Justice O’Connor in Lopez where he described four distinctive 
aspects of our constitution: 
Of the various structural elements in the Constitution, 
separation of powers, checks and balances, judicial 
review, and federalism, only concerning the last does 
there seem to be much uncertainty respecting the 
existence, and the content, of standards that allow the 
																																																								
417 N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (citations 
omitted). 
418 This Article does not attempt to define the merits of our federalist system, but 
Justice Kennedy does it well. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 568–83 
(1995). See also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713–15 (1999) (Justice Kennedy 
delivered the opinion of the Court that under the Eleventh Amendment Congress 
could not abrogate the sovereign immunity of the States as to monetary damages 
using its commerce powers.); Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 220–24 
(2011) (Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court holding that a person charged with 
a federal crime can raise the Tenth Amendment federalism issue.). 
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Judiciary to play a significant role in maintaining the 
design contemplated by the Framers.419 
Only “our role,” he said of the Court, “in preserving the federal 
balance” seemed “tenuous.”420 And that is exactly the problem with 
the rational basis test in the Commerce Clause cases. It removes to a 
significant degree the Court from the job of deciding a crucial element 
as to federal power vis-à-vis the states. It is my opinion that under the 
substantial effects test, the Court is to decide this element of 
federalism. Under the rational basis test, it seems to me, the Court’s 
job is to rubber stamp it if Congress’ own determination of its role in 
our federalist system is at all conceivable. I would say that not only is 
Congress incapable of limiting itself to matters needing national 
attention, it is unfair to ask it to monitor itself. Congress gets no credit 
for what it does not do. Yet, the country is so polarized that it is hard 
to address real issues like the looming bankruptcy of our public 
pension system. Thus, Congress almost for survival has to appear to be 
doing something, even if that something is already being adequately 
handled at the state and local level. 
There is something very telling about the Line Item Veto Act that 
Congress passed in 1994. 421  Under that Act, Congress gave the 
President the power to veto line items related to certain spending and 
tax deductions.422 No one was forcing Congress to spend money or to 
give tax deductions, but it seemed to recognize that it could not control 
itself. Like the first of some kind of economic twelve-step program, 
Congress acknowledged that it had a spending problem, and it needed 
the President’s help.423 Congress can be no more trusted with defining 
its own power in our federalist system than it can be trusted to be 
fiscally responsible. It needs the help of the Court to keep its powers in 
																																																								
419 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 575. 
420 Id. 
421 See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448 (1998). The Court found 
the Line Item Veto unconstitutional, “Thus, because we conclude that the Act’s 
cancellation provisions violate Article I, § 7, of the Constitution, we find it 
unnecessary to consider the District Court’s alternative holding that the Act 
‘impermissibly disrupts the balance of powers among the three branches of 
government.’” Id. 
422 Id. at 436. 
423 Id. at 447. The Court in Clinton recognized the potential merits, “Many 
members of both major political parties who have served in the Legislative and 
the Executive Branches have long advocated the enactment of such procedures 
for the purpose of ‘ensur[ing] greater fiscal accountability in Washington.’” Id. 
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check. Admittedly, the substantial effects test may be more like the 
illusion of a check, but the rational basis test is not even that. 
XII. CONCLUSION—LIMITS ON COMMERCE POWER MATTERS 
This Article has the audacity to claim that a somewhat stricter limit 
on Congress’ commerce power would be more compatible with 
constitutional norms of federalism. Even if that claim is supportable as 
this Article tries to do, does it make a difference when all is said and 
done? What Congress cannot do using its other enumerated powers, 
including its commerce power, it can accomplish using its spending 
power. As others have said, Congress’ spending power makes it the 
900-pound gorilla.424 Congress is virtually unlimited in its ability to 
encourage state and local bodies to undertake federal objectives. 
Nonetheless, Congress cannot use its spending power as a source of 
direct legislative power, and oftentimes Congress needs to do that.425 
Limits on commerce power matter. They go to weightier matters of the 
waste of federal resources and respect for states to find their own way. 
In terms of California v. Raich, would the substantial effects test have 
made a difference? The estimate—and the rational basis test required 
no more than that—was that there were 100,000 users of state-grown 
marijuana. Surely some of that unregulated marijuana would have 
made its way into the interstate market, but would the class impact of 
that illegally diverted marijuana have been a substantial impact? Or 
framed in another way, was there a sufficient impact on interstate 
commerce for Congress to preempt California’s different calculus as to 
the permissible use of that ubiquitous substance? I think not. Whatever 
																																																								
424 It was my pleasure many years ago to co-teach a course in constitutional history 
at Pepperdine University School of Law with Justice Scalia, and he was forever 
reminding the class that Congress’ control over the purse was “the 900-pound 
gorilla.” Every class he made us laugh, and he challenged us to move beyond 
our preconceptions. He will be missed. 
425 Spending power alone does not always work. E.g., Robert Pear, Medicaid 
Expansion Finds Grass-Roots Support in Conservative Utah, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/09/us/politics/utah-medicaid-
expansion.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage 
[http://perma.cc/TFW5-P5E4]. Only thirty or so states have taken advantage of 
the additional federal spending available for the expansion of Medicaid under 
the ACA despite the fact that the federal purse pays for at least 90% of the cost 
of newly eligible beneficiaries. Id. 
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the test the Court applies, it must always be applied with respect for 
what is truly national versus what is local. 
 
